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6-2-00 (0525-F-01)

# MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN

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April-  
June 2000  
PB 34-00-2



Current  
World  
Conflicts

# FROM THE EDITOR

The **Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin** usually is a forum to exchange ideas regarding intelligence doctrine, tactics, leadership, procedures, technology, system development, lessons learned, etc. These topics form the core of what is "within" the world of MI. That is to say, these topics relate the way MI affects the world. However, this issue of **MIPB** looks through the opposite lens—we are discussing the international issues that affect MI.

More than ever before, the world is a complex, dangerous place. MI professionals should necessarily devote time to understanding actual and potential threats in the world; these threats are the variables that MI officers must negotiate in future conflict. LTC Eric Lamberson leads off this issue with a comprehensive article on the underlying issues of "Current World Conflicts."

We are fortunate to have multiple articles on several geographic regions. CPT Brock Harris leads our section of articles on North Korea with "The North Korean Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat." CW4 Guy Bake contributes an article on the famine in North Korea, and MAJ Al McCam and SPC Loida Grijalva wrote articles detailing the interesting developments in North Korean diplomatic relations. CPT Carolyn Ford draws on her wealth of experience in Chinese studies to write about the potential conflict between China and Taiwan. W.R. "Bob" Baker continues the discussion of China in his article, "China and Intelligence Analysis." LTC Steve Rundle provides an in-depth look at the security issues of Southeast Asia to include Indonesia, Burma, and the Spratly Islands. MAJ Allan Frederickson describes the roots of the conflict in East Timor and offers a forecast for the future of the island. We are also fortunate to have a first-hand account of the conditions in East Timor from 1LT Chris Tubbs who recently returned from a deployment there.

We have several articles on non-traditional threats in the world. CPT Mark Riccardi details the threat of land mines in East Africa. MAJ John Della-Giustina talks about Joint Task Force Six's Reserve Intelligence Analyst Counterdrug Program.

**MIPB** is always eager to fan the fire on the topic of foreign language policy within MI. In addition to several language-related letters to the editor, Mr. Ray Lane Aldrich adds to the debate with his article, "How Will We Talk to Them All?"

**MIPB** is seeking articles to add to our professional acumen. We are especially interested in articles on the following topics for the next year: intelligence analysis (strategic, operational, tactical levels and human, signals, imagery and technical intelligence); unconventional warfare; information operations; and tactical intelligence (lessons learned, new ways to do things, updates to doctrine, etc).



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## Writer of the Year and Quarter

**MIPB** is pleased to announce the 1999 Writer of the Year awards. **Writer of the Year:** SSG Martin A. Schwerzler, "Multiple Echelon Exploitation of UAV Imagery—Does It Work?," October-December 1999. **Runners up:** SSG Jennifer L. Dees, "Joint STARS in Kosovo—Can the Army and the Air Force Blend Their Operational Differences?," October-December 1999, and CW2 Leonard R. Holden, "Counterintelligence: A Decade of Change," July-September 1999. **Honorable Mention:** MAJ Eric L. Lamberson, "ARISCs: Regional RC Intelligence Training Centers," April-June 1999, and CPT Guy M. Burrow, "The Aerial Exploitation Battalion at NTC: Aerial Intelligence Defines Battlefield," January-March 1999.

Lieutenant Colonels Eric L. Lamberson and Steven L. Rundle tied for **Writer of the Quarter**, April-June 2000, for their articles "Current World Conflicts" and "Regional Security Issues—Southeast Asia," respectively.

Congratulations to all of our winners for 1999 and this quarter, and many thanks to all of the authors for their great articles, book reviews, and letters to the editor. Contributions like yours make **MIPB** the professional development forum for MI professionals.

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## How to Submit an Article to **MIPB**

**MIPB** is always seeking good articles on a variety of topics as well as action photographs of MI soldiers. Please see page 72 for more information.

# MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

PB 34-00-2

Volume 26 Number 2

April-June 2000



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**Purpose:** The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) publishes the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* quarterly under provisions of AR 25-30. *MIPB* disseminates material designed to enhance individuals' knowledge of past, current, and emerging concepts, doctrine, material, training, and professional developments in the MI Corps.

**Submissions:** Please send your manuscripts, letters to the editor, photographs, and any inquiries to: Commander, USAIC&FH, ATTN: ATZS-CLM, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000; send via E-mail to [mipb@huachuca-emh1.army.mil](mailto:mipb@huachuca-emh1.army.mil) and an information copy to [mcgoveme@huachuca-emh1.army.mil](mailto:mcgoveme@huachuca-emh1.army.mil); or telephone (520) 538-1006/5 or DSN 879-1006/5.

**Subscriptions:** Subscription rates are \$10.00 per year (Domestic, APO, and FPO) and \$12.50 per year (Foreign). Send changes of address and subscriptions (see page 35) to Commander, USAIC&FH, ATZS-CLM, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. For further information, phone (520) 538-1015 or DSN 879-1015 or E-mail [martinezc@huachuca-emh1.army.mil](mailto:martinezc@huachuca-emh1.army.mil).

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Check us out on the Internet at  
<http://huachuca-usaic.army.mil/mipb/mipbhome/welcome.htm>

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# VANTAGE POINT

## The Initial Brigade Combat Team

by Major General John D. Thomas, Jr.

Significant changes are underway in the Army and in Army Intelligence. The vision of the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric Shinseki, has provided a basis for self-examination by the Military Intelligence Corps. It is imperative that we structure a full spectrum, strategically responsive MI Corps to provide the superior situational awareness required in the Army of the 21st century. The Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) gains its lethality and survivability from maneuver and maintaining positional advantage over an opponent. To capitalize fully on the tremendous capabilities of the IBCT, the organization must achieve superior situational understanding. Military Intelligence is a major contributor to achieving this capability.

The Army resourced the IBCT with significant MI capabilities but that is only a start at achieving the kind of situational understanding that is required. We must integrate MI even more thoroughly into the combined arms structure of this organization. Previous MI elements were generally organic to division or higher levels and allocated to subordinate units for employment. Correcting this approach was an important step and the basis of our current combat electronic warfare intelligence (CEWI) organizations. Previously, intelligence elements did not have good integration at the division level; MI companies or Army Security Agency companies often appeared to be separate from their divisions.

Within the IBCT, MI capabilities are an organic part of the Brigade and of its subordinate Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition Squadron and MI Company. This combined arms integration moves MI from a predominantly combat support role to that of an integral part of the warfighting force. This integration should improve the ability of the MI team to contribute to the operation and better enable the tactical commander to use and focus his MI assets. This continued evolution of MI's integration into combined arms units at the lower tactical levels is a recognition of the contributions made by our great MI soldiers and the importance of MI to the successful prosecution of military operations.



U. S. Army photo.

Major General John D. Thomas, Jr.

Together with the increased integration of MI soldiers at the brigade level and below, the transformation recognizes the importance of split-based operations with "reach back" capability and acknowledges that intelligence is a system of systems. Intelligence organizations at division, corps, and the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) are critical to providing the kind of virtual, internettted intelligence operations required in the 21st century. We must ensure a collaborative environment that allows the MI Corps to focus its full capabilities in support of combat commanders at all echelons.

The establishment of the IBCT is a further step in the evolution of the MI Corps. It is another illustration of MI professionals being...

**ALWAYS OUT FRONT!**



# CSM FORUM

by Command Sergeant Major Scott C. Chunn

This year's Sergeants Major and Command Sergeants Major Conference, held from 6-10 March, was by all accounts a resounding success. We shared ideas and information and networked with our SGMs and CSMs stationed around the world. This is an important conference and I ask commanders for their continued support in sending your Sergeants Major to this Conference. Historically, we have had SGMs and CSMs who had to travel using permissive TDY or at their own expense because the commanders did not feel it was important enough or that the operational timing was not right. Please support this effort—it is important.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank CSM David P. Klehn (USA, Retired) personally for his continuing support of the MI Corps for almost six years as the Honorary Military Intelligence Corps Sergeant Major. Dave, you have done a tremendous job and we appreciate your support and effort. Thanks from all the MI soldiers around the world, and particularly for your continued support of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. We wish you well in all your future endeavors.

We welcome the incoming Honorary MI Corps Sergeant Major, CSM Sterling T. McCormick (USA, Retired) and we look forward to your support and guidance in moving the MI Corps into the 21st century. CSM McCormick's induction into the MI Hall of Fame will be on 30 June. Congratulations for your tremendous contributions to MI and we look forward to working with you in the coming years.

The slides from this year's conference are available on the Fort Huachuca Home Page link to the Sergeants Major Home Page (at <http://huachuca-usaic.army.mil>). Please use them for Noncommissioned Officer Development Plans (NCODPs) and for keeping our soldiers informed of the latest changes to our Branch. In addition, we have approximately 30 SGMs and CSMs registered on our list server. It provides a way to keep in contact with the MI SGMs and CSMs around the world and we will frequently post items of interest and discussion. Please use it.

CSM Ronald D. Wright, SGM Mark L. Maedge, and I will be meeting soon to define and select the MI SGM Board of Directors. CSM Wright is the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) CSM and



U. S. Army photo.

## Command Sergeant Major Scott C. Chunn

SGM Maedge is the Department of Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) SGM. The Board will refine the discussion and topics for future conferences and any topics that are pertinent to MI. Please feel free to contact any of us to provide your input. This is your Branch and your conference and it will be as good as you help to make it. The Board will also meet six months before the next SGM/CSM Conference to review previous conference recommendations and the status for the upcoming year. We will post these to the Sergeants Major Home Page as well. Please review them and provide comments. We will track the short-range issues that have been resolved, and the long-range issues to work.

On personal note, I would like to thank you all for a terrific year. We are doing things that have never before been done and with fewer resources than in the past. Keep charging hard and taking care of soldiers.

As always, train hard, take care of soldiers and their families, and have fun. Thanks!

**ALWAYS OUT FRONT!**

# Current World Conflicts

by Lieutenant Colonel  
Eric L. Lamberson

Just over one hundred years ago, the United States reveled in its relatively easy victory over Spain in a mere 113 days. For the next 17 years, the War Department devoted a large portion of its limited resources to managing new responsibilities in the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. Mexico received top billing in the Secretary of War's 1916 report with "Black Jack" Pershing's pursuit of Francisco "Pancho" Villa into Mexico—the war in Europe merited only passing mention. Less than one year later, the United States had declared war on Germany. Many expeditionary force members—largely trained in tactics based on the Civil War—faced the new horrors of chemical warfare in the trenches and the deadly shadow of the Spanish influenza. Even after the "Great War," it was difficult for the United States to perceive its eventual permanence on the world stage and the threats and challenges that it would face in the coming years.<sup>1,2</sup>

There is no question that the past ten years have seen a world political and economic order buffeted by great uncertainty and unforeseen, and often uncontrollable, change. We have observed the demise of the Soviet Union, a resurgence of democratic forms of government worldwide, a tremendous increase in regional conflicts, and widening concerns over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

In the next ten years, we will likely see a continuation, if not an increase, in the stress the international order is now experiencing. The volatile mix of ever-changing global political, economic, social, and military conditions will continue to feed the basic engines of turmoil.

*"The talk today is of the changing world economy." I wish to argue that the world economy is not "changing"; it has already changed—in its foundations and in its structure—and in all probability the change is irreversible.<sup>3</sup>*

—Peter Drucker, 1986

Major powers and their relationships with each other as well as those with emerging regional competitors will increasingly interlink. These are but a few of the remarkable changes we have seen as a result of technological development in the last several years:

- The U.S. stock market surges when Brazil devalues its currency.<sup>4</sup>
- The "Blondie Wongs" hack into People's Republic of China (PRC) Government communications systems.<sup>5</sup>
- A Colombian cocaine trafficker calls his partners in Mexico via satellite telephone from his jungle lab.
- Anyone with \$194 can buy 1-meter-resolution imagery of Washington, D.C.<sup>6</sup>

There is much more to come.

In the next ten years, military intelligence professionals will confront some of the greatest challenges we

have ever faced. The notion that events unfolding in one region will happen in isolation and be contained within that region is more unlikely in the future than ever before—the world gets smaller every decade (see Figure 1). While we can bring technological prowess (that was quite literally unimaginable 50 years ago) to bear on the problems confronting the United States, the challenge of assessing future threats to our national security has never been greater. This issue of the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* explores some of the conflicts extant in the world today; the remainder of this article addresses some of the potential conflicts that will challenge MI in the next decade.

## Global Trends For the Coming Decade

The President's *National Security Strategy for a New Century* posits several major trends that will create unprecedented opportunities for


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progress and at the same time fuel new national security challenges.<sup>7</sup> The strategy identifies a wide range of potential threats to U.S. national security:

- Conflicts with nation-states that pursue policies and actions hostile to U.S. interests—particularly when those countries possess strategic nuclear forces or control nuclear weapons (e.g., a peer competitor).
- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or nuclear fissile materials—particularly when WMDs fall into the hands of terrorist groups or rogue states.
- Hostile actors using asymmetric attacks such as terrorism or information operations.
- Regional conflicts or transnational threats that affect U.S. national security interests.
- Threats to U.S. forces and citizens abroad.

### Nation-State Conflict with A Peer Competitor

Fortunately, the chance of war with a nation-state peer is remote. The United States currently has unquestioned military superiority over all possible adversaries. Although the United States is unarguably the most militarily and economically powerful nation in the world today, that does not mean that we will have no potential nation-state peer challengers in the next ten years. The PRC remains a country with a population and resource base that could ultimately become a peer competitor of the United States. Although relations between the United States and the PRC were better in the 1990s than any previous decade after China's fall to communism, this cordial relationship will not necessarily continue. China and the



**Figure 1.** This graphic depicts how the world has relatively "shrunk" as a result of transportation advances.

United States have major differences over Taiwan (the Republic of China), Tibet, human rights, missile defense, espionage, economic policy, and weapons and technology sales.

The PRC remains adamant that Taiwan is a breakaway Chinese province that is China's internal problem and not a matter for U.S. concern. However, the United States is again considering sales of advanced arms to Taiwan. Taiwan has asked to purchase four Aegis ships, high-speed antiradar missiles, advanced air-to-air missiles, and two early-warning radar sys-

tems with utility for both missile defense and aircraft tracking. Press reports indicate that the current U.S. Administration is seriously considering (and may possibly have approved) the sales. The anti-radar missiles and Aegis ships could provide protection against the PRC's new Russian-made Sovremenny destroyers.

Predictably, China vehemently opposes these sales. In the past several years, as the United States has refused Taiwan's arms purchases, the PRC has built up its forces confronting Taiwan. Open-source reporting indicated that in December 1999, the Defense Intelligence Agency identified two new short-range missile bases in southern China where several hundred M-11 missiles will deploy, targeted against Taiwan.<sup>8</sup> The possibility that the United States may be drawn into a shooting conflict between the PRC and Taiwan remains a concern.

An alliance between Russia and China would also effectively create a peer competitor. In January 2000, acting Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that Russia might begin to provide advanced missile technology to China in response to the United States' continuing development of an antiballistic missile defense system.

*The United States will fail to dominate the world. Its power to control and support world affairs will weaken. Especially under the circumstances of tense competition among the allied countries, the chances of using military means are greatly reduced. This means that it is impossible for the United States to launch a major war.<sup>9</sup>*

—Gao Heng, 1995

The United States is at peace with the few nations capable of reaching peer status and no potential peer nation is overtly arming for war with the United States—war with a peer is not on the horizon. However, there is no guarantee this peaceful environment will last. History has demonstrated repeatedly that times



and capabilities change. "Despite current optimism, humankind has not seen the end of major war. Major war may happen in 10 years (unlikely), or 15 years (possible), or sometime after that (virtually certain)."<sup>10</sup>

### **Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

Weapons of mass destruction are nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons that can cause widespread death or destruction. WMDs present two serious concerns from a U.S. national security perspective. One would be the acquisition of WMDs by a terrorist group and the other would be a rogue state's acquisition or development of WMDs.<sup>11</sup>

Although history gives us several examples of WMD use, modern terrorism and WMD had never mixed—the full potential has yet to occur. There are several reasons why WMD terrorism has not had a major impact on history. Technical, political, and financial factors have generally constrained terrorist use of WMDs. The first modern terrorist use of a WMD against a civilian target (the Tokyo subway in 1995) was a wakeup call that may unfortunately presage more widespread use in the coming decade.

Until recently, the technical complexities associated with developing and weaponizing NBC technology was beyond the reach of all but the most sophisticated nations. This is most obvious in the case of nuclear weapons. Although the technology is fifty years old, developing a nuclear weapon requires a sufficient quantity of weapons-grade fissile material, high explosives and the related technology, and a workable design for a nuclear device. The technical factors, combined with international efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons materials and technology have made acquiring a nuclear

weapon very difficult.

A second constraint to the use of WMDs is the almost guaranteed retaliation for its use, whether from the target nation, the international arena, specific allies of the target nation, or all of the above. Using WMDs under any circumstance will undoubtedly bring an extraordinary effort to eliminate the terrorist group or the rogue-state government responsible for the attack.

Finally, terrorist groups (and rogue states that sponsor terrorism) have likely believed that conventional weapons were just as effective for accomplishing their ends. The groups responsible for the World Trade Center, Khobar Towers, and the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania may surmise that their goals have been served in the past without crossing into the realm represented by WMD—a move that would undoubtedly risk their very existence.

Recent evidence, however, provides disturbing indications that the factors causing restraint in the use of WMDs may be weakening. In prepared testimony to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Donald Cobb and Walter Kirchner stated that—

*There are over twenty countries suspected of some form of nuclear, biological or chemical proliferation. In addition, subnational, organized crime, and other terrorist groups that could gain access to these (NBC) materials are of growing concern...The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the most urgent and direct threat to national security. The threat to U.S. civilians and interests is real, and the political, societal, economic and psychological impacts are potentially devastating.<sup>12</sup>*

There are numerous reasons why WMD use may become increas-

ingly more attractive to rogue states or terrorist organizations. Principal among these are several advances in technology (computer technology in particular) and the breakup of the former Soviet Union. Although the United States is purchasing tons of highly enriched uranium from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons for conversion into commercial reactor fuel for U.S. use, there is clear evidence that additional nuclear material is leaving the former Soviet Union.<sup>13</sup>

Of perhaps greater concern is the smuggling of nuclear material from the former Soviet Union (see Figure 2). Since 1994, there has been a disturbing string of seizures in Europe of weapons-grade fissile material allegedly originating from the former Soviet republics. Potential customers shopping for illicit nuclear material fall into three loose categories: states, sub-state entities, and terrorist organizations. Each of these groups has different reasons for seeking nuclear weapons, as well as different priorities as to the resources they seek.<sup>14</sup> During 1999, India and Pakistan demonstrated that they both had the capability and will to build and test nuclear weapons and develop missile programs for weapons delivery. Although there is no open evidence linking the Indian and Pakistani programs to Russian nuclear material or expertise, it is likely that Russia or republics from the former Soviet Union are playing a role.

In addition to India and Pakistan, several states have or have had clandestine nuclear weapons development programs including Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Because weapons-grade fissile materials are extremely expensive and difficult to make, obtaining them is probably the top priority of states without indigenous nuclear-production capabilities. Given the high cost of developing an indigenous nuclear program, these customers are prob-




Figure 2. Incidents of smuggling nuclear weapons material in Europe.

ably seeking the least expensive route to obtain nuclear weapons. Those states with established nuclear production facilities are probably seeking intellectual assistance such as working bomb designs and technical experts including nuclear weapons and uranium-centrifuge designers and engineers—all of which appear to be for sale in the former Soviet republics.

Sub-state entities are political groups or movements that have significant popular support and resources; however, they do not have formal international recognition as a legitimate governing body of a state. Examples would include Chechen or Kurdish nationalist movements and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Since these groups have a political stake in the people they purport to represent, they are less likely to use nuclear devices. However, they can and have used radioactive materials for terrorist or extortion purposes. For example, in November 1995, a Chechen insurgent planted a small quantity of highly radioactive Cesium 137 in Moscow Park.<sup>15</sup> Sub-state entities represent a group

of potential customers for highly radioactive materials or an assembled nuclear device to be used for terror or extortion purposes.

Radical and socially disconnected terrorist groups are also potential customers for radioactive materials, fissile materials, and assembled nuclear weapons. Because these groups often see themselves as having little or no stake in the existing political and economic system, they are more likely to use any destructive capabilities they may obtain. There has been great concern that the Osama Bin Laden terrorist group is trying to obtain or has obtained small nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union.<sup>16</sup> Terrorist groups around the world pose significant challenges to MI operations targeted against them. One of these groups obtaining a nuclear device or significant quantities of radioactive material is a nightmare challenge we may likely face in the next decade.

### Asymmetric Attacks: Terrorism or Information Operations

Unfortunately, terrorism has become a familiar threat to the United

States that will undoubtedly continue into the next decade. Advances in technology have presented opportunities for anti-U.S. groups to use information warfare (IW) against us. IW is more than attacks on tanks and troops, it uses information tools to target and disrupt U.S. operations or the information and networks that support crucial day-to-day workings of civilian and military systems.

One could argue that Mohammed Adid in Somalia used terrorist-type IW against the United States when he mutilated the bodies of U.S. soldiers in front of Cable News Network cameras. Was Adid's tactic information warfare or a good understanding of the U.S. center of gravity? Regardless, he accomplished his goal of getting rid of the U.S. presence in Somalia.

Information terrorism is a potentially important component of IW—perhaps more challenging to confront and respond to because of the difficulty of determining exactly who the perpetrators are and their goals. Information technology offers new opportunities for terrorist acts against the United States and its allies.

As technology becomes more cost-effective—its availability and potential for disruptive effects rise while its price decreases—terrorists will likely become more technologically oriented in tactics and strategies. The criminal and subversive connotations of the term "terrorist" have resulted in labeling many acts of computer abuse as "information terrorism." Although we can define information terrorism legally as the intentional disruption of a digital information system in a manner that supports a terrorist campaign or action, generally disrupting a computer system would not necessarily result in direct violence against humans. Most of the acts so labeled have really been criminal acts and not terrorist operations.

However, terrorists could reap low-risk, highly visible payoffs by attacking information systems with little fear of retaliation. Devost, Houghton, and Pollard identified two general situations in which a terrorist might conduct an information attack: when information technology (IT) is a target, and when IT is the tool of a larger operation. A terrorist in the first case would target an information system for sabotage (electronic or physical), thereby destroying or disrupting the information system itself and any infrastructure (e.g., power, communications, etc.) dependent on the targeted system. In the second situation, the terrorist would manipulate and exploit an information system, altering or stealing data, or forcing the system to perform a function for which it was not intended (such as spoofing air traffic control).<sup>17</sup>

Open-source information reveals few computer attacks that one could legitimately call "information terrorism." The following are a few (and there really are very few openly known) examples of information terrorism:

- A "PLO" virus developed at Hebrew University in Israel.
- In Japan, groups attacked the computerized control systems for commuter trains, paralyzing major cities for hours.
- More recently, Sinn Fein supporters working out of the University of Texas at Austin posted sensitive details on the Internet about British army intelligence installations, military bases, and police stations in Northern Ireland.<sup>18</sup>

Terrorist organizations have repeatedly demonstrated a capacity for innovation and flexibility in their tactics and strategies. Many terrorist and insurgent organizations have their own Internet home pages. A quick Internet search locates among many others—

- Colombian insurgent groups National Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN).
- Ethiopian Oromo Liberation Front (OLF).
- Palestinian PLO.
- Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

- Mexican Zapatista organization.

Many of these pages exhibited a level of design knowledge that far exceeds the typical U.S. Government Internet website. The international economy and national infrastructures will become more dependent upon information systems in the next decade. We will see terrorist organizations using



**Bomb damage to U. S. Embassy in Kenya after the 1998 explosion.**

Photo courtesy of the Department of Defense.



these information systems to communicate their goals and will likely also see terrorist organizations using information terrorism to accomplish their ends.

## Regional Conflicts or Transnational Threats

The United States has a relatively long history of tendencies to enter regional or transnational conflicts when such conflicts appear contrary to U.S. national interests (as defined by the then current administration). In the past decade, U.S. military forces have deployed worldwide more frequently than in any previous period since World War II. The next ten years will present similar challenges.

The greatest challenge MI faces will be to provide support to commanders deploying to areas outside the "norm" of U.S. regional interests. Somalia was a good example: U.S. forces deployed to an area with little warning and almost no intelligence collection capability. Unfortunately, we are likely to see many more of these types of operations in the coming decade.

Given the time required to establish U.S. intelligence collection efforts, MI professionals must be ready to examine alternatives. The "Burundi exercise" held under the auspices of the Aspin-Brown Commission on Intelligence demonstrated a good example of the sources available for tasking given proper funding.<sup>19</sup> A commercial open-source company (OSS Inc.) produced and delivered all of the information below to the commission within 72 hours of the tasking:

- A strategic orientation using **Oxford Analytica**.
- Academic experts identified and available for immediate debriefing.
- LEXIS-NEXIS helped to identify journalists of varying nationality who had been on the ground recently and were intimately familiar with the personalities and the situations.
- Jane's Information Group provided a very authoritative and easy to use map of tribal areas of influence. They also furnished one-page orders of battle for

each tribe and one-paragraph summaries of all articles about the Burundi situation published by Jane's in the preceding two years.

- East View Publications provided a listing of all immediately available military maps (created by the former Soviet Union) at the 1:100,000-kilometer size and with contour lines.
- SPOT (System Probatoire d'Observation de La Terre) Image Corporation of France confirmed that it had available in its archives cloud-free imagery of all of Burundi. The imagery was immediately available for the creation of military maps, precision-munitions targeting packages, and aviation mission-rehearsal systems.

## Conclusion

The next decade will be rife with opportunity and challenge for the United States and its Army. SIGINT officers must think beyond "producing SIGINT" and explore methods to ensure that the SIGINT we produce is truly signals intelligence and not classified history. Our human intelligence specialists must explore new avenues to leverage the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) to support force protection operations. Imagery specialists must examine new ways to provide a view "over the next hill" via broadcast imagery to our ground forces engaged in combat. Military intelligence will continue to play a pivotal role in U.S. operations only if the professionals in the MI Corps continue to examine new and innovative ways to support U.S. operations in the field. The years between 2000 and 2010 will provide many opportunities for success.\*

## Endnotes

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# The North Korean WMD Threat

by Major H. Brock Harris

Much has been written about the missile threat still posed by Russia. The Great Bear is no longer a super power, but with a strategic nuclear inventory containing more than 6000 warheads, it still poses a threat that we cannot ignore. However, the capabilities and intent of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea), though less publicized, are of growing concern to international security organizations.

North Korea, along with the People's Republic of China (PRC), is largely responsible for the emerging non-Soviet ballistic missile threat to the United States. Under the terms of the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework, North Korea promised to freeze its nuclear weapons programs in return for fuel oil and financing of two light-water nuclear reactor complexes. Contrary to the Department of Defense view espoused in 1997's **Proliferation: Threat and Response**, North Korea has not honored this agreement.<sup>1</sup>

North Korea, led by the dictatorial Kim Jong-il, is a poor country engulfed by famine and on the brink of economic collapse. Yet with the exception of the former Yugoslavia, no other country poses a greater threat to regional and world stability than North Korea. This small nation continually uses its nuclear capability as leverage for gaining financial support that the government and its starving people so desperately crave.

The DPRK sorely misses the military and economic aid and support it stopped receiving when the Soviet Union disbanded, and has since looked elsewhere for capital. Like Russia, North Korea possesses a reliable means of raising cash—the

proliferation of arms and missile technology (see Figure 1). North Korea is perhaps the number one producer and exporter of missile technology in the world today, with ties to missile production programs in Pakistan, Iran, and various other Middle Eastern countries. As one might expect, these sales provide the equivalent of millions of dollars to the DPRK's economy and military establishment. More importantly, their support of Iranian and Pakistani WMD (weapons of mass destruction) programs upsets the balance of power in two of the world's most volatile regions.<sup>2</sup>

ner because other countries are watching and waiting for U.S. reaction to such rogue demands. Remember that a major underpinning of the many arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or USSR) was trust and verification of compliance.<sup>3</sup> Our current relations with North Korea are not based on either.

## The Agreed Framework

The Agreed Framework, signed in October 1994, represents a com-




Figure 1. North Korean Tactical Ballistic Missile Ranges.

The problem with North Korean missile exports extends far beyond the economics of energy and food aid. The belligerent government is using the threat of further missile proliferation to conduct what one can only refer to as "missile diplomacy." Pyongyang is attempting to extort billions of dollars from the United States, South Korea, and Japan as a condition for halting its proliferation activities, or allowing inspections of suspected nuclear production facilities. The United States has backed itself into a cor-

promise between North Korea and the United States. In return for an agreed freeze and eventual dismantling of its existing nuclear power and weapons programs, North Korea accepted U.S. support in building two light-water nuclear power plants, and the promise of a constant flow of fuel oil (500,000 metric tons annually) until the plants could begin producing energy around 2003.<sup>4</sup>

Development of the Agreed Framework traces back to the early 1990s when intelligence sources



first realized the sophistication of the North Korean nuclear weapons program, and policy-makers acknowledged the severity of the situation. The United States persuaded the leaders of the Republic of South Korea, Japan, and the PRC of the imminent danger posed by the Pyongyang nuclear efforts, and each joined in support of the Agreed Framework. South Korea and Japan demonstrated their support of this engagement of North Korea by funding a significant amount of the \$4 to 5 billion cost of implementation.<sup>5</sup>

South Korea will fund approximately 70 percent of the cost incurred in building the two light-water nuclear reactors, while Japan will contribute just over 22 percent (\$1 billion) to the project's budget. Japan's resolve to follow through on earlier pledges of support came under tremendous fire at home following the Taepo Dong launch in August 1998. However, the Japanese Prime Minister is convinced that participation in this endeavor *"is the only realistic way to keep North Korea away from nuclear weapons and missiles."*<sup>6</sup>

Almost six years after its inception, the Agreed Framework is under fire from all directions. The North Koreans have continuously complained that the United States has not upheld its end of the agreement. Here at home, meanwhile, the measure is losing support from Congress, which is threatening to cut off its funding. Born of crisis, the Agreed Framework is creating crisis today. The DPRK understands the shortcomings in U.S. policy toward this issue, and regularly uses this knowledge to its advantage.

North Korea effectively uses crisis as a means of negotiation. Since 1994, the regime has often resorted to crisis creation in order to exact its demands—easing of U.S. sanctions, progress toward construction of the light-water reactors, and on-

time delivery of the heavy fuel oil promised by the United States. These demands demonstrate the vastly different perceptions of the Agreed Framework by the two countries.

According to L. Gordon Flake, Associate Director of the Program on Conflict Resolution at the Atlantic Council of the United States, the North Koreans view the most important aspect of the framework as the potential easing of economic sanctions, normalized relations, and a "guarantee" of the country's continued existence. Moreover, Flake asserts that Pyongyang associates U.S. commitment to the Agreed Framework with its actions in "lifting the embargo."<sup>7</sup>

It is interesting that North Korea would seek to develop normalized relations with the United States. The term "normalized" implies that a degree of trust exists between the two parties. Both sides seek mutually advantageous courses of action when negotiating arms control agreements, and the result is often the result of much "give and take." No doubt, few treaties would exist between the United States and Russia had either country demanded the billions of dollars that North Korea wants in exchange for halting its proliferation activities.

The U.S. view of the Agreed Framework is decidedly different, and somewhat unclear in its intent. According to Arnold Kanter, the Agreed Framework may have been destined for failure from the beginning. Kanter, a Senior Fellow at the Forum for International Policy and Under Secretary of State from 1991 through 1993,<sup>8</sup> argues that **there was never a clear understanding of the goals, purposes, and objectives of the Agreed Framework** when it was formulated. In his opinion, a lack of consensus among those who negotiated and supported the measure is responsible for the state of affairs today. Accord-

ing to Kanter, such divergent views of the agreement have resulted in the current crisis, and in the ensuing confusion over policy, North Korea has found a weak spot, and is doing a superb job of exploiting it.<sup>9</sup>

Since signing the Agreed Framework, North Korea has shown little behavioral improvement. Two watershed events serve as evidence that North Korea has not lived up to the provisions of the agreement. The first was the August 1998 firing of the Taepo Dong over Japan (which the next section discusses). The second event was discovery of an underground site at Kunchang-ri, located approximately 25 miles north of the Yongbyon nuclear facility addressed in the Agreed Framework. This site is a suspected nuclear weapons production facility, and if intelligence reports are accurate, represents a violation of the Agreed Framework.

In August 1998, abnormal activity was observed around the Kunchang-ri facility, and analysts assessed the location as a probable nuclear production facility. The North Korean Government denied the site was nuclear-related, but refused U.S. demands for on-site inspections to verify that the location was not a WMD production facility. A major shortcoming of the Agreed Framework is that, unlike most U.S.-Russia (USSR) agreements, it contains no provisions for compliance verification.

From August 1998 until March 1999, U.S. diplomats and arms control experts sought entry into the facility to determine its purpose. Each time, the increasingly belligerent communist regime rebuffed their efforts. Finally, in March 1999, the North Koreans agreed to allow U.S. inspectors into the area beginning in May. How did diplomats reach this agreement? The United States traded 500,000 tons of food and additional agricultural support

in exchange for access to the suspected weapons manufacturing plant.<sup>10</sup> Would the United States and Russia have reached the number of mutually beneficial agreements rising from normalized relations if either had made a habit of demanding exorbitant amounts of money from the other in return for slowing the arms race? Even when the United States sold grain to the So-

off guard with news of the August launch, subsequent investigations of the event revealed that the missile had a third stage—a very unexpected finding.<sup>13</sup> Figure 2 contains the major findings of the intelligence community investigation into the Taepo Dong launch.

How could North Korea accomplish such a feat while adhering to

States. In effect, by launching the Taepo Dong missile, North Korea very clearly stated that it would continue to produce and export missiles until it gets what it wants from the United States.

There is a degree of plausibility to each of these views. In demonstrating improved capabilities, North Korea not only gained economic clout, it also gained a "diplomatic trump card" for use against the United States.<sup>15</sup> North Korea may play this card in the future as compensation for their deteriorating conventional forces, or in an attempt to force the United States out of both South Korea and Japan. Either way, the Taepo Dong launch emphatically demonstrates that North Korea poses an unpredictable and unstable ballistic missile threat to the United States and its allies.

- The missile's third stage traveled some 3,450 miles and landed near Alaska.
- Evidence suggests that new North Korean underground sites exist for the purpose of deploying missiles, and that they could field missiles by 2000.
- North Korea will have a missile capable of striking Alaska and Hawaii by 2002.
- North Korea will produce a longer range intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) within five years.

Figure 2. U.S. Intelligence Community Findings on Taepo Dong launch.<sup>11</sup>

viet Union in the 1970s, the terms of the agreement did not include arms control.

## The Taepo Dong

Discussion of the Taepo Dong launch is necessary because of its impact on regional security and missile defenses. Further, the event underscores the difficulty of identifying and tracking missile production capabilities, even when many collection assets are targeting a particular area.

In 1994, the United States acknowledged the fact that the North Koreans were in the process of developing the Taepo Dong. Analysts thought the Taepo Dong was a two-stage intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) based on satellite images of mock-ups discovered at the Sanumdong Research Center north of Pyongyang. Most analysts believed that North Korea was still some time away from test launching the missile due to an absence of indicators that might have suggested otherwise.<sup>12</sup> Not only was the intelligence community caught

the spirit of the Agreed Framework? More importantly, what was the intent of the North Korean regime in launching the Taepo Dong?

There are several theories as to North Korean intent. One is that the regime was demonstrating a "show of force" in recognition of the country's 50th anniversary, an event that coincided with installation of Kim Jong-il as "paramount leader."<sup>14</sup> If the PRC intends to put a man in space in celebration of 50 years of communism, why should North Korea not be able to put a satellite in orbit as part of its festivities?

Another view is that North Korea received free advertising for its major export—missile technology. In launching a three-stage missile (or satellite according to official reports), the DPRK effectively announced its improved production capabilities, thus solidifying its position as one of the world's leading marketers of WMD technology.

Another view is that North Korea launched the missile to win economic concessions from the United

## Missile Diplomacy

Recent events highlight Pyongyang's increasing reliance on missile diplomacy. Following discovery of the suspected underground nuclear facilities, the North Koreans denied a high-level U.S. State Department delegation access at the site during a November 1998 visit unless the United States paid the DPRK \$300 million.

At bilateral missile talks conducted in October 1998, the North Koreans demanded \$1 billion per year for three years in exchange for converting missile production plants to alternate uses. A new round of missile talks concluded in March 1999 with North Korea citing its "legitimate right of self-defense" as the basis for not changing its missile policy under pressure from the United States. However, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson also announced that North Korea was willing to halt its missile exports if the United States would provide \$1 billion in cash annually for three years.<sup>16</sup>

There may be a precedent for North Korea's expectation of compensation in return for halting exports. Last year, an article appearing in the *JoongAng Ilbo*, (citing the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) as its source), acknowledged that Israel approached North Korean officials in September 1992. The article indicated Israel offered approximately \$1 billion to the DPRK in exchange for an agreement to stop exporting medium-range Rodong-1 missiles to Iran and Syria. However, intervention by the United States prevented consummation of the deal.<sup>17</sup>

The Agreed Framework and engagement of North Korea are not working. The North Korean administration—a regime we cannot trust—serves as an excellent example of a rogue nation against whom the United States would aim a national missile defense.

While continuing talks with the United States over the Agreed Framework, North Korea plans to increase its missile production programs. One senior Pyongyang official said that doing so—

*is a matter of our national survival, and the United States is mistaken if it thinks that it can check the North Korean's missile development through cooperation with other countries or by any other tricks.*<sup>18</sup>

There are also indications that North Korea is attempting to develop and field a significant deterrence force against possible United States attack. According to Russian assessments of the situation, North Korea is emphasizing ballistic missiles as the country's main protection against external threats, while simultaneously upgrading the technical capabilities of both the air force and army. Funding for these endeavors is through the sale of missile components abroad.<sup>19</sup>

## Conclusion

In the post-Cold War world, the United States may stand alone as the world's most powerful nation, but a number of ambitious challengers seek to end its monopoly on power and leadership. Rogue nations, who are less inclined to operate under established rules of engagement, present the United States with a great challenge. Whereas the Cold War relationship between the United States and the USSR developed over time, became very normalized, and provided stability between two superpowers, North Korea does not appear interested in this type of long-term courtship.\*

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by Chief Warrant Officer Four  
Guy A. Bake, USAR

Famine, as defined by G. S. Cox, noted famine expert, is "the regional failure of food production or distribution systems, leading to sharply increased mortality due to starvation and other associated diseases." When famine occurs, it usually results from a chain of events over which political bodies have no control. It could begin with a single event that multiplies—depending on the political, economic, or cultural environment.

Historically, famine occurs primarily in three areas of the world: semi-arid regions, areas that are cool and wet, and in conflict-ridden areas (such as the Korean Peninsula). The chief cause of famine is erratic weather including earthquakes, hurricanes and typhoons, volcanic eruptions, and other natural catastrophes. Lack of suitable, arable land and plant pests and diseases contribute to famine too. Man often causes or contributes to famine-producing conditions through—

- Dysfunctional agricultural practices.
- Failure to foster a healthy agricultural sector.
- Denudation, deforestation, overgrazing, and soil depletion.
- Ineffective crop transportation.
- Wars and conflicts.

### The North Korean Famine

An examination of the causes of the North Korean famine is multifaceted. North Korea has suffered from successive years of erratic weather beginning in 1995 and 1996 with successive years of flooding. A summer of drought (1997) and a subsequent summer of flooding followed these first flood years. The erratic weather has continued since those first years of hardship.

Perhaps the most damaging aspect of the famine is the lack of a governmental and political environ-

## Famine in North Korea



ment that encourages and fosters agricultural output, a serious need because only 14 percent of the land is arable. Effective agricultural planning and organization is not evident in any large degree. Chronic mismanagement of North Korea's collective farms, the farmers' low morale, and insufficient investment in agriculture by the government have significantly contributed to the crisis.<sup>1</sup>

The North Korean Government has put more energy resources into industry and has left little to fuel food production. The development of heavy industry, most of which closely relates to munitions production, has been a priority for the government. Too much of the gross national product involves military production.

The cumulative result of these and other factors has left the country at the mercy of nature. Estimates are that more than two million North Koreans have perished during the last three years from famine and disease. This is about eight percent of the total population. This begs the question of the condition of the remainder of the population.

### Prospective Solutions

Despite the serious conditions, North Korea—with limited success—has been trying to overcome the natural impediments to efficient agricultural production. They are making an all-out effort to develop new

farmland as well as to raise productivity.<sup>2</sup> They are working on developing high-yield varieties of grain, improving and adding to its irrigation systems, and trying to produce more farming tools and fertilizers.

They are promoting the spread of a new rice-farming method. This new method encourages the farmers to plant rice seedlings that are 70 percent longer than the average seedling. These larger seedlings allow the plants to be more productive than the older kinds and permit two crops a year because the plants are already more mature. They encourage planting crops that are more suitable for the climate in North Korea such as barley and apples. Double cropping is also emerging as a common practice. The shortage of chemical fertilizers resulted in a push to use a composite of various microbial substances that can become a fermented liquid, which acts as a fertilizer when sprinkled on the crops.

### Conclusions

North Korea finds itself in dire straits. Severe weather has buffeted the country for years—especially during the last four years. To compound the situation, North Korea has been unable to manage its agricultural production effectively. The result is a catastrophic famine that threatens the country's very existence. The populace as a whole is starving, which is causing devastation in all aspects of human life.\*

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by Specialist Loida Grijalva, USAR

The continuous appeal by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) to the international community for aid is due to its famine and economic strife. Despite the fact that foreign nations have responded to North Korean demands many times, North Korea has not significantly changed its policy toward the outside world. The DPRK's recent increase in communications with Italy, Japan, and other countries has questionable motives. North Korea's foreign policy approach is self-serving and disingenuous.

North Korea has recently relaxed its foreign policy restraints. The normalization of relations between Italy and North Korea marked the beginning of an ostensible flood of North Korean diplomacy, followed by Japan's recent decision to resume food aid in North Korea.

A DPRK diplomatic office will open in February near Hong Kong. In addition, Australian envoys will begin talks in Pyongyang at the invitation of the North Korean Government. Finally, during Berlin talks, North Korea and the United States agreed that the DPRK will send a senior emissary to Washington in March, a gesture that the United States will reciprocate at a later date.

On the other hand, many characterize North Korea as extremely isolationist and self-reliant, hence the name "Hermit Kingdom." Therefore, North Korea's course of action regarding the international community tends to reflect its prominent *juche* (self-reliance) ideology.

Within the past two years, Pyongyang has closed 17 diplomatic missions, including eight in Africa.<sup>1</sup> Japan, Russia, Thailand, and a number of African countries are among the nations reporting North Korean officials smuggling narcotics, ivory, and counterfeit U.S. dollars. Nonetheless, the in-



ternational community's overall perception is that North Korea will make the social and political reforms it has promised.

North Korea's diplomatic efforts do not necessarily represent a major shift in its foreign policy. Instead, this is merely an elaborate plan to obtain contributions from prosperous countries. Simultaneously, the North Korean Government has hindered any foreign reprisal while it continues to strengthen its military. Currently, the World Food Programme (WFP) is one of the largest sources of humanitarian aid to North Korea.

The Group of Seven (G-7)<sup>2</sup> (most economically developed nations in the world) countries are among the largest supporters of the WFP—with the United States being the foremost contributor and North Korea the primary recipient. WFP assistance will be complete by 30 June 2000 with 84,600 tons of food given. The WFP is currently addressing the emergency needs of eight million beneficiaries in North Korea.<sup>3</sup> North Korea appears to have an underlying motive for "good relations" with the international community, in view of the fact that the WFP will conduct its first regular session in Rome beginning 8 February 2000.<sup>4</sup>

North Korea has established a legacy of coercive measures for obtaining monetary support, especially from the United States. Despite the potential benefits of North Korea's increasingly open relations, they will prove problematic and short-lived. North Korea's *juche* ideology promotes autonomy, facilitating exclusionary notions, and therefore making it very difficult for significant negotiations to occur. North Korea's new diplomacy with Italy, Japan, and even the United States will fall apart just the way it has in the past.\*

#### Endnotes

Title photograph—Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen (right) and Korea Minister of National Defense Chun Young-Tae (center) review ROK troops on 15 January 1999 at the Korean War Memorial in Seoul.

1. "Cracks In North Korea's Façade," *Hong Kong Standard*, 22 January 2000.
2. The G-7 nations include the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan, Italy, and Canada.
3. World Food Programme, 17 September 1999, Prospects for Executive Board Approval 19 October 1999, (<http://www.wfp.org>).
4. "North Korea Forges Ties With Italy In Surprise Move," *Suara Merdeka* (1996), 7 January 2000.

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DOD photo courtesy of R. D. Ward.

# Italy and North Korea

## Effects of Diplomatic Ties on U.S. Policy in Northeast Asia

by Major Albert J. McCarn, Jr.,  
USAR

On 5 January 2000, the Italian Foreign Ministry announced the formal establishment of diplomatic ties with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea).<sup>1</sup> This development comes during a period of readjustment in North Korean foreign policy following a decade of reverses since the end of the Cold War. The primary goal of Pyongyang's diplomacy policy remains sustainment of Kim Jong-il's Stalinist regime, but humanitarian crises and economic and industrial shortcomings have prompted the North to cautiously seek more contact with the rest of the world. For Italy, normalization of relations is consistent with recent policy aimed at establishing Rome's leadership in reaching out to the world's rogue states.

Normally, bilateral relations between a second-rank power and an isolated, underdeveloped dictatorship might have little significance for the United States. Such is not the case this time, however, considering the players. Italy is a U.S. ally, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU) member, and one of the Group of Seven (G-7)<sup>2</sup> most economically developed nations in the world. Since 1950, North Korea has been the focus of U.S. policy in Northeast Asia, a critical region including the influential states of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Japan, Russia, and the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea). That policy currently aims at reducing tensions on

the Korean Peninsula by simultaneously engaging North Korea in diplomatic and economic exchange while deterring North Korean aggression. The Rome-Pyongyang announcement therefore has potential ramifications which, if properly managed, could further U.S. policy goals.

### Background

Since 1945, the DPRK has pursued two goals: reunification of the Korean Peninsula under North Korean leadership, and survival of the communist regime in Pyongyang. To meet both of those goals, North Korea has built one of the world's largest military establishments, maintained close ties with the former Soviet Bloc countries, and isolated itself from the capitalist world.

At the end of the Cold War, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' subsidies to the North Korean economy ceased, leaving the North without the means to sustain and modernize its armed forces and with few resources to meet the needs of its population. Moreover, North Korean isolation continued, largely out of Pyongyang's fears that outside influence from trade, investments, foreign broadcasts, and other sources would undermine the regime as had happened with the USSR and its communist satellites. This resulted in an ever-weaker North Korea, seeking to meet its own needs through the centralized *juche* (self-reliance, pronounced *jooshe*) economic policy.

North Korea's means of sustaining itself diminished during the 1990s, while South Korea's economic, military, and diplomatic strength increased. With a fully modernized military, closer links to China and Japan, and support from its American ally, the ROK became an even greater threat to the Pyongyang regime. Countering that threat and maintaining political integrity through *juche* prompted the DPRK to marshal its meager resources in support of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and long-range missile programs. This had the cumulative effects of fur-



DOD photo courtesy of Helene C. Stikkel.

Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lamberto Dini, has been instrumental in Italy's efforts to draw "rogue" states into the international community.





DOD photo courtesy of R. D. Ward.

**Republic of Korea Minister of National Defense, Cho Song-Tae.**

thering isolating North Korea from the global community, increasing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and, in combination with crop failures and floods, reducing the North's ability to feed its population.<sup>3</sup>

*Editor's Note: See the previous articles for discussion of DPRK military sales and WMD and the North Korean famine.*

## **North Korean Foreign Policy**

**Italy.** By establishing links to North Korea, Italy has become one of the few countries having formal relations with every member of the United Nations. Italy is also the sixth EU nation to establish diplomatic links with the DPRK (the others are Austria, Denmark, Finland, Portugal, and Sweden). This action is consistent with recent Italian policy, which seeks to establish Italy's leadership among developed democratic nations in normalizing relations with rogue states.<sup>4</sup>

The precedent began during the Cold War when, thanks to long-

standing economic and colonial interests, Italy served as Albania's only tenuous link to the outside world.

During the late 1990s, Rome's initiatives in expanding contacts with Iran, Libya, and Algeria have raised the possibility of "rehabilitating" those nations in the eyes of the international community. At the same time, these initiatives have helped to satisfy Italian energy needs by securing access to Iranian and Libyan oil and Algerian natural gas. Other EU nations have followed the Italian lead in expanding contacts with these nations; they could very likely do the same with North Korea.

No economic incentive exists in forging links with Pyongyang. This fact underscores the broader goals of Italian foreign policy. What Italy stands to gain is increased influence with less-developed nations and with its Western allies. In practical terms, this policy will probably win special access or considerations for Italy among the isolated and marginalized nations Rome seeks to reach.

What may be of more consequence for Italy in the long run, however, is the prestige this policy could earn among the Western powers. By reaching out to these rogue states, Italy is carving out a niche comparable to those of Germany in Russia and Eastern Europe, France in Africa and the Middle East, Great Britain in the Commonwealth, and Spain in Cuba and Latin America.

The nations with the most interest in North Korean developments are South Korea, the United States, Japan, and the PRC. To a lesser extent, Russia too is concerned with the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

**South Korea.** Under President Kim Dae-jung, the ROK has engaged North Korea through the "Sunshine Policy," which embodies three principles:<sup>5</sup>

- South Korea does not want to reunify Korea by absorbing the North.
- South Korea will not tolerate any North Korean provocation toward the ROK.
- South Korea will pursue reconciliation and cooperation through expanded inter-Korean contacts and dialogue.

Such incidents as last summer's "Crab Wars" indicate the Sunshine Policy's inability to eliminate all sources of tension and conflict between the two Koreas. Nevertheless, it has been useful in reducing tension by expanding economic and cultural ties. President Kim's policy serves as the basis for the long-term South Korean policy aimed at promoting stability on the Peninsula and establishing a foundation for future policies which may eventually result in peaceful reunification.

**United States.** In a recent review of U.S. policy toward North Korea, Dr. William J. Perry, former Secretary of Defense, proposed a two-path strategy focused on U.S. concerns about Pyongyang's nuclear weapons-and missile-related activities.<sup>6</sup> This strategy, devised in cooperation with the ROK and Japan, involved a comprehensive and integrated approach to negotiations with the DPRK seeking—

- Verifiable assurances that North Korea does not have a nuclear weapons program.
- Cessation of long-range missile testing, production and deployment.
- Termination of export sales of long-range missiles and associated equipment and technology.

Progress on this path would be reciprocal: the United States and its allies would move to reduce pressures North Korea perceives as threatening in return for DPRK compliance with the above-mentioned

policy goals. In other words, North Korean compliance would result in relaxation of trade sanctions and other positive steps to provide opportunities for the North.

There have been actions undertaken to contain the North Korean threats that negotiations have failed to eliminate. These include maintaining a strong U.S.-ROK military presence on the Korean Peninsula and continued U.S. work on missile defense.

**Japan.** As an ally of the United States and South Korea, Japan has the incentive to follow the U.S. lead in approaches toward North Korea. This is consistent with Japanese efforts over the past decade to expand their economic ties with the North. However, North Korean missile development poses a direct threat to the Japanese homeland and has prompted a cautious and defensive attitude in Tokyo. Unless Japan can receive assurances that the DPRK missile threat either is eliminated or neutralized, further progress toward harmonious Japanese-North Korean relations is in jeopardy.

**The PRC and Russia.** China has regarded Korea as part of its sphere of influence for centuries. During the Cold War, Chinese ties to the North countered the U.S. presence in the South. A similar situation existed regarding Soviet-North Korean relations. The collapse of the USSR effectively removed Russia from active participation in the region. Russia, like the PRC and the other regional powers, has great interest in maintaining stability on the peninsula, but other priorities (like Chechnya) preclude an active Russian role.

The PRC, in contrast, has played and will continue to play an instrumental role in regional affairs. Beijing's policy aims at increasing its own power and influence in Northeast Asia while limiting expansion of U.S., Japanese, and

South Korean gains. It is therefore in the PRC's interest to prevent collapse of the DPRK, lest Beijing's rivals step in to fill the ensuing power vacuum.


### Assessment

This development in North Korean-Italian relations has significant implications for all interested parties. It could lead to expanded DPRK relations with other European nations, and may ultimately affect the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

**Italy and the EU.** By establishing formal ties to one of the world's most notorious outcasts, Italy has enhanced its position as a mediator between rogue states and the inter-

Italy or to the EU as a whole should those entities seek to expand their prestige and diplomatic influence beyond Europe and its immediate surroundings. To date, the Korean Question has remained confined to a handful of powers, three of which (the United States, Russia, and Japan) are G-7 nations. Any entrance of other players into the diplomatic arena would complicate the process of reducing regional tensions.

Nevertheless, Italy's initiative could help bring North Korea more firmly into the community of nations. This might have the effect of reducing Pyongyang's confrontational policies and, in the end, facilitate reconciliation between the two Koreas.



DOD photo courtesy of Helene C. Stikkel.

**Italian Minister Beniamino Anreatta (left) escorts Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen during an armed forces honor ceremony in Rome on 7 March 1997.**

national community. This Italian initiative could result in limited economic benefits, for Italy and other European nations which may follow Rome's lead, but other implications outweigh the economic aspects. By forging ties with the DPRK, Italy may have opened a way for itself or other EU nations to enter the Korean arena. The intractable and longstanding nature of the "Korean Question" may make it attractive to

**North Korea.** Establishing formal ties with a major European power enhances North Korea's status in the international community and will probably pave the way for further diplomatic links with other developed nations. How this will benefit the DPRK and its people depends largely on the decisions of Kim Jong-il's government. Pyongyang is desperately short of money and every other resource necessary for

feeding its people and modernizing its industrial infrastructure. Continued emphasis on military readiness only deepens the problem.

Because *juche* and confrontationalism have failed to produce favorable results for North Korea, Pyongyang has begun to seek more foreign contacts and to permit limited capitalist enterprise within the country. Nevertheless, the regime fears the subversive impact of greater outside influence, and therefore will continue to manage all formal and informal foreign contacts very strictly. The Italian opportunity may, however, provide a means for the DPRK to secure leverage against its regional rivals and the United States and thus gain more latitude in its relations with them.

**United States, South Korea, and Japan.** North Korea could use its new international connections to find a way around the restrictions inherent in the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework (see Major Brock Harris's article on page 11) and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Such a development could jeopardize U.S. and Allied policy, of which the Agreed Framework is a critical component. If the DPRK can find alternative sources for its energy and other needs, thereby reducing its dependence on KEDO, the United States and its partners will have more difficulty implementing the first (reciprocal conciliation) path of the revised U.S. policy. That, in turn, could lead to more emphasis on the second (containment) path, resulting in heightened tensions on the Peninsula.

On the other hand, this new opening to Italy could support U.S. policy

by facilitating a reduction or redirection in the DPRK's confrontational policies. All players in the region would probably prefer a trade war over economic access to North Korea than a military conflict involving long-range missiles and WMDs.

**China.** The PRC likely views this change in North Korean diplomacy with cautious optimism. While it may result in a reduction of Chinese influence in Pyongyang, it could help diminish tensions on the Peninsula and consequently reduce the chance that the PRC's regional rivals could expand their influence at Beijing's expense.

### Conclusion

On balance, the establishment of diplomatic ties between North Korea and Italy is a good thing. It will probably lead to additional diplomatic breakthroughs as other European states follow Italy's lead. There is some risk that greater North Korean contact with the rest of the world could undermine U.S. and Allied policy, but that risk is minimal considering the DPRK's emphasis on protecting the regime by controlling all foreign contacts. Any progress will necessarily be slow and cautious, which is consistent with U.S. strategy.\*

### Endnotes

1. Reuters, "Italy Forges First G-7 Ties with North Korea," CNN.com, 5 January 2000.
2. The G-7 nations include the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan, Italy, and Canada. Russia, though not as fully developed as the other nations, is also a member.
3. Aiden Foster-Carter, "North Korea: Making Up Lost Ground?" PACNET Newsletter, 14 January 2000.
4. STRATFOR.com, Global Intelligence Update, Italy Brings North Korea Out of

Isolation," 6 January 2000.

5. Lee See-Young, "South Korea's Challenges—Security and Peace," San Francisco Chronicle, 25 January 2000.

6. U.S. Department of State, Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations, William J. Perry, 12 October 1999.

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# Regional Security Issues

## Southeast Asia

by Lieutenant Colonel  
Steven L. Rundle

In the near term, the outlook for a major regional conflict in Southeast Asia is remote. However, there is a great deal of political uncertainty and instability that could easily precipitate the use of U.S. forces: evacuations of U.S. citizens, United Nations (U.N.) operations, humanitarian relief, and providing military support to regional allies. Due to the number of countries and the vast geography of the area, I will not be able to cover all the security issues affecting this important region. Instead, I will focus on three areas which I consider first-tier concerns: Indonesia, Burma, and the Spratly Islands.

Southeast Asia is an extremely diverse and dynamic region (see Figure 1). It is the home of the world's longest reigning monarch, the King of Thailand; the world's largest Muslim nation, Indonesia; and some of the world's richest cultural treasures, such as the ancient temples of Angkor Wat. Southeast Asia has also seen much conflict: the Indochina Wars, reign of the genocidal Khmer Rouge, and the slaughter of thousands in Indonesia during the post-coup period of 1965-1966.

As Southeast Asia moved into the 1980s, stability and prosperity drew many up into the middle class, and it appeared that several Southeast Asian nations were on the verge of joining Asia's economic tigers. However, rapid change, too few controls, and huge sums of newfound money caused a severe reaction in 1997—the Asian financial crisis. This crisis was the catalyst for much of the uncertainty that one sees in the region today. Aftershocks are still rocking Indonesia where stability has eluded two governments and

the cards are still out on the newly elected Wahid-Megawati team.

### Indonesia

The economic crisis and the corresponding rise in the prices of basic subsistence items brought the masses demanding change out into the streets of Jakarta and several of Indonesia's other major cities. Unexpectedly, this civil upheaval brought the Suharto regime crashing down, a government that had ruled the country for more than 30 years. Previously considered politi-



Photos courtesy of Colonel (retired) John Haseman.

Indonesian Armed Forces.



**Burmese civilian demonstrators killed by government forces.**

cally invulnerable, the loss of Suharto pushed the country down a dark road. Almost overnight, dormant or suppressed separatist movements, ethnic divisions, and religious differences rose to the surface and engulfed the country in a continuing series of violent eruptions. The resulting tragedy was that neighbor turned on neighbor and affluent residential suburbs and crowded shopping areas became the scenes of horrible atrocities.

The largest upheaval occurred in East Timor, where after a year of violence, a dramatic and heretofore unimaginable option presented itself to the people. The Habibie caretaker government conducted a referendum on independence, something that two years ago no one would have predicted. The result of that vote created a tidal wave of violence and unrest that resulted in the deployment of a U.N. force led by the Australians. (For an in-depth look at the East Timor crises, see Major Fredrickson's article on page 27).

The success of the East Timorese in gaining independence, albeit at an exorbitant and tragic price, has had, and will continue to have a pro-


found impact on other separatist movements in Indonesia. Rumblings and incidents of violence are growing in both Aceh and Irian Jaya. In Aceh, there has been a marked increase in violent insurgent activity, and an equally violent reaction on the part of Indonesian security forces. In a rapidly changing environment, the Aceh separatist movement's leadership has become increasingly bold and demanding in their quest for full independence.

President Wahid appears to be willing to offer the people of Aceh a greater degree of autonomy, including the implementation of some measure of Islamic law, and a larger share of the money generated from the exploitation of the province's resources. A referendum similar to that conducted in Timor concerning independence, once considered, is looking less and less likely. If conducted, a referendum of this nature would almost guarantee independence. It would also pit the military, already deeply scarred by events in Timor, against the civilian-led government of President Wahid.

The military's badly tarnished image needs overhauling after allowing, and in some cases directly supporting, the violence in East Timor and elsewhere. Their constitutionally mandated *dwi-fungsi*, or dual function (civil-military), role places them in a crucial position able to aid society in the return of stability and in bringing about positive change. Currently, there is a window of opportunity to make badly needed internal reforms and to help Indonesia turn into an actual democracy. The military stands on a critical precipice: forever judged a barbaric impediment to



**Burmese troops in the street in Rangoon.**



Burmese soldiers in a captured insurgent position.

progress or being the cutting edge on the blade of democratic reforms.

Religious violence has also created a serious fissure among local populations, especially on Java, the Maluku Islands, East Timor, and Batam. There have been numerous incidents of the burning and looting of religious buildings as well as persecution on both sides, often resulting in serious injury or death. Couple religious animosity with a growing breakdown in relations between Indonesia's minority Chinese population and its majority indigenous populace, and one can see several of the country's most important unifying threads unraveling.

In addition, the poor—a huge segment of Indonesia's 210-million population—have broken through the invisible barrier that prevented them for 30 years from taking to the streets in large numbers.<sup>2</sup> The realization that the masses can have a say and effect change is something new to the psyche of Indonesia. Living at the barest subsistence level, they can be easily misled and misdirected at the hands of the government, the political opposition, populist leaders, or the military.

The newly elected government of President Wahid faces a daunting

uphill battle to take full control of the instruments of power and use them to address all of these significant issues. East Timor desperately needs substantial reforms but reform is extremely difficult when corruption and cronyism remain the hallmarks of doing business throughout the country. The government will be under siege at every turn as it tries to grapple with a myriad of problems, each of which has the potential to explode without notice.

The first priority has to be stability. For this, President Wahid will inevitably have to go to the military. However, he will first have to provide them with a vision of his long-term goals and ensure that these goals are congruent with those of the senior members of the armed forces. Without co-opting the military and swinging them into his camp, he has little chance of long-term success in addressing the country's pressing problems, and continuing strife, uncertainty, and upheaval will keep tearing the country apart. A last option is that if this government fails to win the military's support and does not move quickly to bring about stability, the military will feel that it has to take action on its own.

It may assume the reigns of power as seen in Thailand in 1991 and most recently in Pakistan.

## Burma

Southeast Asia's only remaining military-controlled government has been firmly ensconced in Burma since 1962. A country rich in natural resources with huge economic potential, it continues to lag further and further behind its Asian contemporaries. The policies set forth by the State Peace and Development Council, a 19-member military-based ruling junta, have continued to stymie the nation. When faced in 1990 with election results that gave the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) a clear victory, the military viciously cracked down on NLD candidates and supporters, arresting scores and causing hundreds to flee to the border areas.

By its very nature, the current regime is inherently unstable. It does not possess the mandate of the people and there is a spark smoldering in those who silently oppose and resent them. What will be necessary to ignite that spark and send the people back to the streets is unclear, but what is certain, though extremely unpredictable, is that in time the dictatorship will fall. The voice of history also tells us that the fall of this dictatorship, like many before it, will probably be anything but peaceful and orderly.

The problems of a fluid frontier with lingering ethnic separatist insurgencies, and governmental links with upland drug barons generate tensions with Burma's neighbors, most notably Thailand. The Burmese military has been quite successful over the last ten years in most ethnic separatist movements along its eastern border by pitting one against the other and granting limited autonomy. There are now only two active ethnic groups in open, armed rebellion: the Karen and Karenni, down from almost 20



groups in the late 1980s.<sup>3</sup> For many years, the Thais provided limited support to these organizations and used them as a buffer between the two countries. Royal Thai Army (RTA) contacts with the separatists were also lucrative as they transferred gems and timber directly from the insurgent groups to Thailand. In return, the insurgents received cash and limited amounts of defense articles. With the fall of most of these groups, the Burmese and Thai militaries now find themselves directly facing one another across the border.

Additionally, the Thais and Burmese back differing factions of one of the remaining important groups. Since World War II, the Karen Na-

tional Union (KNU) has controlled a large segment of terrain just across the western-central Thai border. However, through a very successful psychological operations campaign, the Burmese Army was able to break this group into two factions divided along religious lines. The Rangoon-supported splinter group, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), has over the last couple of years been responsible for several cross-border raids into Thailand, attacking the largely Christian KNU refugee camps. These incursions have caused serious consternation in Bangkok. The RTA, embarrassed by its inability to secure the country's frontier, has now taken

several steps to increase security along the western border.

Another area of concern in Burma is the drug trade. Burma traditionally has been the largest opium producer in the world, though recent estimates now state that Afghanistan holds this infamous honor. According to 1996 estimates, Burma produced more than 2,500 metric tons of opium. In addition to opium, Burma is now exporting huge amounts of methamphetamines into neighboring countries.

The Director of Thailand's National Narcotics Center, Permpong Chavalit, estimates that as many as two million pills enter Thailand every month.<sup>4</sup> Heroin, though used in Thailand, more frequently goes to the West, whereas methamphetamines are having a huge social impact on the country. The problem is greatly affecting the nation's youth, as well as impacting on the working class where truck drivers, day laborers, and skilled workers are all being caught up in the seemingly endless supply of this drug. The RTA was so concerned that they recently launched an unprecedented offensive along the border areas of Chaing Mai and Chaing Rai provinces in Northern Thailand in an effort to eliminate the drug networks that had expanded out of Burma.

The main supply of these drugs in Burma originates from farms and factories run by members of the Wa ethnic group, and specifically, remnants of the United Wa State Army (UWSA). It was largely the UWSA, supported by the Burmese military, that forced the surrender of opium warlord Khun Sa in 1996. The Wa, with the sanctioning of Rangoon, quickly moved in and took over the terrain previously occupied by Khun Sa's Mong Tai Army; the Burmese military orchestrated this to eliminate the separatist threat that Khun Sa and his supporters presented.



Figure 1. Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, East Timor, the Spratly Islands, and Burma.

The Burmese now control the border and all crossing points in the area—a major long-time Rangoon objective. The drug trade along the border has never been more brisk.

Heavy drug traffic, coupled with the presence of Burmese regular troops deployed along on the border, greatly increases the chance of a misunderstanding or miscommunication between Burma and Thailand, and could easily result in bloodshed. Though large-scale conflict is unlikely, small incidents will arise, and turbulence will continue to mark the relationship between Burma and Thailand.

### The Spratly Islands

The Spratly Islands lie about 250 nautical miles from the Philippines and consist of more than 100 rocky islands, shoals, and reefs (see Figure 2). What makes this an area of strategic importance is that it potentially offers the owner riches in the form of fertile fishing beds, natural gas, oil, and minerals. In addition, the large volume of maritime traffic that passes the islands to and from Japan, Taiwan, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) adds to the island's strategic importance. Six nations claim the entire Spratly chain, or at least parts thereof: the PRC, Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Many of these islands are merely rock outcroppings that are not above the waterline at high tide. It is not unusual to see photographs in the press of soldiers performing sentry duty atop a very small reef in the middle of the ocean.

Conflict over the Spratlys began in 1978 when the PRC occupied six of the islands, taking them from the Vietnamese. Ten years later, this led to the Spratlys' most violent confrontation, when the Chinese and Vietnamese forces clashed at Johnson Island resulting in two Vietnamese vessels sunk and 70 Vietnamese dead. The PRC's encroachment




Figure 2. Some of the Spratly Islands' more than 100 islets, coral reefs, and sea mounts.

has continued, and in 1995, the Philippines discovered that the Chinese had emplaced markers on Mischief Reef, one of the reefs closest to the Philippine island of Palawan. The Philippine Armed Forces reacted, removed the markers, and seized Chinese fishing boats and crews in the area. Since then, the PRC has returned, and slowly but steadily increased its presence on the reef. Today there are fairly large, permanent-appearing buildings, including a two-story structure, complete with wharf and helipad.<sup>5</sup> The Chinese buildup on Mischief Reef is representative of what is occurring on other reefs, such as Fiery Cross, Johnson South, Subi, Chiqua, and others.

Although intermittent, conflict continues with several incidents in the last year. In May 1999 near

Scarborough Shoal, the Philippine Navy chased two Chinese fishing boats, one of which sank. Reports as to how the ship sank conflicted, with the Chinese stating that a vessel rammed it and the Philippine Government stating that it went down due to heavy seas. Regardless, the incident resulted in heightened tensions between the two nations.

On 13 October 1999, two Philippine OV-10 aircraft on a surveillance mission were taken under small arms fire by Vietnamese forces stationed on Tennesse Reef (also claimed by the Philippines). Though the planes returned unharmed, this caused much alarm in Manila. Furthermore, later in the month, Malaysian Hawk fighters intercepted two Philippine aircraft over Investigator Shoal. Although the aircraft fired no

shots, these types of incidents continue to fuel national rhetoric and are an impediment to closer multilateral and bilateral relations between the six claimants.<sup>6</sup>

Resolving and preventing conflict in the Spratlys has been an ongoing process. Starting with the Indonesian South China Sea Workshop in 1991, there have been many diplomatic initiatives to assist the claimants in reaching a resolution concerning the use of the islands, sorting out the various claims, and trying to diffuse tensions. The PRC seems to be only interested in seriously discussing the issue bilaterally, thus putting forth little effort to reach any settlement in a multilateral forum.

The latest initiative, proposed at the 3rd Informal ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Summit in Manila in November 1999, resulted in the ASEAN members agreeing to sign a Code of Conduct drafted by Manila. This Code asked members to renounce the use of force, refrain from unilateral actions that might increase tensions, set up a mechanism for mutual visits to the islands in question, and to place a ban on creating any new structures. The PRC refused to sign. Without the backing of the PRC, an overarching, comprehensive solution cannot be found. In light of obstructions by the PRC, it remains doubtful that a resolution will occur soon and the issue will continue to bounce around in diplomatic channels with no real progress in the foreseeable future.

What is the impact for the United States? The U.S. has taken a very ambiguous stance on the issue of the Spratlys and it is not clear if we are prepared to defend Philippine maritime claims, something that Manila has long been asking. With increased tensions among Manila and other claimants, it is clear the Philippine Government is interested

in closer U.S.-Philippines security ties. The feeling is mutual, though the U.S. is not prepared to sign up for any security arrangement that would commit it to a course of action concerning the Spratlys. This ambiguity on the part of the United States does nothing to hold in check Chinese advances into the area.

Although China's primary security concern is Taiwan, it is no secret that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy is slowly striving for a blue-water capability that will allow it to exert influence and control throughout maritime Asia. If a diplomatic solution cannot be found, it is only a matter of time—even if distant—when the PRC will move to take control of the Spratly Islands. The most promising solution is for the six involved nations to agree to a Code of Conduct as the first step to a permanent arrangement, then to develop the region jointly, thus sharing the islands' potential wealth.

## Conclusion

In summary, Southeast Asia remains a most dynamic region with the fuel necessary to keep the economic turbines spinning, and there is every reason to think that prosperity and democratization will continue to spread. However, with development and political evolution, there is a cost, one unfortunately and undoubtedly paid by human suffering. It will be up to the United States, and hopefully, multilateral organizations such as the United Nations and ASEAN to mitigate the tumultuous effects of further change.\*

## Endnotes

1. The title photo is of the Indonesian Armed Forces, photo courtesy of Colonel (Retired) John Haseman.
2. Indonesia is the world's fourth most populous nation.
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pages 232-233.

4. Sumet Wannapruet and Thongchai Chaiyasa, "Northeast: A Major Route for Smugglers," **Bangkok Post**, 4 October 1999, online version; and Robert S. Gelbard, "Burma: The Booming Drug Trade," **Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future**, Robert I. Rotberg, Editor (New York: Routledge, 1997), page 186.

5. "Spratly Island Scrapbook," located online at China Guide, [http://www.actionworks.org/guides/frlinks/spratlys\\_pics.htm](http://www.actionworks.org/guides/frlinks/spratlys_pics.htm), pages 1-3.

6. "Close Encounters in the Spratlys," **The Philippine Star** Online, 1 November 1999; and "China Accuses Philippines of Harassing Chinese Fishing Boats in Spratlys," **Yahoo! Asia-News**, 5 November 1999.

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*A Fort Huachuca landmark, statue in the cemetery dedicated to the families of the U.S. soldier.*

Photo courtesy of Gregorio O. Figueroa.



# East Timor at a Glance

by Major W. Allan  
Frederickson, USAR

The island of East Timor lies near the end of the archipelago of Indonesia in the South Pacific. Indonesia has had a longtime dispute with Portugal about sovereignty over Indonesia's Timor Timur Province. Since the beginning, Indonesian governments have experienced resistance coming from the independence movements of various islands claiming ethnic and cultural diversity from the predominant Javanese ethnicity.

Portugal's vast colonial possessions had once made the island great, and with time, the prior Portuguese rule had become a reason for Indonesian suppression of the island.<sup>1</sup> Committed to freedom from colonial rule, the Timorese conducted a successful coup d'état in April 1974, which incited a national revolution ending the colonial dictatorship. It brought instability to the government of the country and the urgency to lay the basis of democracy.

Indonesia then set in motion the annexation of East Timor. Upon the withdrawal of the Portuguese Colonial Administrator from East Timor, Indonesia invaded in December 1975. This invasion, which interrupted a process of Timorese decolonialization, resulted in 25 years of Indonesian rule. "The subsequent Indonesian rule by force resulted in the militia and Indonesian forces being responsible for the killings of more than 200,000 Timorese."<sup>2</sup>

This region is of significant interest to the United States. The politi-



cal, economic, and military interests of numerous industrial nations converge in this region of the world. Asia-Pacific nations have become interdependent. The region only accounted for four percent of the world economic output in 1960, but by 1995, it accounted for 34 percent. The World Trade Organization estimates that by 2020 the region will account for 50 percent of the world economic production.

## The Colonial Period

When the Portuguese arrived in 1512, the Atoni people inhabited the island of Timor. The Dutch captured the island of Meluka in 1641 and continued a protracted struggle with the Portuguese until 1655 when they forced the last of the Portuguese from West Timor. The only industry was the fabrication of cotton cloth, which they used for clothing and their commerce was limited to specific trade products. The production of wax and harvesting of sandalwood brought the need for outside labor in the form of ethnic Makasare, Malays, and Javanese.

Before the arrival of the Portuguese and Dutch, Timor engaged

in commercial trade, politically centered east of Java, and linked by trade with China and India. In documents published during the Ming dynasty in 1436, the described commercial value of Timor is as a place covered by trees of sandalwood, producing little else. One of the first Portuguese to visit the island wrote in 1518, "there is an abundance of sandalwood, white, to which the Muslims in India and Persia give great value and where much of it is used."<sup>3</sup>

Since the Japanese occupation, which gave birth to the Indonesian military forces, through the presidencies of Sukarno and Raden Suharto, the Indonesian Government dealt with accentuated ethnic, cultural, and social diversity—greatly responsible for regional dissidence. The rise of the military and the killing of at least 600,000 communists marked the beginning of Suharto's dictatorship.

The prospects of independence saw the emergence of conflicting parties in East Timor with the rise of Frente Revelucionaria de Timor Leste Independence (FRETILIN), matched against the parties of

Associaçao Popular Democratica Timorese (APODETI) and the lesser known Klibur Oan Timor Aswain (KOTA) and Tribilist. This conflict eventually ignited a brief civil war between FRETILIN and the parties of APODETI assuming control of the province. In July 1976, Indonesia formally annexed the region as the 27th province of the Republic of Indonesia. Since the annexation, FRETILIN has waged a separatist war against Indonesia within the province of East Timor.

### Deployment of Indonesian Forces

The Indonesian Government's ability to control the infrastructure allows for the absolute control of its people. This ability centers on the posting of military units throughout the country. Until the International Forces East Timor (INTERFET) arrived, the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) maintained approximately 15,000 soldiers in Timor. The Indonesian Army had a territorial command structure posted throughout the country (see Figure 1). The East Timor Military Provincial Commander is a Colonel and the 13 Military District (in the largest major towns) commanders are Lieutenant Colonels. The Military Sector commanders are Lieutenants and Captains who are responsible for military affairs at the local village level.

Until April 1999, the civilian police were under the control of the TNI. East Timor housed a single police mobile brigade (BRIMOB) with an estimated 500 personnel. In addition, three BRIMOB companies with an estimated 100 personnel were in a rotation cycle within Timor. During the recent elections in East Timor, an additional BRIMOB brigade deployed in the province to supervise and protect the polling locations. During this time, the TNI established a civilian support strategy to allow the incorpor-




Figure 1. Indonesian Army Territorial Command Structure.

ation of armed civilians, the (RATIH) militia, into the defense infrastructure. These unsanctioned armed militia units in East Timor (also called the people's resistance) do not have Indonesian Government approval, but have received support from the military within the province.

In the August 1999 referendum, the East Timorese people voted to separate from Indonesia leading to widespread unrest and violence in East Timor. The civilian-led militias opposed this independence and any future vote on autonomy. These militia groups carry weapons similar to those of the TNI Forces, and the local Military District Commands have supplied materiel. However, with the departure of TNI Forces and a shortage of military supplies, the militias will likely become ineffective as direct fighting forces.

### Situation

On 20 September 1999, the INTERFET, lead by Major General Peter Cosgrove (Australian Forces), established a buffer zone between East and West Timor. In

addition, Major General Cosgrove placed peacekeepers throughout the provinces as a buffer between the people and the militias. Before this deployment, INTERFET assessed and analyzed the battlefield in terms of the military, political, social, economic, and geographic situation. The situational guidelines focused on the threat strategy, intentions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities. In addition, analysts developed host-nation counter-threat capabilities and identified potential courses of action.<sup>4</sup>

Since 30 August 1999 (the date of the autonomy vote), the TNI and militia groups remained in the province and thus retained responsibility for any violence that occurred. The United Nations (U.N.) mandate expired on 30 September 1999, triggering a violent reaction from the separatists and counterstrikes from the TNI and militias. During this time, on 15 September 1999, the U.N. Security Council authorized a multinational peacekeeping operation, and INTERFET deployed five days later. The arrival of INTERFET and international focus on East



11th Signal Brigade communications site in Dili, East Timor.

Photos courtesy of First Lieutenant Chris Tubbs.

Timor forced the TNI Forces to pass responsibilities to INTERFET and deploy to West Timor.

### The Resistance Movement

Since the 15 September 1999 U.N. Security Council vote to establish a U.N. security force in East Timor, a minimal TNI force was assisting INTERFET until the Indonesia Parliament ratified the East Timor independence vote. This reduction in TNI forces and militia attacks have resulted in a stabilization in East Timor, giving way to the East Timor National Liberation Army (FALINTIL) resistance fighters.

The FALINTIL armed resistance movement has expanded since the INTERFET forces arrived. The FALINTIL is acting as a security force in the outlying East Timor countryside, where the INTERFET forces did not deploy. International reports have credited FALINTIL to international relief workers in providing assistance by identifying medical support and other aid needed in specific areas outside INTERFET control. In the weeks following the TNI pullout on 22 October 1999, the formal Indonesian

Parliament ratified the East Timor autonomy vote.<sup>5</sup>

### TNI's Legal Defense

The Indonesian Human Rights Commission (KPP-HAM) began questioning senior TNI leaders in late December, beginning with General Wiranto, TNI Chief of Forces. Wiranto's testimony to the KPP-HAM suggests a defense strategy to minimize and redirect specific allegations of TNI involvement in the post-referendum violence and human rights violations in East Timor.

The KPP-HAM questioned several TNI commanders and a former province commander on 27 December 1999. Reports attributed the widespread arson to East Timorese who were disappointed with the unfair practices of the U.N. Mission East Timor (UNAMET) in conducting the referendum process. Further reports indicated that the TNI made "persuasive and repressive" efforts to control the arson.<sup>6</sup> The TNI military commanders stated that they held meetings with militia leaders, but only regarding the meaning and framework of safeguarding security and territorial development.

Throughout the hearings, TNI commanders indicated that the militias were legitimate security volunteer units, which received no support from the TNI. However, they discovered that several provincial governments financed the militias and local police had trained them.

In responding to the questions from the KPP-HAM, the TNI denied wrongdoing and refused to answer questions and blamed UNAMET for causing the bias against the Indonesian Government. Senior leaders will likely escape prosecution for their involvement in the post-referendum campaign of violence, despite the discovery of several government documents outlining planned attacks and militia support. On 28 December 1999, the Indonesian Representative Council issued a public statement rejecting any international effort to try TNI generals for allegations of human rights violations in East Timor.

### KPP-HAM Findings

On 31 January 2000, the Indonesian KPP-HAM presented its findings to Indonesian Attorney General Marzuki Darusman. The findings indicated that the TNI leaders and police assisted the militias, and committed serious human rights violations. The KPP-HAM found evidence of mass killings and torture, and attempts to obstruct justice by tampering with evidence. The report named more than 25 individuals involved in the post-referendum violence, including five TNI general officers. President Wahid stated that he would support any legal action taken as a result of the KPP-HAM findings, and the documented evidence should trigger a criminal prosecution by Attorney General Darusman within the next six months.

The KPP-HAM report provided President Wahid cause to relieve the Chief of TNI Forces, General Wiranto. Shortly after General





An example of the destruction in East Timor as a result of TNI actions.

Wiranto's removal, immediate rumors of a possible coup d'etat emerged as well as protests by disenfranchised groups and students. As of 10 February 2000, the government of President Wahid is still very much in control. Supported by direct evidence indicating knowledge of the alleged crimes, Attorney General Darusman will likely focus his case on the most visible targets named by the KPP-HAM report: selected TNI officers, militia leaders, and mid-level Indonesian Government employees.

At the time of this assessment, the Australian-led INTERFET had secured East Timor. UNAMET will arrive sometime in February or March 2000.

### Assessment

The consolidated militias assisted by the TNI were very effective in destroying property and left East Timor in a condition similar to how Serbia left Kosovo. In the long term, the TNI support for the militia will wane and logistic support will stop. The hard-core militia members believe in Indonesian sovereignty and neither money nor power motivate

them. The least likely course of action for the militias over the long term would be to continue a low-intensity conflict supported by the Indonesian Government.

Later, TNI and pro-integration senior leaders will probably take an approach of plausible deniability (of support for the violence). The TNI involvement with the militias and lack of documentation, or the destruction of documents identifying TNI involvement, will become common. Additionally, we can expect, as in Kosovo, that the independence supporters will become equally responsible for post-referendum violence, aided by United Nations Transitional Administration East Timor's (UNTAET's) disorganization and lack of civilian police security.

Senior leaders from all sides are likely to avoid prosecution for their involvement in the post-referendum-campaign violence because of Indonesia's interest in East Timor. An important factor in this decision was the Indonesian People's Representative Council's statement rejecting any international effort to seek prosecution against TNI gen-

erals for the alleged human rights violations in East Timor.

East Timor still has several hard-line militia cells comprised of the disempowered that will likely continue strengthening and organize into criminal elements. These organizations will seek the assistance of TNI forces stationed at crossing points. The recent series of border incursions indicate prior planning and coordination among militia leaders. In light of these incidents, and the professionalism of the commanders on the ground, an organized attack or major crossing is possible but unlikely because the INTERFET is responsible for security at various points and enclaves throughout East Timor.

The national infrastructure is weak, and social tension and street crime worsen as more refugees return from West Timor. Violent incidents between returning refugees and Timorese youth will increase. Furthermore, the lack of police control in looting and other criminal behavior will encourage its continuation.

Although sporadic militia activity in several enclaves has sparked concern over the security situation along the borders, social problems within in East Timor's population centers constitute the greatest threat to stability. The UNTAET has requested several hundred additional civilian police. Lacking authorization of these forces, UNTAET may rely solely on the rotational peacekeeping forces.

INTERFET will pass security operations to the UNTAET in late February 2000. Currently, the focus is on stabilizing the infrastructure and unemployment numbers. In addition, the emerging leadership of East Timor must gain support from the international community and prove they have the ability to rebuild the infrastructure and bring order to a land in turmoil. We can expect this

reform process to continue through September 2000, and a permanent government will emerge within three years. \*

#### Endnotes

1. Lieutenant Colonel Laurence W. Mazzeno (USA, Retired), "The New Warfare-Ethnic Conflict," *Military Review*, March-April 1999, pages 70 and 71.
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## Impressions of East Timor

*Editor's Note: First Lieutenant Chris Tubbs deployed to East Timor in October 1999 as part of the 11th Signal Brigade's (Fort Huachuca, Arizona) mission to establish communications to aid in rebuilding East Timor.*

On 10 October 1999, I first set foot on the island of East Timor. In the short ride from the Dili-Komoro Airport to the INTERFET compound, the most prevalent thing I noticed was destruction. The TNI had torched building after building as they left the country following the referendum vote. This was by no means isolated destruction but rather a cold and calculated means to suppress the people of East Timor. In talking with some of the local citizens, I heard them recount that the TNI filled a fire engine with gasoline and went through the streets spraying the buildings while foot soldiers trailed behind igniting the buildings. Unlike other war-torn countries where weaponry had caused such destruction, the devastation in East Timor was a brutal, inten-

tional act by those formerly in power to suppress those trying to assume control.

This destroyed what little infrastructure existed in the country and drove most of the people from their homes. They fled the violence by either heading into the surrounding hills or into West Timor. Conditions improved slowly, and the area again became stable. Events elsewhere in Indonesia and the world community's response persuaded the TNI soldiers to leave East Timor.

The people of East Timor have slowly come to the realization that they are now an independent nation. The expression on the faces of the people and especially the children had changed dramatically from the first looks I noticed when I entered the country. They all were grateful that the INTERFET forces, led by the Australians, had come to their aid. I often ran in the afternoon and the children greeted me on the streets with wide smiles; generally, they would utter some broken English and want to slap hands. Those moments made me thankful for the

things many of us in the United States take for granted and reinforced the difference our sacrifices during the deployment made.

The recovery process for the nation will be a long one. After 25 years of Indonesian rule, the people of East Timor not only have to rebuild their homes, but also develop a governing body. The United Nations is planning to assume control of the operations in East Timor in February 2000. Like many of the past places where the United Nations has activated a force, I would anticipate this mission lasting into the middle of this decade.

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## Saddam Hussein: Lost Battles, Winning the War?

by Chief Warrant Officer Two  
Jimmie E. Youngblood, Jr.

*The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.*

Saddam Hussein's national strategy and his effective use of the military, diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power have enabled him to win the long-term fight for regime survival and to maintain Arab dominance in the Middle East. Saddam's objectives have been simple:

- Remain in power.
- Continue to be the dominant hegemony in the Middle East.
- Lift all United Nations-imposed sanctions on Iraq.

For nine years, the Coalition has attacked elements of each instrument of power to prevent Saddam from achieving his objectives. However, the Coalition has never completely destroyed any of Saddam's instruments of power and has allowed him to recover and reconstitute any losses.

Iraq has endured all the hardships of economic sanctions, internal security threats, military restrictions, and continued Coalition bombings. Is the United States losing a war of will with Iraq? How long can our planes continue to patrol the no-fly zones in Iraq before a pilot is lost?

The real issue is what course of action (COA) should the international community take that will force Saddam to comply with the United

Nations (U.N.) resolutions; more importantly, how much of the international community really cares if Iraq complies? The latest sanctions review in October 1999 clearly indicated a split between the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (United States, United Kingdom (UK), Russia, People's Republic of China (PRC), and France). With the exception of the United States and the UK, all are in favor of suspending economic sanctions on Iraq, but maintaining the military restrictions. Why do the United States and UK persist in suppressing Iraq, while they observe other countries build nuclear arsenals and commit atrocities against humanity without taking similar sanctions against them?

Will the rest of the international community force the United States and UK to conform and change their foreign policies on Iraq? This article will examine each instrument of power and provide potential COAs that could end the predicament the United States and UK face.

### Military Power

To maintain dominance in the Middle East, Saddam must protect the regime from both internal and external threats. Saddam has managed to remain in power through a constant paranoia of a military coup and insurgent threats. He formed an elite organization called the Special Republican Guard (SRG) to protect him and the regime from internal threats. Saddam also uses a "Gestapo" type organization called the Fedayeen to spy on his own government officials and military com-

manders. Their fear of the security services and uncertainty over what might happen to them if Saddam were overthrown hold these leaders in line.

Since 1991, the Iraqi High Command has desperately attempted to rebuild its armed forces to confront both external threats such as Iran and the Western-backed Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states,<sup>1</sup> and to suppress domestic rebels in northern and southern Iraq. The rebuilding of Iraq's armed forces has taken place against a background of political instability, with numerous senior officers losing their lives in coup attempts and purges. The U.N. embargo has made obtaining new equipment and spare parts a near impossibility.

The current U.N. sanctions and Security Council resolutions restrict military movements and prevent Iraq from improving its military capability. Military training and operations are also restricted and Iraq's military leaders, out of necessity, must change their missions from a force projection army to a force capable of defending against low-level threats and internal security missions. Nonetheless, the Iraqi military has been able to reconstitute a considerable portion of its pre-DESERT STORM combat power. Despite massive equipment losses, Iraq's military remains a credible threat in the region.

Regionally, Saddam must counter Iran's growing military and expanding global influence. This task is becoming more difficult due to the sanctions decreed by the United



Nations that prevent spending for increased military weapons and equipment. The U.N.-imposed no-fly zones and U.S.-UK demarches restrict Iraq's air force flight operations and ground force deployments in northern and southern Iraq. The Iraqi Army remains superior to the Iranian Army but is constrained to operating only in central Iraq. Therefore Saddam's primary counter-measure with which to fight Iran is his weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) arsenal, a capability that devastated the Iranian Army during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. Since the end of Operation DESERT STORM, the international community has taken severe measures to eliminate Hussein's potent arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, and his ability to deliver such devastating munitions. However, despite these restrictions, Iraq's WMD capability remains a serious threat in the region.

### Diplomatic Power

Established in 1945, the Arab League<sup>2</sup> was to be a means of strengthening relations between member-states. Article V of the charter specifically outlines, "any resort to force in order to resolve disputes between two or more member-states of the League is prohibited." The charter additionally states,

*the Council shall mediate in all differences which threaten to lead to war between two member-states, or a member-state and a third state, with a view to bringing about their reconciliation.*

Prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1991, there were no sessions assembled to discuss the disputes between Iraq and Kuwait in the months leading up to the invasion. The last session before the invasion was held in October 1989. After the invasion in August 1990,

the Arab League held an emergency session the following month, but did not discuss the issues of Iraq and Kuwait. The United Nations Security Council adopted *Resolution 678* in November 1990 authorizing the member-states co-operating with the Kuwait Government to use all necessary means to force the unconditional withdrawal Iraqi forces from Kuwait. United Nations *Resolution 678* marked an end to Arab League decisions regarding Iraq. The Arab League Summit last met in 1999; Iraq walked out of the session.

Iraq's argument is that the Arab League is the only governing body authorized to determine policy amongst the member-states, not the United Nations. To further Iraq's discontent, United Nations Security Council *Resolution 687* established the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in 1991 with the charter to find and destroy Iraq's WMD, and restrict Iraq's ability to produce such weapons in the future. Iraq had 45 days to comply with the resolution. Nine years later, Iraq has yet to disclose all of the elements of its WMD program and has side-stepped UNSCOM's intrusive inspections by manipulating the United Nations with empty promises of compliance, and thumbing its nose at the international community. The game of cat and mouse came to an end in fall 1998 when Iraq accused Richard Butler, the UNSCOM Chairman, and John Ritter, his top weapons inspector, of spying on Iraq for the United States. Subsequently, Iraq permanently expelled UNSCOM.

The decision whether to lift sanctions against Iraq has forced a split between the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. The latest *Omnibus Resolution 1284* calls for the establishment of a U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Com-

mission (UNMOVIC) to complete the unfinished work of UNSCOM. Iraq has publicly stated it will not support the resolution and that there will be no more inspection teams allowed in Iraq. Abstentions from Russia, PRC, and France have bolstered Iraq's status in the international community. Saddam Hussein continues on the path towards diplomatic reform in the Arab League and the end of western influence in the region.

### Informational Power

Iraq has embarked on a propaganda campaign designed to broadcast human suffering and target insurgent groups operating in Iraq. In the growing days of information warfare (IW), Iraq is flooding the Internet worldwide web with hundreds of web pages that highlight human suffering at the hands of the United States and the UK. The Office of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations has its own web page. The first page of that site reads, "This page is in black for the mourning of the Iraqi children...dying on daily basis due to the continued imposition of the unjust sanctions on the people of Iraq." Iraq's IW efforts appear to be effective, even in UK where the Mariam Appeal has made a significant impact.

The Mariam Appeal<sup>3</sup> is a campaign founded and organized by George Galloway in London. His principle objective is to highlight the disastrous effects of the sanctions on Iraq. The *Iraqi Sanctions Monitor (ISM)*, launched in late January 2000, is the Mariam Appeal's free E-mailing news service. Four times weekly, the *ISM* exposes the perceived injustices of a policy that has supposedly killed more than 1.5 million Iraqis in ten years. The Mariam Appeal campaigned for three months against the Anglo-American stranglehold on Iraq; the

campaign spanned eleven countries traveling in a traditional London double-decker red bus.

When President Bill Clinton announced to the world in January 1999 that the international community would heighten its support for the insurgent groups in Iraq, Saddam immediately implemented a plan to counter this threat. Counterinsurgency operations expanded in southern Iraq against the Shiite Marsh Arabs, and Hussein's security forces increased their presence to crack down on influential figureheads campaigning against the regime. The opposition groups, meanwhile, have also taken advantage of the information age and established web sites designed to gather opposition support.

One such organization is the Iraqi National Congress (INC).<sup>4</sup> Its charter is committed to the perpetual and irrevocable independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Iraq and dedicated to the idea of constitutional, democratic, and pluralistic government in Iraq guaranteeing essential human rights to all Iraqi citizens. The INC calls for the strict enforcement of all U.N. Security Council resolutions and it mandates the end of Saddam's repressive regime. The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 called for the training, arming, and support of opposition groups in Iraq to destroy the regime. However, there have been no opposition groups to date capable of achieving this task.

### Economic Power

Under the current U.N. sanctions imposed following Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, Baghdad can neither freely export oil nor invest in its oil sector. Economic sanctions have significantly degraded Iraq's economy, infrastructure, and military. Iraq's economy has been able to maintain the status quo through U.N. resolutions such as the oil-for-

food program that enables Iraq to sell a controlled amount of oil in trade for food money for the population. The United Nations is to regulate the money distribution; however, Saddam controls all of the money flow in Iraq. Illegal trade and oil exports have provided Saddam the majority of his monetary income.

Russian companies have begun implementing contracts worth \$400 million, recently signed with Iraq's Ministry of Oil, Amir Mohammed Rasheed. Russian Fuel and Energy Minister Viktor Kalyuzhny said in recent press remarks that Russian private oil companies might start developing Iraqi oil fields despite the sanctions.



### Forecast

After analyzing Hussein's effective use of the instruments of power, the question remains. What will the United States and UK do? Will they adopt a more lenient foreign policy with Iraq, or remain steadfast with the status quo and the principle that Iraq must comply with the decrees of the United Nations? The international community would view backing down to Saddam as a defeat for the United States and a great victory for Iraq; therefore, adoption of this COA is not likely. Saddam will never give in to the demands of the U.N. Security Council resolutions or fully disclose any information regarding his WMD program. Therefore, the United States must unilaterally force Iraq into compli-

ance by attacking the decisive points of each center of gravity in every instrument of power.

Strengthening relationships between Iraq, Russia, the PRC, and France will make it difficult to attack the diplomatic powers in Iraq. Economic sanctions have only proven to affect the ordinary Iraqi citizen while the elite in Baghdad continued to build elaborate mosques and enjoy prosperity and comfort. Support for Saddam grows stronger each time the Coalition bombs Iraq. These attacks fuel Hussein's information warfare (IW) and propaganda efforts by providing him a mechanism to show human suffering at the hands of the "Americans." The United States can attack this instrument of power and counter Saddam's efforts by flooding the information highway with facts about his repressive regime and showing the efforts the West has made to help the people in Iraq. Additionally, we could deny Hussein the source of his propaganda by suspending all Coalition attacks in Iraq, and potentially cease patrolling the no-fly zones. Iraq's Regular Army and Republican Guard continue to train and operate through severe degradation of equipment and poor troop morale. Attacking these units would significantly degrade Iraq's ability to defend against external threats like Iran, and possibly hinder their ability to defend against internal insurgent threats.

These findings infer that Saddam is clearly the center of gravity in Iraq. Consequently, removing him from power is the only COA remaining that will meet the requirements of the Security Council. The SRG and Fedayeen forces are the crucial decisive points that protect Iraq's center of gravity. Saddam's Baath Party-controlled regime remains strong and resilient due to a strict security apparatus that continues to suppress any organized coup at-

Any aggressive COA taken by the United States will be a unilateral operation that will bring certain opposition within the United Nations. We must be prepared to counter the repercussions from the international community for any actions taken to remove Saddam. More importantly, the United States must reestablish Iraq's instruments of power by creating a stable government for the people. This will inevitably lead to a long-term commitment in Iraq to rebuild the nation. Are the people of the United States prepared to support such an

## Endnotes

1. The Gulf Cooperation Council members include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The GCC formed in 1981 with the charter to promote peace in the Gulf through cooperation, integration, and cooperation through economic, social, defense, and political affairs.
2. The Arab League members include Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
3. The name of the Mariam Appeal is for Mariam Hamza, an Iraqi child brought to the UK by George Galloway for medical treatment in July 1998. The Appeal solicits funds to cover the costs of treating Mariam at a British hospital.
4. Created in June 1992, the INC is the first active opposition group in Iraq since 1962. The INC headquarters is in Sala-

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# Potential Conflict In the Taiwan Strait

by Captain Carolyn A. Ford,  
USAR

Taiwan, an island about the size of West Virginia, lies 100 miles off the South China coast.<sup>1</sup> The Japanese won the island in an 1895 war and held it as a colony until 1945. At the end of World War II, Japan gave up its colonies, but no clear-cut treaty or law settled the question of Taiwan's sovereignty. There was only the 1943 Cairo Declaration. In the Declaration, the United States and the United Kingdom promised Chiang Kai-shek, then President of the Republic of China, that Taiwan would be "restored" to China, despite the fact that republican China and imperial China were different political entities.<sup>2</sup>

Before 1945, there was every reason to believe the residents of Taiwan would be happy to reunite with the mainland, particularly because the people thought of themselves as Han Chinese. The Republic of China Government (also known as the Nationalist government) made two crucial mistakes in its initial attempts to assert sovereignty over the island. In October 1945, the Nationalist troops ordered to receive the Japanese surrender and take initial positions on the island balked and refused to land when they saw the strength of the Japanese forces on and near Taiwan. The troops eventually landed only when U.S. forces nearby guaranteed their security.

When the residents of Taiwan saw the refusal of the ragged troops to land, they were embarrassed by the conduct of people they considered

their countrymen. Less than two years later, Nationalist troops massacred 20,000 residents after an anti-government demonstration known as the "February 28 Incident." The Nationalist government took this as a sign that the Taiwanese could not be trusted and strove to keep political power in the hands of Chinese people from the mainland. Consequently, animosity as well as social and economic gaps grew between the Taiwanese and mainlanders, two groups which previously believed they belonged in the same group.<sup>3</sup>

The Chinese Civil War (1947-1949) between the Nationalist and Communist forces complicated the delicate situation on Taiwan further. In late 1949, Mao Zedong declared the establishment of the People's Republic of China. To avoid the advance of Communist troops throughout China, President Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government took refuge on Taiwan (also called Formosa).

The Nationalists claimed they had not lost; they were simply biding their time until they could retake the mainland and assert political control over all of China. The Communists, however, held that the civil war was over and it was simply a matter of time before they carried out the mop-up operation that would reintegrate Taiwan. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 intervened and the United States, which hitherto had no plans to prevent a mainland takeover of Taiwan, shifted its policy to recognize the Nationalists as an ally in the fight to contain Communism.

Under the protective U.S. umbrella, Taiwan was able to industrialize and modernize throughout the period from 1949 to 1987. What it could not do on a large scale was democratize. The Nationalist government kept martial law in effect because it maintained that the civil war was still active and refused to abandon the stated goal of retaking the mainland. However, as time passed, it became clear that Nationalist forces were not going to recover mainland China any time soon.

The government abandoned martial law in 1987. Opposition parties that had formed at the grassroots level, such as the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), were now legal. The post-martial law period brought paced democratization to the island.

By 1991, President Lee Teng-hui declared that the civil war was over. Since the Communists had not defeated the Nationalists, this meant in his opinion that there remained two sovereign governments—the Republic of China (ROC) and the People's Republic of China (PRC)—which had jurisdiction over two different geographical areas. Consequently, the ROC and the PRC were equals and any discussion of the final status of the island of Taiwan should take place on a "state to state" basis. This concept would later figure prominently in cross-strait relations.

## Current Situation and Outlook for the Future

What, exactly, is the nature or basis, for this conflict? Divided in their



assessment of the Taiwan Strait problem, some analysts say the crux of the problem lies with the modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the PRC's refusal to forego force as an option for reunification.<sup>4</sup> Others point to the possibility that Taiwan may declare itself independent, which is inherently destabilizing to the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>5</sup> Still others say it does not help that both parties are very stubborn and unwilling to compromise on their positions.

In the past, the Nationalists and Communists, despite their many differences, had at least one position in common—there is only one China and Taiwan is a part of it. With the rise of democracy in Taiwan, however, people have had the freedom to rethink their ideas about identity. Today there are people in Taiwan who are quite vocal in stating that they are ethnically Chinese but consider themselves politically Taiwanese.<sup>6</sup>

While President Lee still technically adheres to the Nationalist Party platform of "one China," he possibly has dreamed of a legacy as the "Father of Taiwanese Independence." Just as democratic presidents hope to leave meaningful legacies, so too do communists.

Jiang Zemin, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party and head of state, hopes to add Taiwan to his list of reunification accomplishments (Hong Kong in 1997 and Macao in 1999). The PRC seems to think part of its legitimacy rests on gaining and retaining sovereignty over the same geography that the last imperial dynasty had.<sup>7</sup>

Despite the disagreement over the final status of the island, recent talks on transportation and communications links between the mainland Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) and the Taiwan Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) were improving. Indeed the ARATS chairman, Wang Daohan, was ready to make an unprecedented trip to the island. Then on 9 July 1999, President Lee made remarks on a German radio program that raised the level of tension in the Taiwan Strait.

Although the "state to state" concept was not new, the PRC reacted to President Lee's remarks with anger, stating that he was a "splittist" and traitor to the Chinese nation. In July and August, the Taiwan press was full of stories on cross-strait cyberattacks and fighter pilot sorties over the Taiwan Strait. Patriotic hackers from both sides of the Strait took it upon themselves to hack

their way into official government sites and leave messages about Chinese unity or Taiwanese independence. Even now, no one knows whether these hackers had the support or official sanction of their respective governments. Fighter pilots from the PRC and ROC armies flew over the Taiwan Strait on more than one occasion.<sup>8</sup> Wang Daohan postponed his visit to Taiwan in another demonstration of the PRC's ire over Lee's remarks.

The future holds a few critical milestones that merit attention. First was the presidential election in March 2000. The DPP candidate won, and Beijing did not take the results well. The DPP has a pro-independence reputation despite recent efforts to tone down its party platform. Beijing might have preferred Soong Chu-yu, a mainlander by birth, so there was at least the aura of mainland control. The Nationalist Party platform is still committed to reunification with the mainland but only once the mainland has become democratic. The Taiwanese would reject having to live under a communist government, but they do not rule out being citizens of a democratic China.<sup>9</sup>

A second milestone does not have a concrete date; it encompasses both the China-Taiwan missile balance and the rate of U.S. development and deployment of the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system. There is no guarantee the United States will sell TMD to Taiwan once the system is available. When the PRC develops an overwhelming superiority in offensive missiles, it may decide that patience with respect to the Taiwan question is no longer a virtue.

Other significant milestones could include Taiwan receiving earlier entry to the World Trade Organization than the PRC. More remotely, if the U.N. General Assembly tabled a motion to debate the admission of

Taiwan, that could have a negative impact on cross-strait relations.

### Possible Future Scenarios

**Status quo indefinitely.** In theory and in rhetoric, there is only one China, and Taiwan is a part of it. In practice, however, the island of Taiwan has control over its own affairs. It even employs a successful marketing campaign (dollar diplomacy) as the next best substitute to official recognition as a nation-state.

**The PRC retakes one of the islands close to the coast** in order to demonstrate its commitment to reunification and test Taiwanese and U.S. resolve.

**One China and Taiwan is part of it,** peacefully rejoined circa 2050 with the complete democratization of the mainland.

**One China and Taiwan is a part,** retaken by conventional force circa 2005 to 2015 upon the complete modernization of the PLA as the United States accepts the fait accompli.

**One China and Taiwan is a part of it,** but the island is uninhabitable due to the nuclear strikes the PRC launched when its conventional attack failed. The United States accepts the fait accompli.

**Two Chinas.** The PRC and the ROC decide via peaceful agreement (written into international law) that ethnicity is no longer destiny. Ethnically Chinese people do not need only one China and embrace a complete break with past concepts that have influenced 5000 years of Chinese history.

**One China and one Taiwan,** through peaceful consensus. The PRC accepts the de facto separation and accepts a de jure recognition of Taiwan on the condition the island does not claim to be a part of China.

**Two Chinas,** established via a peace treaty ending a second Chi-

nese civil war in 2020. In accordance with the *Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (TRA)*, the United States (in a coalition of nations) defended Taiwan after a PRC attack. The United States decided the TRA called for the defense of Taiwan and was a member of the coalition that came to Taiwan's defense. Victory would not have been possible were it not for the support and eventual participation in the war effort of the European Union and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

### The U.S. Military Perspective

The TRA makes it clear that any attempt by the PRC to "determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means" will be a matter of grave concern to the United States. The Act is purposefully vague and flexible. It requires the United States to ensure Taiwan has a self-defense capability with sufficient defensive weapons and services. It does not, however, give an unqualified promise to come to Taiwan's rescue if

attacked. As such, it sends a signal to Beijing that would make the Chinese think twice about using the force option while simultaneously denying the Taiwanese a blank check promise of support should they decide to declare independence without consulting the PRC and United States.

The PRC regards the Taiwan Strait problem as a domestic affair, but the island lies on a critical sea line of communication. Japan relies on the Taiwan Strait shipping route and ninety percent of Japan's imported crude oil travels through it.

The PRC has had 20 years to study the TRA. A 1999 Department of Defense report, *The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait*, suggests that the mainland leadership has not been wasting its time. The PLA of 1979, if it had had the proper level of equipment and training, would have contemplated blockade operations and amphibious assaults to retake the island. These operations, by their very nature, would





have triggered many indicators with sufficient time to allow the United States to respond and prevent an attack.

The PLA of 1999 is undergoing a doctrinal shift emphasizing quick offensive missile strikes by M-9 and M-11 missile launchers emplaced in Fujian province followed by airborne assault armies. These operations are much shorter and no one can assume there will enough time to deter a high-speed attack. The PRC and PLA would be betting that if they presented the world with this situation, the United States would decline to respond.<sup>10</sup>

Post-Kosovo, the PRC is very concerned about what they view as the U.S. propensity to involve itself in the internal affairs of other countries. This assessment only adds to the strategic pressure to make the Taiwan question a "done deal" before the United States can effectively intervene.

If the PRC decided to reunify by force, and the United States chose to assist the Taiwan's defense actively, the U.S. Army could potentially deploy on extremely short notice. We would have to address multiple issues of interoperability of doctrine, weapons systems, logistics, and language barriers simultaneously. Any large-scale effort to aid a Taiwanese defense would have an immediate impact upon the Army's ability to fulfill its commitments in the rest of the Asia-Pacific region and, no doubt, the rest of the world.

## Conclusion

For fifty years, the Taiwan Strait has been relatively peaceful. For much of that time, the PRC was absorbed in its domestic affairs. The possibility of armed conflict often seemed, and still seems, quite remote, even to Taiwan residents. Unfortunately, the Chinese civil war left a host of issues that still need resolution before there is guaran-

teed peace. Beyond that, the open door and economic modernization policies the PRC adopted more than twenty years ago have had follow-on effects on Chinese military capabilities and doctrine. The PLA has new-found muscles to flex—muscles it did not have twenty years ago. There is no guarantee that during the next fifty years, the parties will exercise the same level of judgment and restraint they did in the early 1950s. [They coordinated lobbying artillery shells at each other on alternating days so there would be few injuries.] Can a small, democratic island whose identity does not even exist under international law persuade the most powerful country in Asia to leave it alone?

## A Final Thought

Before the reintegrations of Hong Kong and Macao, a clock set up in downtown Beijing counted down the remaining seconds. One wonders what the clock setting is currently. Does the PRC dare to make a concrete statement of its (im)patience to take back Taiwan?\*

## Endnotes

1. There are other islands under Taiwan's current control, most notably Quemoy and Matsu, (Jinmen and Mazu in pinyin romanization) which are within visual range of the Chinese coastline. In the 1950s, the Communists and Nationalists set up loudspeakers to blare propaganda at each other.

2. The revolution of 1911 brought down the Qing Dynasty in 1912 and ended more than 2000 years of Chinese imperial history. The Republic of China was founded in 1912.

3. Rigger, Shelley, *Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), page 58.

4. Yates, Stephen, "Promoting Freedom and Security in U.S.-Taiwan Policy," *Heritage Foundation Background*, Number 1226, 13 October 1998. See [www.heritage.org/library/background/bg1226.html](http://www.heritage.org/library/background/bg1226.html).

5. Nye, Joseph, "A Taiwan Deal," *Washington Post*, 8 March 1998; Chas W. Freeman, "Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1998, pages 6-11.

6. I base this statement on many conversations I had with the residents of Taiwan during my stay in Taipei from 1998 through 1999.

7. Strict fidelity to that type of thinking would require the Communists to retake parts of what was outer Mongolia, but one does not hear of them calling for that.

8. For more information on the tensions of July and August 1999, see the archives of the *Economist* at [www.economist.com](http://www.economist.com), especially "Taiwan's High-stakes Game" (21 August 1999), "Taiwan's Long Farewell" (24 July 1999), and "Taiwan's Unnerving President Does It Again" (17 July 1999).

9. President Lee's remarks were in a question-and-answer session about his book, *The Road to Democracy*. See [www.taiwaninformation.org/lee/bio/lee121399.html](http://www.taiwaninformation.org/lee/bio/lee121399.html).

10. Ford, Carl (no relation to author), statement to a Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on "U.S.-Taiwan Relations: The 20th Anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act," 25 March 1999. See [www.taiwaninformation.org/views/speeches/ford032599.html](http://www.taiwaninformation.org/views/speeches/ford032599.html).

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# The People's Republic of China and Intelligence Analysis

equipment upgrades by 2010 (see Figure 1).

The narrowness of the Taiwan Strait reduces warning and reaction

by W. R. Baker

*Whom does the Communist Party of China regard as its international enemy? It is the United States.*

## —1993 People's Liberation Army Report

The threat of conflict between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) (Taiwan), as well as the challenge for intelligence analysts to anticipate such imminent hostilities cannot be overstated. By including the potential for conflict over the islands in the South China Sea, the challenge becomes even greater.<sup>1</sup>

U.S. naval operations near the Taiwan Strait prevented a 1996 clash between the PRC and ROC at the time, but the animosity between the two countries continues to merit increased vigilance. Recent political conditions, especially the ROC's call for a "state to state" dialogue between the two countries and its recent elections (March 2000), only serve to amplify the potential threat to the region.

*Use the West for China's purposes.*

—Chairman Mao Zedong,  
date unknown

The PRC is using trade as a means to acquire technology (through technology transfer, spying, etc.), while spending enormous sums to skip generations of technology for its armed services. The financial near-collapse of many of Russia's armament industries brings bargain prices and the PRC is a willing buyer. A recent government edict calls for completion of

### People's Liberation Army (PLA)

Reorganizing 6 of the 21 Group Armies from division to brigade structures  
BMP-3 Armored Personnel Carrier  
Bastion (9M117) antitank missile  
Model 2000 (update of T-90-2M) and T-72 tanks  
Surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs)  
360-kilometer "super-range rocket gun"  
SA-10 and SA-15 surface-to-air missile systems

### Peoples' Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF)

FBC-1/Flying Leopard, Su-27, Su-30MKK  
F-10 Multi-Role Fighter, Air-to-air refueling  
First true AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System)  
Air-to-air missiles (including AA-1 and AA-12)  
Air-to-surface missiles (including Kh-31 and Kh-59M)  
Doctrinal changes toward offensive air operations

### Peoples' Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)

2 (and possibly more) Sovremenny-class DDGs (guided missile destroyers) (equipped with SS-N-22 supersonic SSMs)  
4 Kilo-class SS, Type-093 SSN  
Indigenous development of SSN and SSBNs  
Development of the indigenous F-16U (Stealth) frigate (available for export)  
Doctrinal changes toward a "blue-water" navy

### Command, Control, and Communications

New C<sup>4</sup>I system (called "Qu Dian," using Feng Huo-1 (C/UHF band) satellites)  
Recent command post exercises  
Increased major simulations (including a U.S. Army brigade or battalion simulation provided in 1988)  
Foundation of an information technology (IT) academy, region, and programs

### Strategic

DF-31 ICBM, DF-41 ICBM, JL-2 submarine-launched ICBM  
Government approval for two aircraft carriers  
New SSBN submarine (Type-094), could field neutron bombs  
Listening posts in Cuba, Tarawa, and Burma  
Laser weapons (including a low-earth-orbit groundbased laser operational since mid-1998)  
Possibly obtaining the SS-N-26  
Increased joint operations and information warfare (IW)  
"Passive Coherent Location" system (anti-Stealth early-warning system)  
Increased emphasis on space and space operations  
Interested in acquiring the Russian Tu-22M BACKFIRE bomber  
Studying cyberwarfare for at least 15 years and recently "practiced" against Taiwan  
Chemical-biological research (soman, mustard gas, and antidote research against marine toxins (study such as TTX, MTX, and STX)).

Figure 1. Recent and Forthcoming Military Advances.

times if hostilities commence. The ROC cannot defend against a surprise attack. The construction of surface-to-surface missile sites (for more than 200 SSMs) along the PRC's coastline positioned for attacking the ROC compresses the warning and reaction time even further. The ROC recently stated that it could not count on the United States to defend Taiwan, given its current defensive deployments. U.S. forces increasingly stand at risk from the PRC's conventional and nuclear submarines, land- and sea-based SSMs, aircraft, and future nuclear weaponry everywhere in the Pacific Ocean.

### The PRC on the World Stage

Using its position as a member of the United Nations Security Council, the PRC prevents unwanted discussions of its internal affairs (e.g., human rights) and foreign affairs (e.g., U.N. resolution of the South China Sea dispute and the ROC's entry into the U.N. body). The PRC increasingly uses its financial strength to gain economic allies to isolate or lessen U.S. interests abroad (e.g., South Africa, Panama, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries, etc.). Furthermore, the PRC is increasingly employing bilateral agreements to secure its "1st Line of Defense" (area of influence) and ensuring its defense by purchasing state-of-the-art military equipment.

Despite pledges to the contrary, the PRC continues to sell weapons and technology (including nuclear components and SSMs). The recipients include Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, and most of the countries on the U.S. State Department's Official Terrorist List.

World Bank loans (the PRC is the largest benefactor in the world) are enabling the PRC to refurbish its infrastructure at virtually no cost, as the Bank has approved new loans

regularly for years. Its monetary reserves are at an all time high (US \$152.5B in October 1999). This is not surprising considering that many high-technology deals inside the country are joint ventures with Western corporations. Although it is a U.N. Security Council member, China pays virtually nothing (currently 0.97%) for its share of the U.N. budget.

Party, government, and military personnel changes at the higher levels tend to reflect not only Jiang's personal wishes but also indicate policy and political directions. The PRC has also recently established a National Security Council, based largely on U.S. design.

A PLA high-command textbook, **Can the Chinese Army Win the Next War?**, has guided strategic thought since its publication in 1993. Likewise, the recent publication of **Unrestricted Warfare: Assumptions on War and Tactics in the Age of Globalization** by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui seems to have attracted the attention of the leadership of the PLA and the government. It may serve as the guide by which the PRC will conduct future offensive operations. Briefly, this new "doctrine" states that all means of warfare (e.g., economic, information warfare (IW), etc.) are not only within grasp but should be applied to force submission of a

(greater) foe. In fact, they could preemptively initiate conflict and end it without ever firing a shot.

Document 65, an internal Chinese Communist Party Central Military Commission instruction, published in August 1999, states that active planning of a military invasion of Taiwan is taking place.<sup>2</sup> The instruction, sent to all regional commanders, also states that the PRC is prepared to wage war against U.S. intervention, up to and including the point where it would consider using its small force of nuclear weapons.

The PRC's view of the world is consistent with *Wei-chi* (literally the game of war) (pronounced way-chee). Central to understanding the Eastern perspective of war, *Wei-chi* defines their political behavior in a strategic sense. It provides a valuable tool for developing tactics and strategies consonant with opposing an Eastern mindset.<sup>3</sup>

The PRC attempts to stiffen resistance to the United States through various methods. The PRC knows that trade drives U.S. (and Western) foreign relations almost exclusively, and it consequently uses that fact to beat back any criticism of its internal affairs. Elsewhere, China uses its economic support to developing nations to gain allies.

On the world stage, the PRC has historically suffered from an inferi-

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The development of an Asia-Middle East-North Africa Axis is consistent with the PRC's grand designs for superpower status. The axis would comprise Iran, Pakistan, and the PRC as the leading nations, with North Korea, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and the Muslim states of the former Soviet Union within their orbit. Only the United States, Japan, and India stand in the way. Its neighbor, Pakistan diverts the latter, while China often cites Japanese aggression in World War II to keep Japan in check psychologically

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ority complex. China now demands recognition as an equal, though it signs and agrees to abide by international agreements and just as quickly ignores them. This is akin to diversionary diplomacy (much like, for example, the Paris Peace Accords that "ended" U.S. participation in Vietnam)—an old guerrilla warfare strategy. This gives the PRC better control over the timing of hostilities.

### Analysis of the PRC

*[As for the United States], for a relatively long time it will be absolutely necessary that we quietly nurse our sense of vengeance...We must conceal our abilities and bide our time.*

—Lieutenant General Mi Zhenyu, PLA, 1996.

The challenge to intelligence analysts is not only in monitoring new equipment acquisitions and technology (much less the PRC's weapons and technology exports), but also the level of proficiency that they attain. Deficiencies in PRC military technology required for power projection will identify the probable suppliers. "China watching" does not exclusively mean concentrating on the country itself: its economic (including black and gray markets), social, political, and military threads extend worldwide and are so intertwined that a global watch of current activities is necessary to predict future events and capabilities.

All too often, the results of new weapons, platforms, and technological advances catch analysts off guard. Focusing on the decision-makers and their opinions and judgments (collectively and individually) can assist in identifying where the PRC will seek to fill whatever technology gaps exist, as well as policy and doctrinal changes. This will undoubtedly require greater cooperation between governmental departments and agencies. Likewise, corporate, private, and individual

knowledge may also assist in specific and overall analysis.

A potential conflict in the region may occur under many guises:

- Quick preemptive strike.
- Strike when U.S. forces are elsewhere or spread thin.
- Strike as the result of an isolated incident, etc.

Any action the PRC takes "locally" may take the same or a different form strategically against U.S. forces, assets, or infrastructure.

*You could do that then because you knew we could not retaliate. Now we can. In the end, you care more about Los Angeles than you do about Taipei.*

—General Xiong Guangkai, PLA Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence [Discussing the PRC and North Korea during the Korean War and the threat of nuclear weapon use by the United States], October 1995.

### Conclusion

With more than 80 percent of the electorate voting in March, the Taiwanese elected a new president, Chen Shui-bian, thus bringing into power a new political party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). All three of the main presidential contenders, especially Chen, agreed that the ROC is a sovereign state, despite the PRC's intimidation in publishing its recent White Paper. While the United States' One-China policy is based on preserving peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, the political and geographical realities will eventually require resolution, not withstanding the PRC's incessant demands and timelines for Taiwan's absorption. While political appeasement, ignorance, ambiguity and wishful thinking have helped to mollify Adolph Hitler, Saddam Hussein, and Slobodan Milosevic, in each instance the result has been disastrous—this is not a lesson worth repeating. Hong Kong was the first instance in which a democracy (the United Kingdom) relinquished control of a colony to a communist

country. With 22 million people in Taiwan, will the United States be party to yet another democracy falling to the same fate?

China's apologists (political, business, academia, and other "experts") continue to dispute the PRC's intentions. However, China's military and civilian leaders have made it plain on numerous occasions that the United States is its enemy. It is foolish and, in light of continuing evidence, irresponsible for those concerned with the security of this nation to dismiss the increasing potential threat that China represents to the United States.\*

### Endnotes

1. Source: China Threat Brief at <http://www.jue.org/jue/chinaneews/threatbrief/index.htm>.
2. See <http://www.insightmag.com/archive/200003057.shtml>.
3. Chapen, Lieutenant Commander George S., "Wei-Chi: The Game of War," U.S. Navy, *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, August 1999.

*Walter R. "Bob" Baker graduated with the first 96B (Intelligence Analyst) class at Fort Huachuca in 1971. He served with the 1st Battalion, 525th MI Group, headquartered in Da Nang, Vietnam. His further assignments included tours with the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) Defense Analysis Center (EUDAC) at Vaihingen, Germany, as a Forward Area Ground and Naval Analyst and as an Electronic Order of Battle for Poland during the crisis and for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. Mr. Baker has a Bachelor of Science degree in Government from the University of Maryland. He has held various threat and threat manager positions with a number of defense contractors and has written numerous articles, including "The Easter Offensive of 1972: A Failure to Use Intelligence," published in the *MIPB* in January-March 1998. Mr. Baker also maintains a China Threat Brief on the web at the address noted in endnote 1 above. Readers can contact him via E-mail at [wrbaker@hotmail.com](mailto:wrbaker@hotmail.com).*

# How Will We Talk To Them All?

by Chief Warrant Officer Three  
Ray Lane Aldrich (USA, Retired)

Look at the world crisis map for a moment (see Figure 1). Forget about where all those places are and how difficult it will be to get there. Transportation is not really a major problem. We have planes, ships, and trucks to handle that well.

The real obstacle is that once we deploy to a crisis area, we will have to speak (or listen) to someone. We will have to talk about everything from, *"Where will we stop all these planes and ships and trucks,"* to *"How do we get the people off, where do we put them, what do we feed them, where do they bathe, and..."* You get the idea.


## Analyzing the Linguist Situation

There are roughly 40 locations highlighted on the crisis map. If we are lucky, the local inhabitants will all speak or understand English. Consider the chance of our military doing something in a former colony of the British Empire; that slim chance leaves many other places and many languages that we do not speak. Looking at one of the simpler databases of languages and where they occur, we note about 700 entries. The 40 conflicts on the map would require us to have linguists in more than 100 different languages to cover most of the possibilities. We can shorten the list

considerably if we accept the risk that the participants will not use all of their possible languages just to confuse our intelligence collectors.

We must either find or train folks who can converse with or translate for these people. The problem is too few linguists, or too many contingencies in the "wrong" places. Our solution has been to fill from the inventory, train new linguists, and contract for the shortfalls. We should plan and prepare to have the requisite linguists available when necessary.

Finding needed linguists is, in many cases, cheaper and faster than training new ones. It often provides more fluent speakers. The best (and cheapest) way to find people that speak foreign languages is to convince service members that they should tell us who they are. If all soldiers (not to mention the sailors, airmen, and Marines) who had any skill in a foreign language would identify them-



**Figure 1. Current World Conflicts.**

## "Stop! Drop Your Weapons!"

One of the best deals in our military language business is the Survival Guide from the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC). It consists of essential words and phrases for contingency operations gathered into a small booklet with—

- A pronunciation guide for each phrase.
- Plastic-coated command and control cards that fit easily into your cargo pocket.
- An audiocassette that helps you with the pronunciation.

Available in more than 40 languages, you can get these survival guides by mail from DLIFLC in time to outfit your quick reaction force or you can download many of them from LingNet, DLIFLC's language-focused website. These guides will not make you a great linguist, but they just might save your life.

Contact DLIFLC through Mr. Radko M. Trapl (for AC) at (831) 242-5112 or DSN 878-5108 or Mr. William E. Burkhardt (for Reserves) at (831) 242-5319 (DSN 878-5319). Their website is at [www.lingnet.org](http://www.lingnet.org).



selves, we would be well on our way to dealing with some of these crises.

If we cannot find anyone in the Army who speaks the language we need, we can then check the other Services. If our need still exceeds our inventory, we can usually contract for it. Contract linguists are expensive, but if we have no inventory and too little time to train, they are an excellent option.

We have been able to contract some very valuable people in some rather obscure languages. Some contract personnel are U.S. citizens, some are talented local nationals, some are talented medical (and other) professionals, and some are even former service members.

### Achieving a Solution

The shortage of linguists to meet the needs of the U.S. Forces in

contingencies is critical. Planning and preparation form the route we must follow to solve the "language problem."

**Planning.** Planning, in our context, means convincing the planners to acknowledge that most of the world does not speak English. When the planners seriously consider this fact and incorporate the need for linguists into their plans, our soldiers will be able to contend with the necessity to speak the local languages.

We, and the planners, must think beyond the traditional military intelligence skills of interrogator, analyst, voice interceptor, and counterintelligence agent. There is a far greater need to deal with the routine, infrastructure needs of local supply, liaison, law enforcement, civil affairs, medical, transportation, and any number of other categories that become significant problems when the participants' languages are different. The infrastructure-related linguistic requirements are much greater than intelligence would demand. In Bosnia, the Army acknowledges a need for about 50 Serbo-Croatian-qualified military linguists while contracting for more than 500 civilian linguists. There is certainly overlap between the categories, but the fact remains that, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ratio is about one in ten.

Brigadier General Bantz J. (John) Craddock, commander of Task Force Falcon during the initial stages of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Kosovo peacekeeping force (KFOR), reported in *Army* magazine—

*We had 12 interpreters, linguists, to start when we needed 150. It is very difficult for the soldier down on the street, down on the beat, working a corner, when two people are fighting and he*



*does not have someone who can speak the language. You can only go so far with sign language.*

While this is obviously a snap comment, it underscores the need to plan for significant numbers of linguists during a small-scale contingency.

The entire complement of Albanian linguists consists of about 500 contractors. The basis for the early policy decisions to contract for the entire requisition of Albanian linguists was a nearly negative inventory-check result and a 47-week training course. Albanian is such a unique language that there were no practical cross-training options from or within a similar language family.

**Preparation.** What type of preparation is possible? Data mining would provide us with a greatly enhanced inventory. If we knew the soldiers who had a foreign language skill (regardless of specialty), we would be able to call on them when we needed their particular language skills.

We already have the tools to gather that data. We do not have to test the soldiers, we can allow them to "self evaluate" and save significant amounts of time and money. The Army's basic personnel database already lists many linguists. It is an ideal repository for this information and it is free. There is no additional database maintenance or cost, no additional data-entry costs, no changes needed in the database itself. The data-entry mechanism and form are already in use on a regular basis. We can use **DA Form 330, Language Proficiency Questionnaire**, to gather data on "self evaluation" of language proficiency just as we currently employ it to gather the results of the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) or the Oral Proficiency Interview

(OPI). We only need to enforce entry of this specific data into the personnel database.

So what is the problem? If everything the database is already in place, why do we not have the data we need? This data is unavailable because no one has insisted on the gathering and entry of the information.

Just two actions are necessary to make this data available: **inventory** and **ask**. We should inventory all current soldiers on their language proficiencies. We only need to know the languages in which the soldier has some degree of proficiency and his evaluation of that level of proficiency on the Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR) scale (0 to 5) used by all the Services. The lowest possible level should have responsibility for this inventory; for example, company commanders should be responsible for gathering language information on all soldiers in their companies.

We should solicit the same data on each recruit during enlistment processing. The recruiters or the processing station commanders should take responsibility for annotating these skills; it would not take long nor be difficult to accomplish. If we gather this data very early in the enlistment process we will accomplish two things. First, we will gather the data before most of the recruits have exposure to the soldiers' maxim "don't volunteer for anything." We will also let them know early in their careers that we value their language skills.

The beauty of self-evaluation is that if we never need anyone who speaks "Ancient Hindi" for example, we never have to spend any money to test these folks or develop an Ancient Hindi DLPT. If we need them, either for immediate deployment or as candidates for further training, we know where to find them.

This process is doable. The Air Force has already done it; it only required command emphasis—down to the squadron (company) commander for the inventory and the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) for the queries of the enlistees.

## The Bottom Line

This solution to our linguist shortage problems would be easy and inexpensive! Using the folks with basic skills in a language for the infrastructure-related communication would free the more fluent soldiers to use their abilities where fluency is required. Include the foreign language infrastructure (specifically in the planning), build the inventory, contract against the shortfalls. If this is done, we would be able to find the Haitian-Creole speakers we sought so hard not long ago.\*

*Mr. Lane Aldrich currently represents the Army Foreign Language proficiency Office for the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence where he has worked for nearly a decade. He retired as a Chief Warrant Officer Three from the U.S. Army. Following dismal attempts to learn Spanish and French in high school and junior college, he became serious about foreign languages (Russian) in 1961 while in the Air Force. His involvement with military aspects of foreign languages spanned through Air Force enlisted, Army warrant officer, and, ultimately, Army civilian staff positions to this day. He learned German at the Defense Language Institute and has earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in Russian Area Studies and Russian at the University of California. He also has dedicated time to graduate studies at the Army Management Staff College along the way. Readers may contact Mr. Aldrich via E-mail at [ray.aldrich@hqda.army.mil](mailto:ray.aldrich@hqda.army.mil) and telephonically at (703) 601-0708 or DSN 329-0708.*


# Demining Operations in Africa

by Captain Mark T. Riccardi, AGR

Eritrea and Ethiopia are in north-eastern Africa, also known as the "Horn of Africa." Neither country is very prosperous, with a gross national product per capita of only \$75-\$150. Most families live off their own farmlands, and when that land conceals landmines, basic survival becomes even more challenging. The two countries had concluded a thirty-year civil war in which Eritrea won independence from Ethiopia. Between the years of 1975 and 1991, warring factions placed more than 2,000,000 antipersonnel (AP) and antitank (AT) mines in Eritrea alone. Between May 1991 and May 1993, 2000 landmine incidents involved either death or disfigurement to civilians. Upon our arrival in Eritrea, estimates indicated that nearly 500,000 mines remained in places considered cleared by the government.

Since the Eritreans fought a mostly guerrilla war, accurate records and accounting of the mines were scarce. Compounding our challenge in detecting the mines was the different types used. There were mines from Russia, the United States, Italy, Egypt, and the others listed in Figures 1 and 2. Many had anti-tamper or -removal fuses. The minefields included plastic, wooden, and metal mines; one could not safely enter a minefield with just one type of detector.

Both countries requested the assistance of the United States Government to locate and remove the mines. The Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) tasked 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) to form the majority of a



Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). The JSOTF included counterintelligence agents and topographic engineers from Fort Hood, Texas; the CI detachment comprised a team for each country.

## Mission Preparation

Before our arrival in country, we reported to MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, for several weeks of training. Our unit formed an Information Fusion Cell (IFC), which oversaw the operations of CI, psychological operations (PSYOPS), and the topographic engineers. The IFC, structured like an S2 shop in a maneuver battalion or brigade, took information from all of the field operatives, and produced templates of suspected and confirmed landmine locations using intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). We also spent several weeks pouring through government records, studying both the Soviet and U.S. patterns of minefield construction, and conducted predictive analysis to dispatch survey teams to suspect areas.

A company from the 5th Special Forces (SF) Group from Fort

Campbell, Kentucky, joined us early in the operation and their commander assumed command of the task force (TF). Figure 3 shows the command and control (C<sup>2</sup>) configuration in each country.

## CI Helped Open the Door

Both countries looked forward to U.S. involvement in their landmine crisis, but they harbored uneasiness about having U.S. soldiers, sailors, and marines in their land. SOCCENT made a smart decision in requesting CI agents for the mission. When we first arrived, many closed doors hindered our operations. It has been my experience that good CI agents are truly the "great communicators." They took on the lion's share of the acceptance process by going into the government offices, meeting the workers and, over time, building a relationship of trust. Every night these "ambassadors" walked downtown, visiting local shopkeepers and developing relationships with them. By conducting ourselves in a professional and respectful manner, we showed the populace there was nothing to fear from our

Mine	Country of Manufacture	Type, Lethal Mech.	Comments
M7A2	United States	AT, blast	Steel body
M15	United States	AT, blast	Steel body
M/71	Egypt	AT, blast	Metal body
Mk-7	United Kingdom	AT, blast	Steel body
P2 Mk2	Pakistan	AT, blast	Plastic body
P2 Mk3	Pakistan	AT, blast	Plastic body
PM-60	Former E. Germany	AT, blast	Plastic body
PMS-40	Former Soviet Union	AT, blast	Steel body, AT & AP
PRB M3	Belgium	AT, blast	Plastic body
PRB M3 A1	Belgium	AT, blast	Plastic body
PT-MiBa II	Former Czechoslovakia	AT, blast	Plastic or metal body
PT-MiBa III	Former Czechoslovakia	AT, blast	Plastic body, removal fuse.
PT-Mi-K	Former Czechoslovakia	AT, blast	Steel body, removal fuse.
TM-46	Former Soviet Union	AT, blast	Steel body
TMN-46	Former Soviet Union	AT, blast	Steel body
TM-57	Former Soviet Union	AT, blast	Steel body
TM-62M	Former Soviet Union	AT, blast	Steel body
TM-62P	Former Soviet Union	AT, blast	Plastic body
TMA-3	Former Yugoslavia	AT, blast	Fiberglass body
TMK-2	Former Soviet Union	AT, shaped-charge	Steel body w/tiltrod
TMM-1	Former Yugoslavia	AT, blast	Sheet metal
Type 72	China, S. Africa	AT, blast	Plastic body

Figure 1. Antitank Mines Encountered in Eritrea.

involvement. It did not take long before the government offices granted us almost limitless access to their archives, which greatly enhanced the success we achieved.

### Demining Operations

The Operations Detachment Alpha soldiers set up a base camp in Keren, which is 91 kilometers north-west of Asmara.<sup>1</sup> Their mission was to train their host nation counterparts in the actual removal and destruction of the landmines located by the IFC. The interaction between Special Forces and MI personnel

was a natural and positive experience. The total professionalism of the SF detachment was unlike that of any conventional unit with which I had ever served. Their linguistic abilities and knowledge of African culture were invaluable.


The CI agents took on an active role that went beyond the traditional interviewing techniques. While instructing our host-nation counterparts, we went to the actual suspected minefields and conducted a sweep of the area. We would look for obvious signs of

mines, detonations, or markings and record the pinpointed location shown on a GPS (Global Positioning System) device. We would then photograph and draw a sketch of the area. The agents sent this information to the IFC where we plotted it on our map board. When we confirmed the location of a minefield, or we strongly believed one existed, we would pass on the information to the Keren base camp, and they would then dispatch teams to disarm and recover the mines.

Mine	Country of Manufacture	Type, Lethal Mech.	Comments
DM-11	Former W. Germany	AP, blast	Plastic body
M3	United States	AP, fragmentation	Cast iron body
M14	United States	AP, blast	Plastic body
M16A1	United States	AP, bounding frag	Metal, "Bouncing Betty"
M18A1	United States	AP, directed frag	Plastic body
MIAPDV 63	France	AP, blast	Plastic body, Stake mine.
MIAPID 51	France	AP, blast	Plastic body
MON-50	Former Soviet Union	AP, directed frag	Plastic body
MON-100	Former Soviet Union	AP, directed frag	Steel body
MON-200	Former Soviet Union	AP, directed frag	Steel body
OZM-3	Former Soviet Union	AP, bounding frag	Cast iron body
OZM-4	Former Soviet Union	AP, bounding frag	Cast iron body
OZM-72	Former Soviet Union	AP, bounding frag	Steel body
P2 Mk2	Pakistan	AP, blast	Plastic body
PMD-6	Former Soviet Union	AP, blast	Wood body
PMN	Former Soviet Union	AP, blast	Bakelite body, rubber cover
PMP-71	Former E. Germany	AP, frag	Plastic body
POMZ-2, -2M	Former Soviet Union	AP, frag	Cast iron body, stake
PP-Mi-Sr	Former Czechoslovakia	AP, frag	Steel body
PP-Mi-Sr II	Former Czechoslovakia	AP, frag	Steel body
PPM-2	Former E. Germany, China	AP, blast	Plastic body
PRB M35	Belgium	AP, blast	Plastic body
PROM-1	Former Yugoslavia	AP, frag	Steel body
Type 69	China	AP, frag	Cast iron body
Type 72	China, South Africa	AP, blast	Plastic body
V Mine	Italy	AP, frag	Metal body, stake

Figure 2. Antipersonnel Mines Found in Eritrea.





**Figure 3. Demining Operations Command and Control in Eritrea and Ethiopia.**

The justification for our presence was all along the countryside. It was a daily occurrence to see unexploded mortar rounds in vegetation and antipersonnel land mines with their exposed fuses poking from the ground. Tanks lay on their sides with their turrets blown off. Most telling, however, was the number of people (children and adults) disfigured by landmines.

One of our biggest challenges—and the reason for our many mine awareness programs—was the complacency that came with thirty years of civil war. People became accustomed to having land mines in their villages. When they located one, farmers would pile rocks near the mine and just plow around it. Unfortunately, livestock did not know

the meaning of these rock formations and animal carcasses were a common sight. Considering that many live in huts constructed of mud and cow dung and survive on only what they grow, the loss of one cow can devastate a village.

It was also common to see families dig up mines (particularly AT mines), remove the explosives, and use them for many purposes such as cookware. They did not always extract these mines properly and many people were injured or killed in the attempt. During our time in country, the JSOTF medic repaired the hand of a small child who encountered a hand grenade in the fields and was tossing it into the air when it exploded.



Photos courtesy of the author.

**Host nation students on their own sharing what they learned.**

Our Task Force conducted a Medical Civilian Assistance Program (MEDCAP) in several villages. This entailed having medics come into a village, provide vaccinations, conduct physicals, and provide protein supplements for the malnourished. This program was not only a wonderful humanitarian mission, but also provided great intelligence in our mine detection efforts. CI soldiers would accompany the medic and as people came in to seek care, they would interview them. Due to the large number of people seeking medical help, we could not interview everyone but we did identify many individuals knowing the locations of unexploded mines. We received many good leads by participating in the MEDCAP excursions.

It was always our intention to create a self-sustaining program that would continue upon our departure. To meet this goal, we set up a basic train-the-trainer program. The cadre trained the first set of host-nation students in intelligence gathering techniques, interview techniques, use of the Global Positioning System (GPS), computer and camera operations, and a multimedia mine-awareness educational program. Upon completion of this training, these host-nation soldiers became the trainers who taught another group of students, using the CI team as assistant instructors. They conducted a third class completely on their own.

## Comments and Conclusions

This was the largest demining operation conducted since the conclusion of World War II. I found the complexity of the operation and the inherent political sensitivities surprising. Briefing ambassadors and dealing with foreign government officials was an incredible learning experience.<sup>2</sup>

Some questioned the validity of the mission and why CI was involved in it. Humanitarian missions such as this are among the few real world missions CI agents can conduct in peacetime that train their wartime mission. Of course, we did not take a mission training plan with us and check off every individual and collective task. However, just as you can do various activities to prepare yourself for the physical fitness test, you do not have to stay with conventional CI tasks to increase your proficiency in CI operations. As for the validity of the mission, we only need to look at our current operations worldwide to see the importance of missions such as landmine removal. Recently, a landmine killed a soldier from 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) in southeastern Kosovo.

The operations performed by CI personnel were a crucial factor in the overwhelming success of this mission. Not only did they perform their traditional interviewing role, they also modified their role of conducting investigations to more fully meet mission goals. Their targets were the landmines and they used their training to find them. The mines



Result of an antitank mine.

became the primary collection target for the IFC and drove the IPB process. Had it not been for the presence of the CI agents, the sparseness of intelligence would have certainly affected the demining operations.\*

#### Endnotes

1. The base camp's name, Firebase Cobra, came from the large number of cobra snakes populating the area. Included in every night's situation report

from Keren was a "Snake-REP" detailing the day's cobra movements and the changes in their population.

2. I even learned to smile and nod acceptance when the Eritrean Minister of Defense offered me a second serving of sautéed cow intestines, which his wife had prepared in our honor.

*Captain Mark Riccardi is an Active Guard and Reserve officer with the Colorado National Guard. He is the Operations Officer for the recently formed Weapons of Mass Destruction Team stationed in Denver, Colorado. His previous assignments include: MI Detachment Commander, 5/19th Special Forces (Airborne); CI Detachment Commander, SOCCENT; S1, 163d MI Battalion (Technical Exploitation); Assistant Brigade S2, 2d Armored Division and 6th Infantry Division (Light); Ground Surveillance Platoon Leader, 106th MI Battalion. His final overseas tour as a Title 10 Federal Active Duty officer was in Eritrea and Ethiopia for six months where he commanded the CI detachment and was also the JSOTF Executive Officer that supported the demining mission. He holds a Master of Education degree in Human Resources Development from Colorado State University and his Bachelor of Arts degree in English was from College of Staten Island, City University of New York. Readers can contact him at [mark.riccardi@cobuck.ang.af.mil](mailto:mark.riccardi@cobuck.ang.af.mil).*



Our end result—host nation students fully capable of conducting a self-sustaining demining program.

# Service to the Nation

## The JTF-6 Reserve Intelligence Analyst Counterdrug Program

by Major John E. Della-Giustina

Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6), established in 1989 at Fort Bliss, Texas, is responsible for providing Department of Defense (DOD) assistance to law enforcement agencies (LEAs) throughout the continental United States (CONUS). JTF-6 supports the President's National Drug Control Strategy with a variety of operational, general support, engineer, and intelligence missions. One of JTF-6's most successful programs has been the assignment of Reserve Component (RC) intelligence analysts to federal, state, and local counterdrug (CD) agencies.

JTF-6 started the Reserve Intelligence Analyst (IA) program in 1991 to demonstrate the unique capabilities DOD analysts could provide LEAs in their ongoing mission to detect, deter, disrupt, and dismantle illegal drug-trafficking organizations. The IA program simultaneously provides superb training and experience to Reservists in a civil-military environment. This program has also given each Service a growing pool of ready, better-trained intelligence personnel who could be called to active duty should a crisis occur.

### Program Administration

Currently, JTF-6 assigns approximately 150 volunteer intelligence analysts every six months to provide direct support analytical capability to LEAs. JTF-6 sends IAs on 179-day active duty special work (ADSW) orders starting in October and April each year.

JTF-6 draws the IAs from the Reserve Components of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. Each Service has CD program managers at their RC headquarters who screen and select IAs for tours.



The Army has two managers—one at the U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM) in Saint Louis, Missouri, for Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) soldiers, and one for drilling soldiers in units at the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC), Fort McPherson, Georgia.

IAs can hold any grade or intelligence specialty. Almost every IA position requires a current Top Secret special background investigation-based clearance (within five years). Certain LEAs conduct additional checks on soldiers slated to work for their agencies. CD program managers look for the following characteristics in prospective IAs:

- Maturity.
- Analytical experience.
- Organizational, writing, and computer skills.
- An ability to work well with others.

Often, an LEA supervisor's only experience with the military is through the IA program.

Analysts draw full pay and allowances during ADSW tours and JTF-

6 provides temporary duty per diem for those IAs not local to their mission sites. Although mission locations change slightly every six months, IA positions are available in almost every area of the country.

The JTF-6 Analyst Plans and Operations Division (APOD), provides mission oversight of IAs throughout their tours. Regional plans officers supervise all operational, administrative, and logistical aspects of an IA while deployed on mission. The planners visit each site during the tour. The JTF-6 Intelligence Directorate conducts intelligence oversight visits each cycle to assure compliance with statutory laws and regulations.

### Counterdrug Intelligence Analyst Training

Prior to proceeding to their mission sites, IAs report to Fort Bliss, Texas, at the start of the tour for a one-week initial planning conference (IPC). Here, Service representatives update all administrative and financial requirements for this and other possible deployments. JTF-6 presents a series of briefings to thoroughly prepare IAs for their missions. The Florida National Guard Counterdrug Training Detachment provides the training courses the last three days of the IPC. IAs attend a basic or advanced analytical investigative techniques course based on their experience levels. This training helps bridge the gap between conventional analytical skills and those used in the CD environment.

CD intelligence analysis is most closely associated with the general intelligence skills of 96B/350B/35Ds (intelligence analysts and all-source technicians and officers) and the





JTF-6 intelligence analysts conducting counterdrug support.

analytical and liaison tasks of human intelligence soldiers 97B/351B/35Es (HUMINT and counterintelligence specialties). The support provided to LEAs includes threat assessment and analysis, telephone toll and pattern analysis, development of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) products, daily analytical case support, and production of written reports and graphic analysis tools.

### Military Analyst Roles and Restrictions

JTF-6 only assigns IAs to support LEAs when and where a clear counterdrug nexus exists. Most of these positions are with multi-jurisdictional, multi-agency CD task forces located in one of the 29 CONUS high-intensity drug-trafficking areas (HIDTA). Operation Alliance, comprised of civilian LEA representatives, reviews, validates, and ranks all LEA requests for Title 10 federal military support. Every six

months, they publish a list of the prioritized positions for IA support to JTF-6.

The IAs' primary purpose on these missions is to analyze information and data from ongoing LEA drug investigations. The analysts develop reports and products that LEAs use to successfully prosecute drug organizations. IA analytical work has successfully contributed to numerous seizures of illegal narcotics and currency leading to many drug-trafficking arrests and convictions.

Since JTF-6 provides federal military support to civilian LEAs, intelligence analysts have two significant restrictions while on mission. First, they must comply with the *Posse Comitatus Act*, which prohibits IAs from conducting or participating in any search, seizure, arrest, interrogation, interview, or any related law-enforcement activity involving civilians. Second, they must observe intelligence oversight restric-

tions that prohibit IA participation in any active collection, surveillance, or reconnaissance of U.S. persons and organizations. Additionally, IAs cannot collect, disseminate, or retain data on U.S. persons and organizations.

### Conclusion

These intelligence analyst assignments are varied but all are extremely interesting and expose military analysts to a different method for conducting threat analysis. Additionally, the computer software training gained on most tours is substantial and directly applicable to their military analytical skills. Overall, the IA program produces better analysts who can apply their knowledge and experience to future positions.

More important, however, is the significant capability the analysts bring to the counterdrug agencies in their efforts to reduce the availability of illicit drugs and associated crime. On a daily basis each analyst amply fulfills the JTF-6 credo of "Service to the Nation."

For additional information on the JTF-6 Reserve Intelligence Analyst Program, contact the JTF-6 Analyst Plans and Operations Division at (915) 568-9097/8933 or DSN 978-9097/8933. You can reach the Army CD Program Managers at AR-PERSCOM at 1-800-325-1874, extension 1, and at USARC at (404) 464-8332. For general information, visit the JTF-6 website at <http://www-jtf6.bliss.army.mil/>.\*

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Analysis Element (TCAE) Chief, 104th MI Battalion, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson; and a Company Executive Officer, Battalion S2, and Counterintelligence Platoon Leader in the 165th MI Battalion, 205th MI Brigade, V Corps, Germany. His military

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## Military Intelligence Museum Receives Enigma Cipher Machine



Larry Hampton explaining the Enigma during presentation.

The MI Museum at Fort Huachuca has received a World War II, Nazi encoding-decoding machine, the Enigma. Mr. Larry N. Hampton of the National Security Agency presented the machine on 23 March 2000. This well-preserved Enigma machine is on permanent loan from NSA's National Cryptologic Museum at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. This particular machine, manufactured in 1942, is a ground forces variant; there were several variants in use by the military services, government, railroads, and more.

The solution of the Enigma cipher machine was one of the most significant intelligence

events of World War II. The German and Japanese commands considered the Enigma code unbreakable. Used by the Germans and Japanese to encipher and decipher messages, the Enigma consisted of an alphanumeric keyboard, with no numerals or punctuation on the keys. Inside the machine, the keys attached to a scrambler unit consisting of three of a set of five rotating wheels. The rotating wheels scrambled each message according to the 26 contacts on each wheel, allowing any recipient using the same three wheels to decode the message. By changing the positions of the three wheels each day, according to a standard procedure, the high commands could ensure a fresh code each day.

Successful cryptanalytic attack of the Enigma system and the subsequent discovery of its daily coding sequence allowed the Allies to read the daily communications of the Nazi command. Furthermore, the Allies' concealment of the fact that they had the machine also meant that the Nazis would not begin using a different code system.

The Allies' ability to read enemy communications was critical, and they went to great lengths to protect the knowledge that they could. A perfect example was the Allies' intercept of communications indicating when and where the Germans were to resupply Field Marshal Rommel in Africa. To disguise the fact that they had intercepted the

communication, the Allies flew scout airplanes over the supply ships; the bombers came later. Highlighting the crucial importance of the machine: Winston Churchill—despite having prior warning through Enigma traffic—was forced to allow the Germans to bomb the city of Coventry without warning the citizens, for fear the Nazis would know that their codes had been broken.

The capture of the Enigma and its codes during the war saved thousands of American lives and likely shortened the war in Europe. Historians consider the exploitation of its code the most spectacular cryptologic success in history. Never before on public display, the MI Museum is pleased to exhibit this important piece of intelligence history.



# DOCTRINE

by Stephen B. Leeder and Gary M. Kraak

The Doctrine Division is seeking resourcing in order to experiment with a new doctrinal model. The new model includes standard database and web technologies in conjunction with a new method of developing and presenting doctrine to better support you, the customer, and to improve the current process. The purpose of this proposal is **not** to develop unique hardware or software applications for doctrinal development.

More specifically, this proposal endeavors to develop an easier and more efficient means of presenting and developing doctrine. A partnership between the Intelligence Center, Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine (DCSDOC), U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and the "University After Next" at CALL (Center for Army Lessons Learned) provides the basis. The objective is web-based relational doctrine without field manuals (FMs) (by developing related chunks) across the entire Army.

We will start by building a prototype (centered on intelligence doctrine) to discover how far we can leverage technology at a minimal cost. We would base the fundamental framework for the prototype on the Army Universal Task List (AUTL). For an interim period, we believe that it will be relatively easy to ensure that we develop these flexible portions of doctrine in accordance with existing doctrine.

## Field Manuals: A Losing Proposition

The revision of existing and development of new doctrine and tactics,

## A New Doctrinal Model

techniques and procedures (TTP) is a complicated and resource-intensive task. It is clear that the current model for presenting and developing doctrine (e.g., printed FMs) is "a losing proposition" when you balance growing doctrinal requirements against diminishing resources (to include the printing budget). Several trends in Army operations since the end of the Cold War have created requirements for a larger volume of doctrine that we must develop, revise, and validate at a faster pace. These trends include—

- The Army's operational tempo (OPTEMPO).
- Operations in a variety of uncommon environments with unique missions.
- The faster fielding of many new organizations, systems, and technology to include the many facets of spiral development and Army Experimentation Campaign Plan (AECPP) investigation.
- The emergence of information operations (IO) and other significant changes to Army operations.

At the same time, the current OPTEMPO and the inability of doctrine to keep pace with these growing requirements have caused several negative impacts to our individual customers (Army units):

- It is a burden to maintain enough copies of the latest approved and draft manuals (especially for Reserve and National Guard Units).
- Users have a loss of confidence in doctrine, less thor-

ough understanding, handles inclination to use doctrine. MI professionals have less time and inclination to thoroughly review draft doctrine.

- In the face of outdated doctrine, units develop their own doctrine and TTP, resulting in nonstandard operations.

Finally, the cycle perpetuates itself as less training material and actual training has a firm doctrinal foundation. At the same time that each TRADOC proponent (e.g., Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery) does its best to struggle with the reality of these factors, TRADOC is under pressure to find efficiencies across the scope of training and doctrine because of continuous resource constraints.

Doctrine is doomed to lag in timeliness and responsiveness to the field. For example, a change to the steps of the IPB process in FM 34-130 (**Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield**) would necessitate a revision of FMs 34-1 (**Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations**), 34-3 (**Intelligence Analysis**), 34-7 (**IEW Support to Stability Operations and Support Operations**), 34-8 (**Combat Commanders Handbook on Intelligence**), 34-8-2 (**Intelligence Officers Handbook**), all four echelon manuals, and many other intelligence manuals.

The lag in changing the other manuals creates a problem for the customers if they use the older manuals. Currently, the Intelligence Center lacks the resources (and likely always will) to break the backlog, deal with emerging doctrine, and rapidly maintain the body of intelligence doctrine. To "stack the deck in our favor," a judicious



change in the development process, combined with technology, can help to provide a more useful product, at a faster pace, and with related customer tools.

### The Concept

The Army must develop a model to enable doctrine to keep pace with the rapid changes in Army concepts, operations, systems, technology, and AECF (Army Experimentation Campaign Plan) exploration that combine to create an environment of spiral development. We must find the tools to better support our customers with timely and relevant doctrine.

By leveraging current technology, we are confident that we will demonstrate greater efficiencies when we replace the complicated hierarchy and duplication of effort (inherent to FMs) with one-time entry, web-based relational doctrine. We refer to this technique as "chunking." Such tools as the Active Server Page (ASP), Standard Query Language (SQL), and Visual Basic™ databases will provide an unprecedented capability to truly exploit web-based doctrine. Consequently, each proponent can sequentially revise that doctrinal chunk most immediately in need of revision without having to revise a large number of FMs simultaneously.

The aim of this initiative is producing both a prototype and a new process with supporting procedures for the doctrinal development process. This will result in a greater distinction between the different elements of doctrine and therefore, the query focuses doctrine for the customer. The elements also standardize doctrine across the Army. While this may not seem significant, one of the recurring deficiencies in doctrine development is the inability to combine different elements in an effective and standard manner. Principles, functions, processes, descriptions, systems and architec-

tures, terminology, vignettes and examples, force structure, and TTP are all unique elements of doctrine. It is important that the customers can efficiently get to the element of doctrine they need. This will also facilitate development of training materials and provide for distance learning.

This concept will lead to a better customer relationship with doctrine. It will result in—

- Greater access to doctrine, lessons learned, and training products (a valuable unit- and self-development training tool for soldiers and leaders).
- Renewed confidence in the quality, responsiveness, and adequacy of doctrine and training products.
- More thoroughly read, reviewed, understood, and used doctrine and training products.

The new doctrine model will offer several enhanced attributes. These characteristics include—

- Friendliness and ease of use (easy access, smart search, and integrated use of supporting information).
- More dynamic and faster development (new method, one-time entry, electronic staffing, change detection, and tracking and development tools).
- Valuable tools (lessons learned, training products, the AECF TTP, and other linkages).

**Easy access.** The customer can quickly access any doctrine (relative to the scope of the experiment) without needing to know an FM number, title, or the Internet address of the appropriate text. The customer accesses the specific material (chunk) desired based on intuitive linkages with a smart search function and minimal scrolling. A related part of the experiment

is to periodically produce the necessary number of compact discs to support the needs in the field.

**Smart search.** An aggressive but important part of the concept is to provide the customer a smart search capability that allows the users to go to the doctrinal material they want more effectively than most current search engines permit.

**Integrated use of supporting information.** The customer views both approved and draft doctrine, and other customer comments about draft doctrine within the same frame-work. Additionally, it offers linkages to lessons learned, AECF TTP, and training products. (Note: We do not intend this methodology to replace, circumvent, or conflict with the mission of CALL. Rather, we will include this as a complementary effort that augments the production of CALL products.)

**A new method.** A prototype (containing intelligence doctrine) and a new process with supporting procedures for the doctrinal development process that we can export to DCSDOC TRADOC and all other doctrinal proponents.

**One-time entry.** This initiative will provide doctrine developers with a one-time (or a limited number) universal entry of doctrinal information (chunks). Additionally, a global search and replace function across the entire web site is essential.

**Electronic staffing.** The web site will facilitate faster staffing of draft doctrine through customer-friendly tools to receive input from the field. This site will have a discussion group and a comment box capability. We may possibly work with the Army Training Support Center to use the Automated Systems Approach to Training-Docctrine (ASAT-D) electronic staffing capability.

**"Tags" (Change Detection).** To better support other doctrine developers, instructors and trainers, and the units in the field, the website will notify users whenever a doctrine

chunk changes. This enables the customer to keep up with doctrinal changes and enables the proponents to react and change doctrine in a more interactive manner.

**Tracking and development tools.** The initiative will include experimentation. It will identify and use other customer tracking and doctrine development tools.

**Lessons learned, training products, and AECIP TTP.** One of the most valuable areas we will demonstrate is a mature integration and linkage of various lessons learned and training products to the framework of the web site.

**Other linkages.** Another aspect of the concept is to effectively integrate the functionality of several of the standard elements of a manual such as the references, index, glossary, etc.

## Conclusion

The Doctrine Division will continue to aggressively pursue the resourcing necessary for this initiative. We are confident that this proof of concept is worth the minimal expenditure of resources. If we do not break the current mold, the Army will fail to keep pace with the growing number of doctrinal requirements.

Therefore, a demonstration designed to effectively employ a new process and web technology is necessary to pave the way for efficient doctrine development in the future. This demonstration would introduce the doctrine covering the Initial Brigade Combat Team and display this new concept of Web-based doctrine that will eliminate FMs in the future. Please feel free to contact the points of contact: Mr. Stephen Leeder or Mr. Gary Kraak (see below). A briefing, white paper, and a small demonstration are available on our division homepage on the Internet at <http://138.27.35.36/Doctrine/dlb.htm>.

## Endnote

1. The Initial Brigade Combat Team is significantly different from previous Army units, especially in terms of organization, doctrine, and training. Intelligence doctrine is absolutely critical to this new operational paradigm and the unique environment. Many aspects of intelligence in the new brigade require the development of completely new doctrine or significant revision of existing doctrine, TTP, and training products. These aspects include—

- ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) integration (C<sup>2</sup>ISR).
- Robust human intelligence (HUMINT) operations.
- Intelligence "reach back" (Army Forces (ARFOR) and echelons above Corps (EAC)).

- New ISR systems (to include commercial off-the-shelf).

- Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron operations.

- Multisensor intelligence collection.

This effort involves extensive changes to large body of related doctrine and training products, and then the reeducation of the participants.

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# PROPONENT NOTES

## OCMI Website

The Office of the Chief, Military Intelligence (OCMI) website contains timely information on proponent issues ranging from enlisted career management field (CMF) overviews to warrant officer current and archived newsletters. The address is <http://huachuca-dcd.army.mil/ocmi/index.html>. We will update the website often, so please use it as a

"favorite" resource for the latest information on the MI Corps.

## Enlisted Actions

We are at the forefront of some very radical changes within the Army. As you might expect, MI will play a vital role in these changes as we transition into the 21st century.

The MI lifecycle managers are striving to identify and properly al-

locate the MI noncommissioned officer (NCO) buybacks authorized for reincorporation into the force. Additionally, we continue to work feverishly to complete the standards of grade issues throughout MI while concurrently satisfying the requirements of ensuring that the Army's new brigade and Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) has its full MI complement. The IBCT development is in an extremely fluid state,

and we hope to elaborate in detail in the next issue. To be sure, MI will have an integral role. Ensure you also pick up the next *MIPB* for more details.

During December 1999, OCMI personnel attended the Army Development Study (ADS) XXI Conference. The Chief of Staff of the Army directed the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel to organize the study and put its efforts into Enlisted Personnel System (EPMS) and the Warrant Officer Personnel Management System (WOPMS). This study relates to the future of the Army as a whole. The topics, though not all inclusive, discuss the Army of 2020 through 2025. Principle areas of concern were qualities of life issues, incentives, and consolidating the Army's military occupational specialty (MOS) structure to allow for smoother personnel management.

MI has already taken measures on this course having consolidated the 33 CMF and integrating 98Ds (Signal Emitter Location/Identifier) with 98Hs (Communications Locator/Interceptor) into the new 98H (Communications Intercept/Locator). Recently, the U.S. Army Research Laboratory (ARL) completed a study considering more consolidation of the 96 CMF, particularly MOSs 96D (Imagery Analyst), 96H (Common Ground Station Operator), and 96U (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Specialist). ARL concluded that these skill sets were distinctively different and better left separate.

The OCMI proposed incentives for career soldiers for discussion at the ADS Conference, and found that we, as MI professionals were not alone in this proposal. The MI Corps proposed that the ADS XXI study, as a whole, consider granting incentives to career soldiers to help retain their expertise through the 20-year mark. Suggestions included increasing pay commensurate with the duties and responsibilities our

senior NCOs and warrant officers now perform and allowing them to take one- to two-year sabbaticals to earn advanced degrees at civilian educational institutions. These were proposals and issues that the study brainstormed. Bear in mind, however, that these are just proposals.

In December, the Army selected the new tactical UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle), the AAI Shadow 200. The contract will result in four systems delivered by spring 2001 for both training and initial operational testing. The AAI Shadow 200 will be an organic asset in each maneuver (infantry and armor) brigade throughout the Army. One of the major and fast-developing issues is the Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) process that will soon be underway. We will send a message to the field seeking volunteers for Phases 1 and 2. Each phase will require as many as twelve 96Us and one 33W (Electronic Warfare/Intercept Systems Repairer). The majority of the initial phase will come directly from Fort Huachuca and then follow the system to its fielding location.

One last item of note is that OCMI, in concert with PERSCOM (U.S. Total Army Personnel Command), has drafted a soon-to-be-released message that will remove the M7 additional skill identifier (ASI) for 98Ks (Signals Collection Identification Analysts) who earned the ASI prior to August 1997. Also affected is the K2 ASI for those who earned that ASI before August of 1997. For more specific information regarding the 98K ASIs, stay tuned for the message. (SGM Antonio Moreno, E-mail antonio.moreno@huachuca-emh1.army.mil.)

### **Warrant Officer Actions**

The Army was not able to meet the recruiting mission for accessions in MOSs 351B (Counter-

intelligence Technician) and MOS 351E (Human Intelligence Collection Technician) for Fiscal Year 2000. Based on these shortfalls, ODCSPER (Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel) has agreed to consider active federal service (AFS) waivers of up to 15 years of service for those two MOSs. This may offer an opportunity to those NCOs who transferred to MI later in their careers to become warrant officers. For AFS waiver consideration, an applicant must have an excellent performance record and require no additional waivers. The AFS waiver may become available for other MOSs throughout the year if recruiters are not meeting their objectives. There is no change in the other requirements, and the Army will not favorably consider waivers for the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) or for operational experience.

For an outline of all requirements, refer to **Department of the Army Circular 601-99-1, The Warrant Officer Procurement Program**. You can also contact Chief Warrant Officer Three Ronald Duquette, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, at DSN 536-0716. (CW5 Rex Williams, E-mail williamsx@huachuca-emh1.army.mil.)

### **SEMA Officer Survey**

OCMI is conducting a survey of all SEMA (special electronic mission aircraft) officers worldwide. The survey will determine if there is a personnel management problem among the SEMA officer population. We sent surveys to all MI aerial exploitation battalions and will follow up with on-site visits by the OCMI Professional Development Officer, CPT Greg Meyer. We will brief the results to Major General John D. Thomas, Jr. and take further action as necessary. (Ms. Charlotte Borghardt, E-mail borghardt@c@huachuca-emh1.army.mil.)



# MI CORPS HALL OF FAME

The Military Intelligence (MI) Corps activated on July 1987 in accordance with the United States Army Regimental System. On 1 July 1988, the Military Intelligence Corps established its Hall of Fame as a means of honoring soldiers and professional civilians who, through their performance of duty, have made special contributions to the Military Intelligence profession. Including this year's inductees, only 165 Military Intelligence professionals have been selected for the Hall of Fame from among several hundred nominations. The selection process is deliberate and thorough. First someone nominates an individual and then the nomination must withstand a detailed examination of the nominee's qualifications by a board of officers, noncommissioned officers, and professional civilians. The board presents its recommendations directly to the Chief of the Corps who makes the final selection. The names of all Distinguished Members of the Corps and Hall of Fame Inductees are inscribed on our Wall of Honor, located in the auditorium of Alvarado Hall, as a symbol of their legacy to our proud Corps.

The Chief of the MI Corps also appoints an Honorary Colonel, Warrant Officer, and Sergeant Major as distinguished members of the Corps to provide a link with history for today's soldiers. This year, Command Sergeant Major (Retired) Sterling T. McCormick has been selected both as a Hall of Fame inductee and to serve as the new Honorary Sergeant Major of the Corps. CSM (Retired) McCormick has distinguished himself by exceptional service to the soldier and the Corps; as Honorary Sergeant Ma-

jor, his duties within the Corps will be ceremonial and will not conflict with the chain of command. He will be installed as the Honorary Sergeant Major and inducted into the Military Intelligence Hall of Fame on 30 June.

The MI Corps Hall of Fame (HOF) is proud to announce the four most recent inductees. This high honor recognizes the outstanding contributions made by these distinguished Americans to our country, our Army, and our Corps. The HOF inductees for 2000 are Mr. Theodor "Ted" Hans, Command Sergeant Major Sterling T. McCormick (USA, Retired), Major Charles D. McKee, Warrant Officer Three Sherman C. Reagan (deceased). The HOF 2000 induction ceremony to honor these distinguished military intelligence professionals will take place at 1000 hours, Friday, 30 June 2000. Other events scheduled that day will include the 309th MI Battalion change of command, a luncheon for the new inductees and their families, dedication of Eifler Track, and the 38th annual MI Ball.

**Mr. Theodor Hans**  
**Discipline: Interrogation,**  
**HUMINT, and CI**

Born in Berlin in 1920, Mr. Theodor Hans emigrated to the United States in 1940. He entered U.S. military service 15 October 1942 with the Army Air Corps. After completing Basic Training and Army Air Corps Specialist training, he learned to interrogate prisoners of war (IPW). During World War II, his first field assignments were in 1945 with the United States Forces, European Theater (USFET) IPW programs in France, Germany, and England. His assignment history from March 1945 until October 1945 indicates

that his military superiors had quickly recognized his special area and language talents, as well as his natural aptitude for MI duties. Selected despite limited formal training, he worked in a demanding and critical project under the Deputy Director for Intelligence, USFET, in Frankfurt, Germany.



As a translator and counterintelligence (CI) analyst, Mr. Hans was instrumental in an Army intelligence project that led to creation of the "Gehlen Organization." This organization comprised an assemblage of German World War II MI and CI officers reorganized under U.S. Army control and assigned to collect military and political intelligence in Soviet-controlled areas. This organization would later become the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND)—the current German national intelligence agency.

Mr. Hans' excellent work drew the favorable attention of his superiors and led to other important projects. In late 1945 and early 1946, he trav-

eled to Berlin to conduct special CI assignments in a program to locate, detain, and interrogate important "wanted persons." They were formerly in the principal Nazi state security and political police organizations, including the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP or Nationalsozialistische deutsche Arbeiter Partei (Nazi Party)), the SS (Schutzstaffel or Protective Squads), and the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA).

Due to his superb performance, he permanently transferred to Berlin in May 1946; in August that year, the Region VIII CI Commander asked him to accept a civilian position as a Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) special agent. When the refugee and defector flow to West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany or FRG) from Communist Eastern Europe began to grow in the 1950s, Mr. Hans was one of a small group of particularly capable CI field personnel who directly guided and influenced the development of the U.S. and Allied intelligence and security screening program at the Berlin-Marienfelde Refugee Processing Center and Camp. At the Center and Camp, they developed and installed CI and security screening procedures resulting in the early detection and exploitation of hostile agents attempting to use the refugee system as a cover.

He was highly successful in developing and exploiting numerous clandestine sources in the German Democratic Republic (GDR or East German) Government, Communist Party, and other institutions—one phase of CIC's countersubversive mission in Berlin. Among his other accomplishments in Berlin, Mr. Hans managed and directly participated in the defection of an East German State President to West Berlin, which resulted in major intelligence gains. He also guided the successful apprehension of a

GDR-based Soviet intelligence officer, removing him as a threat to the security of West Berlin. Additionally, Mr. Hans provided early warning reporting on Soviet and GDR operations to abduct western anti-Communist journalists, human rights activists, and political figures.

Mr. Hans also worked extensively on order of battle (OB) collection of information on the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG), the developing GDR Army, and other Warsaw Pact forces. Mr. Hans was both a supervisor and personal participant in this difficult yet extremely important project. Applying lessons learned from earlier experience, he quickly developed a series of reliable collection sources in East Germany who furnished voluminous information concerning capabilities, military movements, training exercises, troop rotation, and other priority requirements. Through his devotion to accurate and timely reporting and his team's efforts, Region VIII was the 66th CIC Group's premiere reporting unit concerning GSFG OB in the first half of the 1950s.

In 1958, after years of successful CI operations, Mr. Hans returned to the United States for personal reasons and entered the private sector. As result of his outstanding reputation as an authority on Soviet and East German psychological and terrorist activities against West German targets, he received a Congressional subpoena in 1960 to testify as an expert witness before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Using only unclassified information from U.S. and German public sources, Mr. Hans presented a "tutorial" clarification of the threat, evoking high praise from the Committee and favorable press for the Army's CI and security activities.

In June 1962, Mr. Hans resumed service with Army Intelligence as a

civilian intelligence analyst and operations manager with the G2, U.S. Army Caribbean Command, predecessor to U.S. Army Forces Southern Command (USARSO). In addition to his highly successful experience in CI and HUMINT (human intelligence) operations in Germany, Mr. Hans brought to his new assignment special area and language capabilities acquired during a two-year working stay in Cuba from 1938 to 1940, while awaiting a visa for permanent immigration into the United States. By applying his knowledge and prior experience of Soviet and Communist use of sophisticated subversive, espionage, terrorist, and psychological warfare operations, he was immediately productive in this assignment. The period of Mr. Hans' Army intelligence service in Panama was a time of expanding Communist subversive and insurgency threat in Central and South America, including Soviet efforts to destabilize democracies in the region. With only limited resources and a vast geographic area to cover, Mr. Hans and a few other sophisticated, experienced, and hard-working intelligence personnel monitored the region's volatile situation and made significant contributions to USARSO's mission.

Chosen to return to Germany in 1976, Mr. Hans was a Supervisory Intelligence Operations Specialist in the 18th MI Battalion, 66th MI Group. There he assisted in directing the unit's overt HUMINT collection and reporting operations and managed the battalion's extensive interagency, multinational coordination activities. During this time, overt HUMINT collection, primarily refugee and defector debriefings, were producing extremely high volumes of reports. These huge quantities of reports coupled with an antiquated and time-consuming reporting format greatly hampered the battalion's intelligence production efficiency. Drawing on his extensive

prior experience in field-level intelligence reporting, Mr. Hans developed a new, widely accepted reporting format that significantly improved the timeliness of intelligence reporting in Europe. For his liaison efforts within the 18th MI Battalion and his proven professionalism with HUMINT and CI activities, the German Intelligence Service (BND) awarded Mr. Hans the highly prized Saint George Medal. He retired from civil service in August 1983.

**Command Sergeant Major  
Sterling T. McCormick  
(USA, Retired)  
Discipline: Imagery  
Interpretation**

Command Sergeant Major Sterling McCormick distinguished himself by exceptional service in a succession of high positions of increasing responsibility. His contributions to the Army and the nation span more than 30 years, culminating in his assignment as the Command Sergeant Major of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM).



**Honorary Sergeant Major  
of the MI Corps**

His early assignments included service with the 172d MI Detach-

ment, 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) in the Republic of Vietnam. In addition to his assigned imagery interpretation duties, he performed a myriad of intelligence tasks for the detachment. Included in these tasks were flying more than 80 combat aerial observer, Scout, and personnel detection missions in support of the 173d Brigade combat assaults.

In June 1973, he joined the 8th MI Company, 8th Infantry Division, in the FRG. Serving with the G2 Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Night Observation Section, he participated in the fielding of the AN/PPS-5 Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR) to the Division, and set up a division-wide qualification and proficiency course. The GSR sets and the soldiers assigned to operate them were instrumental in monitoring the former GDR-FRG border to provide the potential first warning of armored attacks to the tactical commanders.

Returning to Fort Bragg after a successful tour in Germany, he worked in the 218th MI Detachment (Airborne Corps). He was a squad leader and then Platoon Sergeant of the Imagery Interpretation Platoon that supported numerous XVIIIth Airborne Corps training exercises, to include emergency deployment exercises. In 1978, he served as the Noncommissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC) of the Imagery Interpretation Platoon in the Corps' support and contingency planning regarding Zaire.

Following a second successful tour in Germany, he returned to Fort Bragg. After completing the Sergeants Major Academy, he reported to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 82d Airborne Division and served as the G2 Operations NCOIC. In 1989, he traveled again to Europe where he was the Senior Enlisted Intelligence NCO for the G2 Section and the Sergeant Ma-

jor, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, VII Corps in Stuttgart, Germany.

After nine months, he became the Command Sergeant Major of the 2d MI Battalion (Aerial Exploitation), 207th MI Brigade. Seven months into this assignment, CSM McCormick prepared for the deployment of his unit to the Middle East for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, and returned the unit home safely (with the Meritorious Unit Citation). Upon the inactivation of the 2d MI Battalion and VII Corps organizations, he participated in the reassignment of all personnel and family members and the turn-in of all associated equipment.

Upon returning to the continental United States (CONUS), he served as the Fort Huachuca Garrison Sergeant Major before his selection as the Commandant of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center's Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA) at Fort Huachuca. Overseeing the successful integration of the Fort Devens NCO Academy with the United States Army Intelligence Center and School NCOA into one Intelligence NCO Academy, he became the first Commandant of the consolidated NCO Academy and opened its new academic facilities. The student training population increased from 9 to 17 different military occupational specialties (MOSs) and 1,000 students attended the school per year. Under his watch, the NCO Academy received U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command accreditation of the Basic and Advanced NCO Courses, and TRADOC cited it for superior small group instruction.

Selected because of his success with the NCO Academy, he served as the 513th MI Brigade's CSM at Fort Gordon, Georgia. As the Army's echelon above corps (EAC)



contingency unit, the 513th MI Brigade is of major significance in the nation's intelligence architecture.

Chosen as the INSCOM Command Sergeant Major in 1995, he provided his commanders with sound advice on the most appropriate ways of using the diverse MI MOSs that INSCOM comprises. With the downsizing of forces, he took great care to ensure that INSCOM retained only the best MI soldiers. His boundless energies both inspired the troops and enhanced the overall performance of INSCOM. CSM Sterling McCormick retired from military service in 1998. Having served in times of crisis and peace and having served in every type of NCO leadership position, he had proven himself to be a "soldier's soldier."

**Major Charles D. McKee  
(Deceased)**

**Discipline: HUMINT**

Major Charles Dennis McKee embodied the noblest virtues of the MI profession. His highly successful eighteen-year intelligence career, cut short by terrorist action, was dedicated to providing timely and accurate human intelligence (HUMINT) to national leaders and joint combat commanders alike. He died during the performance of a singularly difficult, extremely high-risk and sensitive collection mission in support of national objectives related to the lives of Americans held hostage by terrorist elements. Prior to his death, MAJ McKee was personally responsible for uniquely relevant, high-impact intelligence reporting in this regard.

Upon graduation from Pennsylvania State University with a Bachelor of Science degree in Law Enforcement and Corrections, MAJ McKee enlisted in the U.S. Army on 2 November 1970. His initial military assignment was as an area intelligence specialist with the 801st MI Detachment, 5th Special Forces

Group (Airborne), First Special Forces, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In a four-year period there, he displayed early talent as an area intelligence and special operations professional. He honed his intelligence skills in area target-dossier preparation and operations security and physical security evaluation, achieving early promotion to Sergeant. Displaying natural leadership and special operations talent, he volunteered for and completed airborne, Ranger, and Special Forces training, completing the latter as the Distinguished Graduate.



In 1974, MAJ McKee volunteered for Officer Candidate School. Completing OCS in 1975 as Distinguished Graduate, he received a Regular Army commission in Military Intelligence. Upon completing the Military Intelligence Officer Basic and Counterintelligence Officer Courses, MAJ McKee's first assignment was in Germany with the 430th MI Detachment, 66th MI Group (MIG) as the Area Intelligence Bilateral Project Officer. As a First Lieutenant, he managed a sensitive, bilateral, HUMINT collection operation involving U.S. and West German personnel. The Bilateral Operation received top ratings

from theater and national consumers. Following a highly productive and successful tour with the 66th MIG, MAJ McKee was reassigned to Bad Toelz, Germany, as the Assistant S2 and Targeting Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Special Forces Support Battalion and First Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), First Special Forces. Under MAJ McKee's leadership, his intelligence section prepared detailed area studies and target dossiers for 12 highly sensitive operational and strategic targets. Approved at the highest levels of the U.S. Army European Command (USEUCOM), these target folders remained essentially unchanged through the end of the Cold War.

MAJ McKee returned to CONUS in 1979 to attend the MI Officer Advanced Course and subsequent language training in Modern Standard Arabic at the Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, California. Assigned to Detachment 0, U.S. Army Operations Group, upon graduation from DLI, his duty station was in the Middle East. Tensions in the region were high. The Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan and threatened the free flow of Mideast oil; Iran still held U.S. citizens hostage and was at war with Iraq. Lebanon was embroiled in a violent civil war and U.S. citizens were hostages; Israel felt threatened on its borders. MAJ McKee's development of reporting sources during this turbulent period was unequaled. He provided the first U.S. reporting on a major terrorist-related incident outside CONUS.

Selected for the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program, MAJ McKee attended the Naval Postgraduate School and graduated with a Master of Arts degree in National Security Affairs, concentrating on Mideast regional issues. Chosen due to his maturity and demon-

strated regional expertise, MAJ McKee became a Middle-East desk officer in the Pentagon. In 1985, MAJ McKee volunteered for and began sensitive duties with INSCOM. Initially assigned as a desk officer, he planned and controlled sensitive overseas intelligence operations. His superb performance led to his selection for an extremely sensitive high-risk overseas assignment directly related to a National Command Authority high interest. MAJ McKee deployed overseas in support of this effort.

The operational environment was extremely hostile; U.S. citizens were openly surveilled and targeted by governmental, non-governmental, and rogue elements. Gunfire and artillery shelling were a constant backdrop. MAJ McKee successfully performed intelligence functions in this environment for more than two years. In December 1988, MAJ McKee and several members of the overseas intelligence effort were recalled to Washington, D.C., for debriefing and operational planning. During their travel on 21 December 1988, MAJ McKee died when Pan American Flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland: the result of a terrorist bomb.

Major Charles McKee's career and accomplishments are distinctive and serve as an inspiration for MI professionals everywhere. He was an expert collector, collection manager, analyst, and area specialist. His area expertise perfectly fit the intricacies of peacetime engagement, operations other than war, asymmetrical warfare, as well as transnational terrorism. He achieved tremendous operational success in the face of a ruthless, unconventional enemy. He was, above all, a superb Army leader and exceptional U. S. citizen who went without hesitation in harm's way to contribute meaningfully to the suc-

cess of his comrades and the well-being of fellow Americans.

**Chief Warrant Officer Three  
Sherman C. Reagan  
Discipline: Linguist**

Chief Warrant Officer Three Sherman Reagan showed an interest in linguistics early in his life. He graduated from Hamilton College in Clinton, New York, with a Bachelor of Arts degree in German. Mr. Reagan began his military career 13 February 1969, when he enlisted in the U.S. Navy.



Upon completion of basic training and selection for the Navy rating of Cryptologic Technician Interpretive (CTI) Branch, he attended the 47-week Chinese-Mandarin course at the Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Washington, D.C. After further training at the Submarine School in Groton, Connecticut, he moved to the Naval Security Group Activity at Brady Air Station, Hakata, Japan. During this assignment, he worked as a voice intercept operator, transcriber, and reporter, and he regularly deployed to the aircraft carriers and submarines of the U.S. 7th Fleet.

When Brady Air Station closed in March 1972, Mr. Reagan left the

service and attended graduate school to complete a Masters degree in German from the State University of New York at Binghamton, which he completed in 1973. Serving as a teaching assistant in the German Department at the University of Wisconsin, Mr. Reagan instructed both undergraduate and graduate students.

In 1979, having taught and studied linguistics thoroughly, and after reenlisting in the U.S. Navy, he earned his Ph.D. in German Linguistics from the University of Wisconsin at Madison. He successfully completed the Basic Arabic course at the Defense Language Institute and earned the DLI Commandant's Prize for excellence as a student of Arabic.

Mr. Reagan's next assignment was with the Naval Security Group Activity at Fort Meade, Maryland. During this assignment, he helped establish Classic Paladin, a new organization that made Arabic, Persian-Farsi, and Hebrew linguists available for rapid deployments to a variety of missions in the Middle East. He also translated and transcribed Arabic at the National Security Agency (NSA) and served as an aircrew member on EP-3 Orion reconnaissance aircraft. During this tour, he won the General Vernon Walters Prize for Linguistics, awarded annually by the CryptoLinguistic Association of the NSA to the agency's outstanding military linguist.

In 1984, after accepting a direct appointment as a U.S. Army Warrant Officer, Mr. Reagan moved to the 307th MI Battalion (Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI)) in Ludwigsburg, Germany, where he headed the Language Support Team of the VII Corps Technical Control and Analysis Element. In this capacity, he developed and fielded the Army's first computer-based training software for lan-

guage specialists. This unique software was in wide use by all the Services through the late 1980s. Furthermore, as the Language Program Manager for the 207th, he implemented the first Language Olympics, a three-day competition involving more than 200 language specialists. His original idea was a tremendous success and evolved into the Worldwide Language Olympics, sponsored annually by DLI.

In 1987, Mr. Reagan transferred to the U.S. Army Foreign Language Training Center, Europe (FLTCE) in Munich, Germany. He was instrumental there in creating and establishing three entirely new departments: Polish, Serbian-Croatian, and Arabic. Prior to the Gulf War, he not only developed intensive Arabic courses, but he also became the focal point in Europe for

Arabic language support to the U.S. forces during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

After the war, Mr. Reagan received a promotion to Director of Instruction for FLTCE. His understanding of the need to enhance Arabic language training in Europe and his successful efforts to establish the Serbian-Croatian program years before direct U.S. military involvement in Bosnia clearly demonstrated his commitment to anticipating the language-training requirements of the military well in advance.

Assigned to the 704th MI Brigade at Fort Meade at the end of 1991, CW3 Reagan was the brigade's Command Language Program Manager (CLPM). He managed the language training for the largest foreign language unit in the U.S. Army,

responsible for more than 650 linguists in 20 languages. CW3 Reagan's original efforts from 1991 through 1994 to develop a comprehensive, quality language program were ultimately instrumental in the selection of the 704th MI Brigade as having the best Command Language Program (CLP) in INSCOM, the Department of the Army, and the Department of Defense in 1997.

Upon his retirement in 1996, the legacy of CW3 Reagan's tenure was both far-reaching and permanent. He clearly established the criteria for integrating technology into language training and recognized the need for quality linguists to support the intelligence community. He directly impacted the intelligence community throughout his career by using his vast knowledge of language and his ability to train linguists.

## 1st USAR Linguist Unit (RTU)

The 1st USAR (U.S. Army Reserve) Linguist Unit (Reinforcement Training Unit or RTU) is a points-only linguist unit located in Alexandria, Virginia. The unit currently has about 90 members distributed across 35 states and several countries. The unit has the capability to support multiple missions and is highly prepared to provide linguists on relatively short notice. Members of the RTU reside in Switzerland, Germany, Africa, Hong Kong, England, Canada, South Korea, the Middle East, Japan, and South America as well as the United States.

Our mission is to provide linguist support to Active and Reserve Component forces globally and to maintain perishable language skills by training qualified linguists in the Army Reserve. Membership is open to all Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Army Reservists regardless of rank, branch, foreign language background, or location.

The three major requirements are—

- Certified language ability (minimum Defense Language Proficiency Test or DLPT 2/2).
  - Strong desire to maintain and increase language proficiency.
  - Motivation to actively contribute to the unit through projects and staff responsibilities.
- We are extremely flexible with training. This unit provides a great opportunity to use your foreign language skills, earn an officer or noncommissioned officer evaluation report (OER, NCOER), and gain access to paid, real-world, language training opportunities with agencies worldwide.

Interested personnel wishing to join the 1st USAR linguist unit may contact Lieutenant Colonel Canning Kraft, Unit Recruiting Officer, at E-mail CKrafts@aol.com or write to Commander, 1st USAR Linguist Unit, ATTN: Recruiting Officer, Lieber USAR Center, 6901 Telegraph Road, Alexandria, VA 22310, telephone commercial (703) 325-3442/3 or DSN 221-3442/3. Soldiers who want an exciting adventure with this unit should send a copy of their DLPT scores, a copy their Forms 2 or 2-1 or their Officer Record Briefs.



# TSM NOTES

## All-Source Analysis System Update

by Colonel Jerry V. Proctor

### TSMs Need Your Input

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) System Managers are the official users' representatives for major development systems such as the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS). The TSMs monitor field use of the systems to see what is working well and what needs improvement. We need to hear from you with your problems, complaints, and comments.

There are three other TSMs in military intelligence. Colonel Kevin Peterson is TSM Prophet. COL Michael Gourgues is the TSM for the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) ground station module and the Common Ground Station (CGS). COL William Knarr is the TSM for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), Guardrail Common Sensor (GRCS), Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL), and future aviation platforms (see the following article). They want to hear from you as well.

### ASAS News

Picture this: you are one of approximately 250 MI soldiers just assigned to a brand new brigade. This new brigade will have—

- Sixteen ASAS Block II Remote Workstations (RWSs).
- Eight prototype ASAS Lights (NT Laptop version of the RWS).
- A couple of counterintelligence (CI) and human intelligence (HUMINT) operations intelligence workstations.
- About 20 suitcase-size CHATS (CI and HUMINT Automated Tool Set) devices.
- Fifty hand-held note-taking devices for the HUMINT soldiers.

This is in addition to the Joint STARS CGS, UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles), and the prototype new ground signals intelligence (SIGINT) system called Prophet.

Sound unlikely? Not so. This fall at Fort Lewis, Washington, this new

brigade will form with all of this equipment. Stay tuned to MI information channels for more details. ASAS is clearly the centerpiece of this new brigade that is the Army's future. These revolutionary changes make it even more important to continue to send feedback regarding our systems back to our office. We should work together to make ASAS the tool that you want to assist you in doing your job. **Let me hear from you.**

*Colonel Jerry Proctor is the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) System Manager (TSM) for ASAS. Readers can contact him via E-mail at [proctorj1@huachuca-emh1.army.mil](mailto:proctorj1@huachuca-emh1.army.mil) and telephonically at (520) 533-3504 or DSN 821-3504. The Deputy TSM is Mr. Michael Strack. Readers can reach him by E-mail at [strackm@huachuca-emh1.army.mil](mailto:strackm@huachuca-emh1.army.mil) and telephonically at (520) 533-3507 or DSN 821-3507.*

## UAV and ACS Update

by Colonel William M. Knarr, Jr.

### Shadow 200 Procurement

On 27 December 1999, the Army Acquisition Executive announced the selection of the Army's Tactical UAV (TUAV). It is AAI Corporation's Shadow 200 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) System.

The Project Manager for TUAV (PM TUAV) established a Source-Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) to determine the winner of a two-phased competitive acquisition

strategy. This strategy included a Request for Proposals review and oral presentation phase and a System Capability Demonstration (SCD) "flyoff" phase. The basis for the source selection was a full and open competition with the goal of selecting the best value system for the Army's TUAV requirements.

The SSEB began on 10 June, and continued through 10 December 1999. The SSEB accepted seven proposals during the Phase I evalu-

ations. This phase consisted of written proposals and comprehensive oral presentations. On 9 August, the SSRB selected four of the seven prospective competitors in the Phase II, the SCD portion of the competition. The SCD ran 4 October–20 November at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Each competitor completed ten days of events evaluated by the PM-TUAV Team and the Army Test and Evaluation Command, with support from TSM-UAV/ACS and the Intelligence Center.

The first portion of Phase II consisted of three days for contractor set up and ground preparation. The next two days were for ground demonstrations consisting of Ground Control Station (GCS) simulation and embedded training, displacement, movement and emplacement, and flight preparation activities. The next portion consisted of one dedicated day for contractor check flights. The final portion was the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) flight stage of the SCD, in which the contractor had three days of technical and operational events and evaluations. The SCD ended on time, and met all objectives.

Following the completion of the SCD, the Army Acquisition Executive, Dr. Paul J. Hooper approved the Milestone II decision at an Army System Acquisition Review Council held 21 December 1999. The Army signed a \$41.8 million Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) contract with AAI on 27 December for the production of four TUAV systems. The initial four systems will serve for developmental testing, operational training, and as test systems for an Initial Operational Test and Evaluation scheduled for (3QFY01) the third quarter of fiscal year 2001.

AAI Corporation has significant experience in producing and operating unmanned aerial vehicles. In addition to producing the Shadow 200 UAV, the company is also in partnership with Pioneer UAV Incorporated in producing the Pioneer UAV currently in use by the Navy and Marine Corps. Working with AAI Corporation will be Raytheon Company, United Industrial Corporation, Camber Corporation, and D.P. Associates.

Each Shadow 200 system will consist of three to four air vehicles (AVs), two GCSs and one portable ground control station, an air vehicle

transport, and a support vehicle to carry troops and equipment. A mobile maintenance facility (MMF) for the brigade contact team will be necessary for sustained and split-based operations. The 304-pound-takeoff-weight vehicle requires a rail launcher for AV takeoff, and an arresting hook for landing to meet the Army's requirement for soccer-field-sized ground operations. A rear-mounted, 38-horsepower UEL AR-741 rotary engine powers the AV.

The TUAV will provide Army ground maneuver brigade commanders with an organic capability

## Guardrail Common Sensor Systems

The Guardrail Common Sensor (GRCS) System 3 is one of two Army systems selected for national-tactical integration (NTI) efforts with the National Security Agency. This effort will provide CRS- (common remoting standards) compliant software to GRCS System 3 as part of the ongoing Guardrail Relay Facility initiative. System 3 will also receive upgraded precision geolocation capabilities in 4QFY00 with the delivery of the Communications High-Accuracy Location System-Exploitable (CHALS-X)




Photo courtesy of AAI Corporation.

**The Brigade Commander's TUAV: The Shadow 200.**

to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA), and battle damage assessment. The operational concept for the TUAV is to be the "dominant eye" for the ground maneuver brigade commanders, allowing them to "See, Know, Understand" their battlespaces. The TUAV will contribute to the brigade's dominant situational awareness, and its design enables it to keep pace with the brigade OPTEMPO during displacement and emplacement, launch and recovery, and mission execution.

processor. This processor provides increased reliability, supportability, and capability compared with the current hardware, and will be active in future follow-on demonstrations to the Precision SIGINT (signals intelligence) Targeting System Advance Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD).

On 23 December, the GRCS System 4 Remote Relay became fully operational. This allows aircraft to operate from Italy in support of Task Force Falcon while remotely sending the raw data via satellite

communications (SATCOMs) to Germany (Mainz-Finthen) for processing and reporting. This effort allowed the battalion<sup>1</sup> to redeploy the majority of its personnel and equipment back to Germany. After receiving \$2.99M in Kosovo Force supplemental funding, the Product Manager-Aerial Common Sensor (PM-ACS) began and completed this effort during 1QFY00, as scheduled.

This capability significantly reduces the footprint of the forward-based personnel and the airlift requirements for the Guardrail system, while providing a robust reconnaissance capability available to support future contingency operations. The next phase of the preplanned product improvements will occur in fiscal years 2003 and 2004; it consists of fielding the Mini-Integrated Processing Facilities (Mini-IPF) which will upgrade the SATCOM remote capability and downsize the Guardrail ground station.

The rollout ceremony for Guardrail System 2 was on 2 February at historic Moffet Field, Mountain View, California. Initial delivery of this system will be to the 15th MI Battalion in April. It will give III Corps the capability to provide premier airborne SIGINT support without the requirement to deploy a ground station to the forward theater by using the direct aircraft-to-satellite relay (DASR). Unit train-up on the new system will take place from April through July 2000 and culminate in a Limited User Test (LUT) in August.

### **Airborne Reconnaissance Low Systems**

The ARL system also continues on its upgrade path. In January, the PM ACS purchased new digital receiver technology hardware to integrate and test in the ARL-C (Communications Intelligence or COMINT) aircraft to provide ad-

ditional capabilities to work with modern signal sets. ARL-M4 (ARL-Multifunction) was delivered to the 204th MI Battalion last fall, and the LUT is now underway at Fort Bliss, Texas. This aircraft restores the unit's capability to collect EO (electro-optical) and IR (infrared) imagery following the loss of the ARL-I (ARL-Imagery Intelligence or-IMINT) aircraft in an accident last summer. Additionally, it provides the unit new SAR (synthetic aperture radar) and MTI (moving target indicator) radar capability with the Hughes Interferometric SAR (HISAR) payload.

The ARL-M5 aircraft will begin flight testing at the end of February to verify the fixes made to the Superhawk payload. Following these flight tests, the aircraft will enter a period of downtime for painting and final configuration. Delivery to the 204th MI Battalion remains scheduled for September 2000 after final calibration in the summer.

### **Aerial Common Sensor System**

The ACS program has also passed a number of major decision points in the past few months. The Army DCSOPS- (Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations) directed study of ACS requirements completed the first two phases (mission needs analysis and operational requirements analysis) in December 1999, and a senior advisory group gave preliminary approval based on the results. We will provide the results of these two phases to an ACS Integrated Concept Team (ICT) later this spring to assist them in refining the ACS Operational Requirements Document (ORD). The third phase of the study will consist of an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) of potential material solutions. We will brief the AoA study plan to the senior advisory group in March, and TRAC (TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command) Analysis Command) at

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, will conduct the AoA study this summer.

In parallel with this effort, the TSM has initiated the ACS and UAV RISTA (reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition) Operations Requirements Analysis (AURORA) Concept Experimentation Program (CEP) to explore teaming efforts between manned and unmanned RSTA assets. TRADOC Headquarters approved funding for this effort in January, and we will begin the CEP this spring. We will use the results of this CEP to define better the optimum mix of UAVs and manned sensor platforms as part of the ACS system.

Following the ACS Milestone 0 decision last summer, the Program Executive Officer for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, and Sensors (PEO-I EW&S) approved starting the Concept Exploration phase of the ACS acquisition. The ACS program will be the Army's pioneering effort in Simulation-Based Acquisition. The Concept Exploration phase will provide a chance for the PM to evaluate several industry modeling and simulation concepts, and will include sensitivity analysis of significant cost drivers in the acquisition program. PM ACS released a Broad Area Announcement for the ACS Research and Development effort on 28 January, with proposals due 29 February.

### **Endnote**

1. The 1st MI Battalion has forward-deployed more than four years supporting three major operations: the Bosnia-Herzegovina Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) as well as the Kosovo Force (KFOR).

*Colonel Bill Knarr is the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command System Manager (TSM) for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles/Aerial Common Sensor (UAV/ACS). Readers may contact him via E-mail at [knarrw@huachuca-emh1.army.mil](mailto:knarrw@huachuca-emh1.army.mil) and telephonically at (520) 533-2165 and DSN 821-2165.*



# LETTERS

## To the Editor:

I am responding to the article, "Linguists in the Army—Paradise Lost or Paradise Regained?," which you published in the October-December 1999 issue of *Military Intelligence*.

I commend Colonel Brian Tarbet and Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Steinke for a professionally written article that addresses a critical issue for the MI community. It is indeed disheartening to see that the Army has made little or no progress in this area. Four years ago, these same problems were plaguing Reserve linguists when I wrote a similar paper as my entry for the *AUSA* (Association of the United States Army) *Magazine* Essay Contest. Foreign language proficiency pay is still woefully inadequate to motivate Reserve linguists.

The "modest proposals" that COL Tarbet and LTC Steinke discuss are also old ideas. Perhaps a more radical approach would have a greater impact. Two significant initiatives that need more attention are a Linguist Badge and the Military Intelligence Augmentation Detachment.

I have twice submitted proposals for the creation of a recognition badge for linguists who meet or exceed the standard on the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT). In 1994, the proponent, the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, indicated there were already too many badges in the inventory. I feel that PERSCOM's attitude wholly excludes any prioritization of skill difficulty. The skills required for the Mechanics Badge do not even come close to those required to

acquire and maintain a foreign language. In September 1998, I again submitted my proposal, this time through the Office of the Chief of MI in the Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, but the latest word from OCMI is that there has been no progress.

The second initiative (for Reserve linguists) is the Military Intelligence Augmentation Detachment (MIAD), formerly known as the Military Intelligence Special Training Element (MISTE) Program. The MIAD, subordinate to the U.S. Army Reserve Command in Atlanta, Georgia, allows linguists (and other MI personnel) separating from active duty to join Reserve units that may be more than a reasonable commuting distance from their homes. The MIAD facilitates their training at alternate sites, language labs, sensitive compartmented information facilities (SCIFs), etc. This concept answers the authors' problem discussed under the subheading "Demographics."

## Lieutenant Colonel

**Carole R. Bishop**

412th Engineer Command  
Vicksburg, Mississippi

## To the Editor:

I read with interest the comments of Colonel Tarbet and LTC Steinke on the MI linguist fields. MI has not developed a realistic idea of how to use MI linguists. Therefore, we change language expectations too often and waste time on training of questionable return on investment to the field. I am a fairly talented linguist as well as language teacher, and it took me three years to reach 3/3 levels in German. If we want translators

and interpreters for the next Kosovo, we are doomed.

MI needs linguists because mastering a second language helps a soldier use translators and interpreters effectively. The extra payback from having the language match the current country is not worth the expense and time required.

We can recruit, train, and retain bilingual soldiers in ethnically diverse areas like California. Further, their language skills are usually very stable. If we require the DLPT to have questions and answers in the target languages, more soldiers who are bilingual will qualify. Testing personnel from Defense Language Institute (DLI) have already admitted in an open meeting that the DLPT is not valid for these bilinguals.

Making our linguist slots ZZ (language non-specific) would provide the stability we need to eliminate our retention problems without having to ignore swings in organizational demand. In the 223d MI Battalion, we felt forced to ignore a requirement for Azerbaijani, a language for which there is not even a DPLT. Sure enough, the language disappeared by our next MTOE (modified table of organization and equipment) iteration.

MI linguists should not be translators who are necessarily under MI's wing. Let us return our focus to why our MI soldiers should know other languages: so they can use translators effectively in the "surprise" languages we will face.

## Chief Warrant Officer Two

**John B. Gamber**  
Davis, California

#### To the Editor:

I have just finished reading the article "Linguists in the Army—Paradise Lost or Paradise Regained?" I am glad to see some high-ranking officers addressing this very serious issue for the MI Corps. The writers raise some valid points that need addressing, especially as they deal with retention. While proficiency pay may increase to provide an incentive for retention, I think we as leaders must also look at working conditions and—dare I use the phrase—"job satisfaction" as the crux of the retention problem.

As stated in the article, estimates for training a linguist range from \$80,000 to \$123,000. What corporation would spend so much money to attract and develop an asset, and not use that asset to its full potential? The Army does that in an almost shameless misuse of its linguists. Many of our first-term soldiers will complete their training and go to tactical units where they will spend more time on vehicle maintenance than on language maintenance. Trucks must roll, but a truck can be brought off the deadline report, or replaced, much more easily than a linguist can be brought up to proficiency. Speaking of proficiency, how many leaders have thought upon the arrival of a 3/3 linguist to the unit, "This soldier scores above the standard, so I don't have to worry about another soldier going to remedial language training, I can use this soldier for (name any

ash-and-trash tasking)"? Soldiers faced with these situations have been voting with their feet for years—why should they stay with an organization that does not allow them to use their skills routinely?

After six years of tactical assignments, I am now a Voice Interceptor, MOS (military occupational specialty) 98G, instructor. It is disheartening to know that less than one quarter of my students will be in the Army by the time I PCS three years from now.

More disheartening is the fact that I will not be training subordinates for those who have gone before, but replacements. As leaders, we must find a solution.

#### Staff Sergeant

**Robert Gutkowski**

B Company, 344th MI Battalion  
Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas

#### To the Editor:

I read with interest the article on the National Counterintelligence Community by MAJ Morris and Ms. Smith in the January-March 2000 issue of *MIPB*. I was pleased to see some of the units correctly aligned and that you dispelled some myths about who answers to whom.

I was very disappointed to see you leave off the human intelligence assets of the 300th MI Brigade (Army National Guard). The 141st, 142d, 223d, 260th, 341st, and 415th MI Battalions comprise a very large number of CI teams and other HUMINT assets. The 142d alone can

muster 12 CI teams and 17 HUMINT teams.

I might not be so disappointed if it weren't for the fact that we provide daily support to the 66th MI Group (U.S. Army Europe Analysis and Control Element) to support the Balkans and participate in CI team rotations to Macedonia. As I write this, a large CI contingent of the 141st is rotating home from exercises in Korea.

It seems like we always find ourselves out in the cold during reunions of the CI Community.

Thanks for the great article and I extend an invitation to any of you to come out to Utah and write the last column for this article.

#### Captain Michael Allison,

**UT ARNG**

Salt Lake City, Utah

#### Ms. Smith's Response:

We left out HUMINT because we were talking specifically about counterintelligence. Our intention with the article was to explain the national community, not to go into details about every CI element within it.

I suggest you consider writing an article yourself, detailing the work the 300th has done lately. Only someone with direct experience and knowledge can adequately cover that ground. Give it a shot—*MIPB* can always use good articles.

#### Regan K. Smith

Counterintelligence and  
Intelligence Oversight Policy  
Washington, D.C.

### MI Corps Hall of Fame Nominations

The Military Intelligence Corps accepts nominations throughout the year for the MI Hall of Fame (HOF). Commissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted soldiers, or civilians who have served in a U.S. Army intelligence unit or in an intelligence position with the U.S. Army are eligible for nomination. A nominee must have made a significant contribution to MI that reflects favorably on the MI Corps.

Fort Huachuca provides information on nomination procedures. If you wish to nominate someone, contact Mr. Jim Chambers, ATTN: ATZS-CDR (Hall of Fame), Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000, call commercial (520) 533-1178, DSN 821-1178, or via E-mail at [chambersj@huachuca-emh1.army.mil](mailto:chambersj@huachuca-emh1.army.mil).

# QUICK TIPS

## FOCUSED PIR

by Major Steven P. Winterfeld,  
USAR

Over the past year of training maneuver brigades, Team C at the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) has seen a trend of S2s writing unfocused priority intelligence requirements (PIR), which subsequently leads to an unfocused collection plan. PIR should support commanders' decision points (DPs) or confirm an enemy course of action (COA).

The PIR come from information requirements (IRs) and wargaming is the primary source for development of IRs. Maneuver brigades and battalions have limited collection assets and consequently cannot collect on every IR; for this reason, S2s must prioritize IRs. The S2 normally recommends IRs (usually one to three) to the commander for approval as PIR. Once approved, the PIR are the focus for developing named areas of interest (NAIs) and a collection asset develops information for each NAI. The NAIs can also link to DPs or targeted areas of interest (TAIs).

PIR are the key to focusing the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan. At both the brigade and battalion levels, there are limited collection assets to cover all the NAIs. S2s must focus their limited intelligence assets to collect sufficient battlefield information—allowing them to conduct predictive analysis so that their staffs can focus on future operations.

### Developing PIR

How many PIR should you have? One PIR is too many if it reads "where is the enemy?" There is no

magic number of PIR, but they must be specific if you want useful information. Generally, one to three PIR at a time are sufficient (see Figure 1); too many will cause your collection assets to become unfocused. As you answer one PIR, an IR can upgrade to become a PIR. If the operation is phased, the PIR should match each operational phase.

One technique to make PIR more specific is using the elements of a SALUTE (size, activity, location, uniform, time, and equipment) spot report to ensure that you have the necessary detail. This gives the collector enough detail to focus his asset. The more specific the PIR, the more likely it is that you will collect the information you need.

Each PIR must have an associated latest time information is of value (LTIOV), normally tied to the phases of the operation. The LTIOV triggers the S2 to update PIR during the battle and allows the collectors to know when to report the information in order to support the commander's decision-making. For example, the S2 must have the information on an obstacle at the

breach point no later than two hours before the lead company reaches it, to allow the commander time to react to the information. Some PIR may be continuous such as the location of the MRL (multiple rocket launcher) battery. Another technique some units employ (although not doctrinal) is to base the LTIOV on an event rather than a time. For example, an LTIOV time might pass when the forward security element (FSE) moves south of Phase Line Colorado.

### Bringing It Together

Here is an example of how a focused PIR would work. PIR 1: Will the 101st MRR (Motorized Rifle Regiment) make a strike along AA1 (avenue of approach) (NAI 1 vicinity BC123456) or AA1b (NAI 2 vicinity BC124457) LTIOV continuous? Later, the scouts watching NAI 1 send the S2 a spot report: "4 BMPs, 3 T-80 tanks, and 4 2S1 howitzers moving south at grid NB123456, time 0205." The S2 determines it is the FSE for the 101st MRR and predicts that the enemy's strike sector is along AA1—the most dangerous COA. The S3 notes that

#### Sample PIR for the Offense

1. What is the composition and disposition of obstacle vicinity NAI 71 (GH123654) LTIOV: 242300JAN00?
2. Will 14th Tank BN counterattack through NAI 2 (GH235986) LTIOV: 250200JAN00?
3. Is the MRL battery located vicinity NAI 14 (GH124983)? LTIOV: continuous.

#### Sample PIR for the Defense

1. Will 131st Tank Brigade FSE use AA1a vic NAI 3 (GH456654) LTIOV: 242400JAN00?
2. Will Light Tank battalion attack along AA1b vic NAI 4 (GH458765)? LTIOV: 222400JAN00?
3. Will MRL battery setup vic NAI 12 (GH234876)? LTIOV: continuous.

Figure 1. Sample PIR for the Offense and Defense.



is DP1 (the first decision point) and asks the commander if he wants to shift A and B companies to alternate battle positions in accordance with a contingency plan designed to react to this enemy COA.

## Conclusion

The essential factor of a good R&S plan is focused PIR. Each PIR must link to a DP, NAI, or TAI and answer the commander's most important

question or confirm an enemy COA. A good PIR is not easy to develop, but once written, it will help synchronize the collection plan.

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*Battalion S2, and Intelligence Observer/Trainer for the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). MAJ Winterfeld is graduate of Colorado State University with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Technical Journalism and a graduate of the U.S. Army Airborne and Ranger schools. In civilian life, he is a Simulations Project Engineer for the U.S. Army Intelligence Center. Readers may contact the author via E-mail at [winters@huachuca-simcenter.army.mil](mailto:winters@huachuca-simcenter.army.mil) and by telephone at (520) 458-9594 and DSN 821-9594.*

## Coming for Training at Fort Huachuca? Useful Contacts

**The Website for all USAIC courses is:**

**<http://huachuca-usaic.army.mil/SCHOOL/training.html>**

### **Officer Advance Course/Officer Transition Course/ACE Chief/G2 Course/PCC**

A Company, 304th MI Battalion

Website: <http://huachuca-usaic.army.mil/contlearning/304mi/a304th/a304.htm>

Telephone: (520) 533-6579 or DSN 821-6579

### **305th MI Battalion Courses**

Website: <http://huachuca-usaic.army.mil/SCHOOL/111MI/305th/305welcm.htm>

Telephone: (520) 533-7352 or DSN 821-7352

### **Noncommissioned Officer Academy**

Website: <http://huachuca-usaic.army.mil/SCHOOL/NCOA/atest.htm>

Telephone: (520) 533-4217 or DSN 821-4217

### **309th MI Battalion Courses**

Website: <http://huachuca-usaic.army.mil/SCHOOL/111MI/309TH/Welcome.htm>

Telephone: (520) 533-6833 or DSN 821-6833

## The 902d MI Group Needs Reservists for Training Opportunities

The 902d Military Intelligence Group and its subordinate units need highly motivated and physically fit MI soldiers from the Reserve Component (RC) to participate in a variety of training opportunities. Tours vary in length. A limited number of Individual and Drilling Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA/DIMA) and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) augmentation positions are also available. The Group's subordinate elements include the 308th and 310th MI Battalions and the Foreign Counterintelligence Activity.

The 902d is looking for RC noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in the grades of E5 through E8 with a military occupational specialty of 97B (Counterintelligence Agent) and RC warrant officers with a MOS of 351B (Counterintelligence Technician). The 902d MI Group's headquarters is at Fort Meade, Maryland; however, it has subordinate elements in various locations across the continental United States. These locations include Forts Monroe, Bragg, Gordon, Knox, Benning, Leonard Wood, Monmouth, Leavenworth, Bliss, Hood, Huachuca, Lewis, Campbell, Sill, Carson, Devens; Rock Island Arsenal, Redstone Arsenal, Detroit, Atlanta, Orlando, White Sands, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and Los Alamitos, California.

Interested personnel should contact Ms. Helen Flowers-Hayes, the 902d MI Group's Reserve Affairs Officer, at (301) 677-4301/3897 or DSN 923-4301/3897. Come join the MI soldiers in the 902d MI Group who are truly—the quiet professionals.

# SLY FOX

by Master Sergeant  
Kristine M. Sleighter

Again, the wheels of progress will effect change for the ASAS (All-Source Analysis System) Master Analyst Course (AMAC). Beginning with Class AMAC 01-01, scheduled for October 2000, we will no longer offer TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal II (TROJAN SPIRIT II or TS II) training. However, the Directorate of Continuous Learning New Systems Training Office will begin offering a TS II course in October 2000 (for more information, see their web site at <http://huachuca-dcd.army.mil/nsto>). This new program consists of two courses, an operator course (2 weeks, 3 days) and a maintenance course (1 week, 3 days). Organizations which possess TS II systems and require their Master Analysts to receive this training should take advantage of the operator course that focuses on operation and troubleshooting of the system.

Our current TS II training occurs during Block II, Communications, which covers three days of TS II and three days of Communications Support Processor (CSP) training. Advanced Analytical Techniques and an introduction to the Army Tactical Command and Control Systems (ATCCS) will replace the TS II portion of the course. We look forward to presenting these new topics and subjects of instruction.

Another change is in the nomination process. Due to administrative constraints, we now require that beginning with AMAC 01-01, submitted nomination packets are due not later than 30 days prior to course start. This provides the required

time to coordinate nominations with the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM), ensuring nominees' data reaches the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) in a timely manner. See our website at URL (uniform resource locator) 138.27.202.66 for more on the nomination process.


The advanced training environment and laboratory we have been working on in cooperation with CECOM (U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command) is near completion. The majority of the new equipment and workstations have been delivered and the room is configured to be "plug and play" ready. Our intent is for AMAC students to work in this laboratory for all training except ASAS-All Source (AS); the laboratory simply is not large enough to accommodate all the workstations required to conduct effective AS training. AS training will continue to take place in rooms specifically configured for AS, which accommodate one person per workstation on each enclave. The laboratory will also house the ASAS portion of the G2/ACE (Analysis and Control Element) Chief Course, providing an opportunity for these leaders to see first hand the learning environment their noncommissioned and warrant officers will experience during AMAC.

Finally, I encourage our MI leaders in the field to continue to nominate their finest talent to become Master Analysts. At the completion of AMAC 00-01 in December 1999, the Master Analyst Program has 30 soldiers active in the field but there are 74 authorized positions. Your continued support will raise the

number of qualified Master Analysts in the field.

We look forward to incorporating these new changes into our course and continuing to support the MI Corps! The courses for the remainder of calendar year 2000 are 6 March through 28 April, 10 July through 8 September, and 16 October through 12 December.

*Master Sergeant Kristine Sleighter is the Chief, ASAS Master Analyst Branch, in the Directorate of Continuous Learning. She has previously served as Chief, Intelligence Section, U.S. Army Europe Battlefield Coordination Element at Ramstein Airbase, Germany. She is a graduate of the ASAS Master Analyst Course and the Theater-Level Collection Manager and Intelligence Analyst Courses. She is in her third year studying for a Bachelor of Science degree in a Business/Information Systems Program. Readers can contact her via E-mail at [sleighterk@huachuca-emh1.army.mil](mailto:sleighterk@huachuca-emh1.army.mil) and by telephone at (520) 533-4652 or DSN 821-4652.*



*Sphinx located in the historic area of Fort Huachuca.*

Photo courtesy of Gregorio O. Figueroa.

# PROFESSIONAL READER

**Ally to Adversary: An Eyewitness Account of Iraq's Fall From Grace** by Rick Francona (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1999), 186 pages, \$27.95.

**Ally to Adversary** is clearly one of the best personal accounts of the Gulf War and long overdue. Unlike many recent publications, this book does not bury the readers in the war's technical minutia; rather, they have the rare opportunity to view the decision-making processes of both the Combined and Iraqi commands as seen through the eyes of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf's personal Arabic translator.

From the multiple perspectives of his military mission and as an author, then Major (MAJ) Francona was the right man for the right job. His earlier tours as an intelligence officer and defense attaché allowed him to meet many important Iraqi officers, lending a sense of personality not usually found in post-war summaries. Additionally, his writing style and strong personal feelings about the participants impart to the reader the full tragedy of the events that took place in the Persian Gulf between 1987 and 1991. Like others wearing his nation's uniform, he suffered the loss of friends and acquaintances associated with the events there and he leaves the reader with the same unique feeling of loss and outrage.

Upon his reassignment from Iraq, MAJ Francona served with the Defense Intelligence Agency where he was able to follow events as they unfolded. His background and experience provided rare insight into the workings of the Iraqi leadership and military regime, and with others he helped predict Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. With hostilities imminent, he became General Schwarzkopf's per-

sonal Arabic translator. This assignment placed him in the exceptional position of being present when and where General Schwarzkopf made most of the crucial decisions regarding the conduct of the war. His insights, many of which have never before appeared in print, provide military historians with a level of detail not previously available.

As an Army doctrine writer and former intelligence officer, I was initially reluctant to review this publication, believing that it just another rehash on the statistical and purely technical aspects of the operation. Those types of histories are now in plentiful supply, but because of variances in research and on-site experience, often provide contradictory information. **Ally to Adversary**, however, proved to be something else. While this reviewer found no reason to contradict its accuracy, what drew my attention were the many personal recollections that provided the inside story behind the events. These paint a far different and more human picture than that provided in official and press reports. In many ways **Ally to Adversary** brought back personal memories of my days of training Iranian pilots, serving as a military advisor to the South Vietnamese Air Force, and a career spent as an Army intelligence officer. This insight often allowed me to read between the lines and gain the full impact of the events that unfolded around then MAJ Francona. Put simply, the full impact of this publication best reaches those who have "been there" or in similar situations.

As in any narration, certain points stand out. Mr. Francona's revelation of the magnitude of loss suffered by both nations during the Iran-Iraq War was sobering. His discussion of Project Morning Star, Iraq's employment of the North Korean Koksan gun, became per-

sonal because of my analytical work on the Koksan gun. The same can be said for Project Babylon, Iraq's attempt to develop "super" long-firing 350- and 1000-millimeter guns.

While the press reports would have led one to believe that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait caught the U.S. Government and military forces unprepared, this is simply not the case. Mr. Francona reveals U.S. pre-war contingency planning, specifically OPLAN 1002 and Internal Look-90. Adding a more personal touch were his narration of problems associated with the arrival of U.S. military women in Saudi Arabia, restrictions on Christian religious services, and Moslem complaints about the celebration of Christmas. Other accounts focused on chemical and biological warfare, the impact of the "Jedi Knights" and "Black Hole" on the operation, problems caused by Jordan's pro-Iraq stand, the press, the importance of soil samples, and closer to home, Major General Charles W. Thomas's design of an effective battle damage assessment tool. [The "Jedi Knights" were a group of officers tasked with developing the offensive plan to liberate Kuwait...their plan became DESERT STORM. The "Black Hole" is a very secure room under the Royal Saudi Air Force headquarters building.]

In summary, the author of **Ally to Adversary** is an experienced intelligence officer and experienced intelligence professionals or serious military historians can best appreciate the book. I feel it is definitely required reading for anyone studying the subject and a must for any library with military holdings.

**Mr. Michael Ley**  
Fort Huachuca, Arizona

## Share Your Photographs

**MIPB** requests that our readers send photographs of MI operations, equipment, and exercises; we will use them to enhance your articles. All photographs should be copyright free. Please send a brief description of the action in the photograph, identify the people and equipment, and include the photographer's full name and rank, unit, and mailing address. The photos can be color or black-and-white, and they should be clear and in focus. Digital photos should be 300 dots-per-inch or better resolution. Provide a return mailing address and we will return the photos if so requested. Thank you!



## How to Submit an Article to *MIPB*

Select a relevant topic of interest to the military intelligence community. For example, it could be about current operations and exercises, equipment, TTP, or training. It could be historical, explain lessons learned, or it could be an essay-type thought-provoking piece. It could be a short "quick tip" on better use of equipment or personnel, or fast "work-arounds" for problems. Articles from the "hot spots" are always welcome. Seek to add to the professional knowledge of the MI Corps. Propose changes, describe a new theory to dispute an existing theory, explain how your unit has broken new ground, give helpful advice on a specific topic, or explain how a new piece of technology will change the way we operate.

Write an outline to organize your work and include a working title and headings. Plan to write 1000-2500 words (about 2-4 pages single-spaced text with normal margins, not counting graphics) and include graphics that enhance understanding of your topic. Quick tips should be 300-800 words. Put the "bottom line up front" and write clear, concise introduction and conclusion paragraphs. Follow proper rules of grammar. Consult **DA Pamphlet 600-67, Effective Writing for Army Leaders** or William A. McIntosh's **Guide to Effective Writing**.

When writing for *MIPB*, several stylistic pitfalls to avoid for a clearer, more forceful article are—

- **Maintain the active voice as much as possible.** Write, "The soldier performed the task" rather than "The task was performed."
- **Make your point.** Avoid writing about internal organization administration. If your topic is a new piece of technology, tell the readers why it is important, how it works better, and how it will affect them. Avoid lengthy descriptions of who approved the new system, quotations from senior leaders describing how good the system is, the reports your organization filed regarding the system, etc.
- **Use the fewest words to state your points.** Write "Leaders must emphasize training" rather than "It is imperative for Military Intelligence professional leaders to refocus their attention to training issues."

Please send the article via E-mail to [mipb@huachuca-emh1.army.mil](mailto:mipb@huachuca-emh1.army.mil) with a courtesy copy to [mcgovern@huachuca-emh1.army.mil](mailto:mcgovern@huachuca-emh1.army.mil) or mail it (with a soft copy on disk) to Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-CLM (MIPB), [expedited shipping: Bldg 61730, Room 102], Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. (Please do not use special document templates and attach the graphics separately). We can accept articles in Microsoft Office 97, Word 6.0, Word Perfect 6.0a, and ASCII and PowerPoint, Corel, and Adobe graphics.) Please include with your article:

- A cover letter with your work, home, and E-mail addresses and telephone numbers, stating your wish to have the article published. Please include your social security number (SSN) so that we can find you if you transfer, PCS, or ETS/retire before we publish your article; we will protect your SSN and make no other use of it. Also, indicate whether we may put your article on our Internet web site even if we do not publish it in the printed magazine.
- Pictures, graphics, and crests/logos with adequate descriptions. Try to find good "action" photos that illustrate your article; photos and other graphics really enliven an article. We need complete captions for the photos (the who, what, where, when, why, and how; the photographer credits; and include the author's name on photos). We can return photos if so requested—be sure to include an address to which you want the photos sent after we use them. We will gladly accept photos without articles too.
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# 1st Military Intelligence Battalion

*Teal blue and yellow denote the Air Reconnaissance Support Battalions. The annulet, symbolic of a camera lens, refers to the aerial-photograph interpretation mission in the unit's history. The wings allude to flight and the eye represents observation. The lightning flash alludes to the signal element in the unit's composition and the hand commemorates the unit's mission in support.*

The 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Exploitation (AE)) conducts aerial signals intelligence operations in support of the 205th MI Brigade and V Corps, and rapidly deploys tailored intelligence packages to support stability and conventional operations. The distinguished histories of its component companies include service in the Korean War, support during the Cuban missile crisis, and May 1965 operations in the Dominican Republic.

Constituted 14 December 1956, the 1st MI Battalion (AE) activated 1 February 1957 as the 1st Air Reconnaissance Support Battalion at Fort Polk, Louisiana. In March 1962 the Army reorganized and redesignated it as the 1st MI Battalion, Aerial Reconnaissance Support, Field Army. Following its redesignation, the battalion deployed to the Republic of Vietnam on 1 December 1965 where it remained in continuous combat service until 30 April 1972. Upon its return from Vietnam, the battalion deactivated until 1983, when it began a phased reactivation and officially reactivated 14 January 1984. Upon reactivation as the 1st MI Battalion, the Army attached it to VII Corps; on 16 June 1986, the 1st MI Battalion became V Corps' AE battalion.

Alpha Company, the aerial surveillance company, provides aerial reconnaissance and surveillance support using side-looking airborne radar (SLAR) and infrared (IR) photographic and visual means. Additionally, organic imagery interpreters exploit imagery resulting from the company's missions. Bravo Company, the aerial electronic warfare company, provides signals intelligence collection, analysis, processing, and reporting using the QUICKLOOK and Guardrail systems. With Guardrail, the Company provides combat information through ground communications terminals at corps, division, armored cavalry regiment, and separate brigade. Normally Bravo Company assets target emitters located beyond the range of ground based assets. The Headquarters, Headquarters and Service (HHS) Company provides command and control of assigned and attached elements. It also provides consolidated logistics support for the Battalion. This support consists of organizational maintenance and recovery support for battalion equipment, food service support for battalion personnel, communications and security support for the battalion, airfield services to support the Battalion's aircraft, and medical services support for the battalion.

In December 1995, the battalion deployed in support of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR as part of Task Force Eagle to Tazsar, Hungary, and began flying missions over Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina only three days after arriving in Hungary. The battalion remained fully deployed until December 1996, after which it reconfigured for split-based operations. From December 1996 until March 1999, a rotational one-third of the battalion forward-deployed in support of Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR, JOINT GUARD, and JOINT FORGE. In March 1999, the battalion deployed its operational elements to Italy in support of Operation ALLIED FORCE.

To date, the battalion has had elements continually deployed for more than 1500 days and has flown more than 3000 mission sorties (222 were combat mission sorties) supporting U.S. and Allied Forces in the Balkans. Because of the battalion's accomplishments while deployed, the Army Aviation Association of America has selected the 1st MI Battalion as the Fixed-Wing Unit of the Year for 1997, 1998, and 1999.



**EYES OF THE DEEP BATTLE!**

Commander  
U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca  
ATZS-CLM (12)  
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